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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CATHY F. CRAWFORD, SHERRY ) 
MORGAN, and DALE HANSEN, ) 
Petitioners, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
v. ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ) Case No. 930589-CA 
and the CAREER SERVICE REVIEW ) 
BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) Priority 14 
Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Career Service 
Review Board of the State of Utah. Jurisdiction in this matter 
is conferred upon this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 
(1993) . 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah Career 
Service Review Board (CSRB), an administrative agency of the 
State of Utah. Only Petitioner Morgan submitted a brief in this 
matter. Petitioner Crawford has dismissed her appeal and 
Petitioner Hansen has not filed a brief. This brief is in 
response to Ms. Morgan's brief. The use of the word Petitioner 
herein refers only to Ms. Morgan. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Respondents assert that the relevant issues on appeal are as 
follows: 
1. Whether it was error for the CSRB to conclude that 
"comparative merit" and "fair treatment" are terms that are used 
in the general context and lack the specificity to be self-
executing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The conclusion of the CSRB is a 
conclusion of law and is reviewed for correctness with no 
deference being given to the agency's conclusion. Savage 
Industries, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether it was unreasonable for the CSRB to find that 
Corrections could determine salary based only on experience 
rather than a combination of experience and education as 
requested by Petitioner. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where discretion is granted to the 
agency, the appellate court will give deference to the agency if 
the interpretation is reasonable and rational. Morton Int'l, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); King v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993); Holland v. 
Career Serv. Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable in this 
matter. The text of the provisions either appears in the text of 
the argument or in the Addendum to this brief: 
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STATUTES: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(6) (1993) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (1) (a) (1993) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406 (2) (b) (1993) 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: 
1. Utah Admin. Code R468-1-1 (1990) 
2. Utah Admin. Code R468-7-2 (1990) 
3. Utah Admin. Code R468-7-2(1) (1990) 
4. Utah Admin. Code R468-7-3(2) (1990) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Morgan, who had been an Adult Probation and 
Parole agent for many years, claimed that the hiring of a new 
agent at a salary higher than hers was an inequity and justified 
her receiving a pay raise. Petitioner's grievance was denied at 
all levels at Corrections. 
Petitioner, along with several other co-grievants, presented 
her case before a duly appointed hearing officer who ruled that 
the setting of salaries could be determined solely on the years 
of experience as had been done by the Department, and that there 
was no obligation on the part of Corrections to consider years of 
education when determining salary. 
Petitioner appealed the hearing officer's decision to the 
CSRB, where it was affirmed. From this decision, the Petitioner 
has appealed to this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The CSRB's decision dealt with more than just Petitioner and 
therefore it is important to segregate those facts which pertain 
only to Petitioner from the others. Petitioner has not contested 
any of the facts as set forth by the CSRB and has made no 
argument that any of the facts found by the CSRB are in error. 
Thus, the Court is referred to the CSRB's decision (Addendum L) 
for a recitation of its facts. Nonetheless, Respondents feel it 
important to emphasize some of the salient facts set forth in the 
record as they relate to this appeal. 
1. When Gary Deland became Executive Director of 
Corrections in 1985, he directed a shift in emphasis within the 
Department to what has been called an active "law enforcement 
mode" (R. 838, 871). This shift included emphasis on law 
enforcement techniques, training and procedures (R. 871). Jim 
Gillespie, Director of Field Operations for Corrections, which 
oversaw Adult Probation and Parole, testified that Corrections 
was in a law enforcement mode when he was hired by Deland (R. 
795). Every agent was required to be trained in law enforcement 
(R. 651-52). 
2. Corrections determined that police and law enforcement 
experience related directly to the type of work done in the 
Department (R. 662, 794, 848-49). 
3. For purposes of qualifying for an Adult Probation and 
Parole (agent) position, either certain education and/or directly 
related experience were accepted (R. 404, 655, 146-47). It was 
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not necessary to have any degree (R. 146-47, 378) as long as the 
applicant's directly related experience consisted of enough years 
as required by the Job Classification Specifications (R. 146-47). 
Education was only considered in determining whether an applicant 
met minimum qualifications for the position and was not 
considered in determining salary placement (R. 659, 727). 
4. After an employee met minimum qualifications for the 
agent position, the salary received was determined by the amount 
of directly related experience to the agent position a person had 
(R. 660). Education was not considered for purposes of 
determining salary (R. 659-60, 743, 829), nor was it added to 
directly related experience for determining salary (R. 744). 
Required education or 
experience to meet minimums was totally separate and apart from 
criteria used in determining salary placement (R. 659-60). 
5. After meeting minimum qualifications, directly related 
experience was independently assessed to determine salary (R. 
659-60) . Directly related experience consisted of any experience 
deemed directly related to the job, such as agent experience in 
another agency, police or law enforcement experience, counselor 
experience in a correctional setting, etc. (R. 661). 
6. Police experience was not the only type of experience 
credited as directly related (R. 661). For example, Co-grievants 
at the hearing level (Dale Hansen, Cathy Crawford, Karl Alberts, 
Gerald White, Patricia Dennis, Robyn Williams, Katherine Straten 
and Karl Bartell) were each given year for year credit for 
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directly related experience that was not police work. Some of 
these were counselors, prison guards or county jailers (R. 38-
41) . 
7. Scott Pepper (Pepper) was hired by Corrections on 
December 23, 1989 (R. 37). He had been a police officer with 
Murray City for approximately 16-1/2 years before moving to 
Corrections (R. 275). Jim Gillespie, Director of Field 
Operations, had worked with him, knew his work and requested that 
he apply for a position with Corrections (R. 800-03). Pepper was 
hired as an Agent 23 at $13.28 per hour, the mid-point of level 
23 (R. 37, 122). Pepper was hired at midpoint because of his 
many years of police experience (R. 670). Pepper had 17 years of 
directly related experience as determined by Corrections at the 
time of the Grievance (R. 122). 
8. When Pepper was hired, Abdul Baksh (Baksh), the Human 
Resource director for Corrections, reviewed Pepper's directly 
related experience to determine where he should be placed in the 
pay range (R. 660, 669-74, 678-80) . Baksh personally made 
comparisons of directly related experience and actual salaries of 
employee agents within the Department as compared to where Pepper 
was being placed to make sure he was consistent with current 
employees. His goal was to comply with DHRM rule and not create 
any internal inequities (R. 670-71, 678-80). 
9. Petitioner began her state work with the Division of 
Family Services of the then Department of Social Services in 1966 
(R. 38-41). This was not considered to be directly related to 
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agent work (R. 701-02). She transferred to the agent position in 
March 1973 (R. 38, 533). Morgan progressed from Agent 15 to 
Agent 23 while with Corrections before resigning in 1977 (R. 38, 
533). Morgan rehired with the State and transferred to an Agent 
21 position in 1981 and again was promoted to Agent 23 in 1982 
(R. 38, 534). She has been an Agent 23 since 1982 and was 
earning $13.34 at the time of the grievance (R. 49). Morgan had 
13 years 10 months directly related experience as determined by 
Corrections and as presented by Morgan in her own prepared 
exhibit (R. 38, 703). 
10. Not every agent position requires the same amount of 
law enforcement emphasis (R. 652-53). One end of the spectrum is 
almost pure police work; the other end of the spectrum is that 
which emphasizes counseling or social work functions (R. 653). 
All agents fit within the spectrum and are considered as much an 
agent at one end of the spectrum as at the other (R. 655). There 
are no barriers to transferring from one position to another 
within the spectrum (R. 655-57). Different positions within the 
spectrum of agent work simply provide for different types of 
agent work (R. 656). The percentage of time one spends in law 
enforcement functions depends on the assignment given (R. 793). 
Every agent does not do all jobs within the spectrum of agents 
(R. 833). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
General policy statements, such as "fairness," as relied 
upon by Petitioner are not self-executing but are implemented 
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through rules adopted by DHRM. Through "consistent" and "fair" 
application of those rules, the rights of an employee are 
protected. All State agencies have an obligation to consistently 
and fairly apply the rules to their employees. 
Petitioner's request for this Court to opine on general 
principles of "equity" and "fairness" is improperly before the 
Court. Rule 468 of the Utah Admin. Code addressed the issue 
contested by Petitioner. Through the rule, she had a full 
hearing on the issues argued. This Court should not speculate as 
to what right of appeal might exist if there were no rule and if 
the facts were different. 
Correction's application of the applicable rule and how that 
affected Petitioner is the issue before the Court. It was 
neither erroneous, arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable for 
Corrections to treat every employee in the same classification 
the same way in establishing salary levels by using the same 
criteria for each. Corrections is not required to adopt 
Petitioner's desire to have her education included in some "not-
before-used" formula just because she believes it would give her 
a larger salary. It is rational and appropriate to assess one's 
value to the organization by the directly related experience one 
brings to the organization. The rules give discretion to 
agencies to make that determination. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GENERAL POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT ACT ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING AND 
MUST BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH APPROPRIATE RULE. 
Corrections has never challenged the concept that it must 
follow rules established by DHRM, nor has Corrections argued that 
"merit principles," as found in broad policy statements cited by 
Petitioner, have no place in interpreting actions of agencies. 
Corrections does assert, however, and the CSRB has agreed, that 
general policy statements are not self-executing. Rules breathe 
life into policy statements and effectuate the policy. 
Petitioner makes repeated use of terms such as "equity," 
"fairness," "consistent," and derivatives thereof to emphasize 
her belief that she has the right to have this Court order her 
salary increased. Respondents disagree, however, that these 
policy statements supersede the very rules DHRM has promulgated 
to implement the policy enunciated by the Utah Legislature. The 
rules are the foundation for fairness and their consistent 
application assures "equity" and "fairness" in the system. 
This was the position of the Federal Circuit of the United 
States in the case Wilburn v. Department of Transp., 757 F.2d 260 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) . Wilburn claimed that a second reduction in 
force with the attendant refusal of the agency to appoint him to 
an open position was appealable. In discussing his right to 
appeal, the Court said: 
The agency must follow the reduction-in-force 
regulations. In order to reflect properly 
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the congressional concern for fairness, we 
strictly construe the regulation's limitation 
of agency discretion . . . . 
Accordingly, the linchpin of federal 
personnel management is fairness, i.e. 
employees who are similarly situated are 
entitled to similar treatment. The notion of 
fairness is implicit in the reduction-in-
force regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 351.201(b) 
reflects the congressional concern for 
fairness, limiting an agency's discretion in 
filling a vacancy during a reduction in 
force. 
Id. at 262 (citations omitted). 
The Court opined that fairness is found in the application 
of rules and that the entire concept of "fairness" is based on 
treating similarly situated employees "similarly." As will be 
shown in this brief, that is what Corrections did and the hearing 
officer and the CSRB found that action appropriate. 
Petitioner cites Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2 (1993) to 
emphasize her position. Subsection (6) states: "It is the 
policy of this state to ensure its employees opportunities for 
satisfying careers and fair treatment based on each employee's 
services." 
This or similar language is not unique to Utah. The Federal 
Government's equivalent to Utah's Personnel Management Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19-1 to -40 (1992) contains almost identical 
language. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) provides in part that "[a]11 
employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and 
equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management . . . 
.
w
 (Emphasis added.) The Federal Merit System Protection Board 
(MSPB), the Federal equivalent of Utah's CSRB, has interpreted 
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these policy statements in light of employee grievances and 
appeals. Its experience is helpful in understanding the CSRB's 
holding in this case. 
In Wells v. Harris, 1 MSPB 139, 1 M.S.P.R. 208 (1979) the 
MSPB held that merit system principles provide no independent 
basis for action by either the agency or an employee. Hence, the 
employee's argument that his removal violated various merit 
principles was held to confer no jurisdiction on the Board. This 
position was reaffirmed in Middleton v. Department of Justice, 23 
M.S.P.R. 223 (1984), aff'd. 776 F.2d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and 
Neal v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 46 M.S.P.R. 26 
(1990) . 
In Neal, t!he MSPB specifically stated that 
The merit systems principles are intended to 
furnish guidance to Federal agencies and do 
not constitute an independent basis for legal 
action . . . . Accordingly, the appellant's 
citation to merit systems principles does not 
establish a cause of action. 
Neal, 46 M.S.P.R. at 28 (citations omitted). 
The CSRB has taken the same position as the MSBP. In 
Thompson v. Department of Employment Sec, 5 CSRB 43 (1993) , the 
CSRB addressed how it viewed the statutory policy statements 
which included that cited by Petitioner. The CSRB stated at page 
20, "These, of course, are broad policy statements rather than 
explicit legal provisions." 
This position was more specifically focused in the decision 
appealed by Petitioner, Crawford, v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 5 
CSRB 45 (1993) at Conclusion of Law 1, page 13, as follows: 
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Those terms used in the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at Utah Code 
Annotated (1992 Supp.) § 67-19-2, under the 
heading "Policy of state," such as 
"comparative merit" (3), "fair treatment" 
(5) , and so forth are broad policy 
statements. As broad policy statements of 
intent and purpose, they provide both 
guidance and philosophic credence. However, 
as very general policy statements, they do 
not contain a precise measurable gauge for 
assessing alleged violations of such terms as 
"merit principles," "fairness" or "inequity." 
Because these terms are used in a very broad 
and general context, they lack the 
specificity necessary to be self-executing. 
The CSRB was concerned that the terms "fair treatment" and 
"comparative merit" were so broad that there was no real 
specificity as to how they were to be understood or used. 
Similar situations (although not in an employment setting) can be 
found in other jurisdictions. In People v. People, 349 P.2d 142 
(Colo. 1960), the Court was asked to determine whether the word 
"estate" was sufficiently explicit to give the court power to 
determine what "estates" would escheat to the school fund. The 
court stated: "Thus it is left to the legislature to determine 
the character and type of estates [that] will escheat to the 
sovereign. The word 'estates' is amenable to statutory 
definition." Id. at 146. 
In Jaramillo v. City of Albuquerque, 329 P.2d 626 (N.M. 
1958), the New Mexico Supreme Court was asked to enforce a 
provision declaring that eight hours constituted a work day. The 
court held that while, the provisions of the New Mexico 
Constitution established declarations of policy and principle, 
the provision was not self-executing and that "enabling 
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legislation" was necessary to implement the policy statements: 
"The answer is clear; the provisions do not set up rules or means 
by which the rights granted may be enforced." Id. at 628. 
This is consistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme 
Court in In re Montello Salt Co., 88 Utah 283, 53 P.2d 727 
(1936): 
Constitutional provisions are self executing 
when there is a manifest intention that they 
should go into immediate effect, and no 
ancillary legislation is necessary to the 
enjoyment of a right given, or the 
enforcement of a duty imposed. 
53 P.2d at 729. 
Even the policy statement of "equal pay for equal work" has 
been held to not be self-executing. Utah has a similar provision 
at Utah Code Ann., § 67-19-12(4) (b) (i) (1993) . As a broad policy 
statement, statutes (or in the present case, rules) are needed 
for meaning. In Gladstone v. Board of Educ, 267 N.Y.S. 444, 
446-7 (1966), the court stated: 
While section 115 of the Civil Service 
Law states that it is the "policy of the 
State to provide equal pay for equal work," 
the courts have repeatedly held that this 
merely enunciates a policy and confers no 
jurisdiction on a court to enforce such 
policy. 
Id. at 446 (emphasis in original). 
Policy statements, such as "equitable" and "fairness," found 
in the federal or Utah state systems, fall into this same 
category. Standing alone they create no enforceable rights, but 
are given effect through the enabling acts or "rules." In Utah's 
13 
case, these are adopted by DHRM through its rule-making powers to 
administer a statewide program. 
It is a violation of these rules or the application of the 
rules which then become the gauge of fairness, as was found by 
the federal court in Wilburn. Hence, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-
202(1) (a) (1993) provides that "violations of personnel rules" 
are grievable. Absent a violation of the enabling language or 
rules that implement the policy, no independent action can be 
taken on such broad principles or policy statements alone. Rules 
bring life to the policies and, as the CSRB said, the policies 
are not self-executing. 
Applications of rules to various circumstances establish 
fair and consistent treatment and equity among employees. Absent 
rules, there is no direction, consistency or fairness. Rules 
govern how situations are to be addressed. 
The CSRB has discussed "fairness" as a ground to sustain a 
grievance. Galleaos v. Office of Recovery Serv., 2 PRB 20 
(1986), involved an employee who claimed she had not been treated 
"fairly" in the assessment of her past experience. She requested 
the CSRB to order her promotion to a position for which she 
believed she was eligible. In rejecting her position, the CSRB 
stated: "It is not sufficient to assert that equity or fairness 
per se should supplant managerial discretion. Appellant, to 
prevail must show that rules have been breached and that such 
breaches caused her harm." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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The Court of Appeals of Louisiana addressed a similar issue 
in the case of Hollingsworth v. State Through Dep't of Pub. 
Safety, 354 So.2d 1058 (La.App. 1977) -1 In that case, an 
employee was being paid less than two less senior employees who 
had been promoted to his level and position. The Court rejected 
his argument that he was treated in a discriminatory manner 
because under the existing rules he received all pay adjustments 
to which he was entitled and the rules had been applied 
appropriately in his case. The court stated: 
However, such a variance comes about 
solely from the mechanics of the system, not 
from any discriminatory application or 
implementation of the pay plan. An imbalance 
can occur in any department, and pay 
discrepancies to a slight extent exist 
throughout the system. Such discrepancies 
are caused primarily by the provisions of the 
Civil Service pay rules and the way the pay 
plan is structured, and not from any internal 
administrative adjustments. 
Id. at 1059. 
The CSRB has articulated various reasons it acknowledges as 
justifying why differences in salary exist, even among employees 
with less experience than those more senior. In Patel v. 
Division of Envtl. Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the CSRB 
acknowledged that changing rules and their application, among 
other reasons, lead to differing salaries yet do not create a 
cause of action for relief. The CSRB stated: 
1
 It is important to point out, however, that Louisiana 
statutorily allowed appeals where the discriminatory application 
of that state's pay plan was alleged. 
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In prior decisions we have noted some of 
these distinctions and reasons for differing 
pay rates between employees due in part to 
the size of the State's work force, its 
turnover and hiring practices, its change in 
philosophies by different administrations and 
department executives, its rather persistent 
changing of personnel rules to adapt to 
changing conditions and exigencies, and for 
other germane reasons that need not be 
included herein. 
Id. at 11. 
Petitioner's citing of the case Jones v. Department of Pub. 
Safety, 4 CSRB 38 (1992) as authority that the CSRB itself has 
adopted the position that policy statements alone create a cause 
of action is misplaced. A careful reading of that decision 
(attached to Petitioner's Brief in the Appendix) establishes that 
it is not "fairness" per se which is the basis of the CSRB 
decision, but it is the "equal application of the rules and 
policies" of the department to the different individuals that was 
key. It is consistent application, Respondents contend, that is 
the heart of the issue in this case. 
This Court recently held in Holland v. Career Serv. Review 
Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993), that while agency discretion 
is reviewed under a reasonable and rational standard, the 
agencies do not have unfettered discretion -- they must follow 
the rules and procedures set forth. In Jones, the application of 
the rule differently to different employees was error and 
breached the general policy of "fairness." Had the rule been 
applied consistently among employees, then "fairness" would have 
been achieved. 
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The CSRB has affirmed that reading of Jones in Thompson, 
where the CSRB states: 
The same system was applied consistently to 
all ten candidates' application materials. 
This process offered a fair, competitive and 
uniform evaluation of the candidates' 
education and work related backgrounds. 
There was no showing of disparate treatment, 
or impropriety nor any illegal 
discrimination. The Board concludes that by 
applying the same standards, reasonable 
standards, that "fair treatment based upon 
the value of each employee's services" was 
applied as prescribed at § 67-19-2(b). 
Thompson, 5 CRSB 43 at 13. 
In conclusion, rules implement general policy statements. 
As long as the rules are applied consistently and "fairly" among 
employees affected by them, there is no violation and therefore 
no relief to which they would be entitled. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER WAS ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH A FULL 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BASED ON HER ALLEGATIONS 
THAT A RULE REQUIRING EQUITY IN HER SITUATION 
ALLOWED HER APPEAL. HER ARGUMENT THAT SOME 
GENERAL THEORY OF FAIRNESS IS APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
While it is true that Corrections filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Petitioner's case for lack of jurisdiction when she first 
appealed to the CSRB, she was allowed to proceed and did so 
through an evidentiary hearing. Corrections never appealed that 
ruling and it was not an issue before the CSRB or at oral 
argument before the CSRB. Petitioner is here arguing that she 
somehow has the right to have her matter heard before the CSRB, 
but that has already happened. 
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Even assuming that this Court is convinced that general 
arguments of "fairness" and "equity" give an independent cause of 
action to Petitioner, such an issue does not need to be addressed 
because the rule under which Petitioner was allowed to proceed 
specifically mentioned equity as a basis for her claim. 
Petitioner is asking this Court to "speculate" as to how it would 
decide a situation if no rule existed. Such speculation would be 
improper for this Court. 
Utah Admin. Code R468-7-3(2) was accepted by the hearing 
officer and the CSRB to establish jurisdiction for the grievance. 
As stated in Point I, policy is implemented through the rule and 
that rule forms the basis for measuring treatment of employees. 
The controlling wording of the rule at the time of the grievance 
was as follows: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the 
minimum of the approved range. However, 
agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. The department head is 
responsible for providing funding and for 
preventing inequities as determined by agency 
management. 
Utah Admin. Code R468-7-3.(2) (emphasis added). 
Corrections never contested the right to determine 
"inequities" under the rule. The rule was clear. "Inequities" 
was an appropriate subject matter for the hearing officer and 
CSRB. "Equity" and "fairness" are what the rule incorporates. 
The evidence needed under the rule would be the same without the 
rule. Petitioner's second argument adds nothing to what the rule 
already mandates. 
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All other arguments about "general" rights of the CSRB to 
hear such matters are both premature and not an issue in this 
appeal for they were never applicable to Petitioner. That issue 
is not properly before this Court and Corrections requests this 
Court to reject it. 
POINT III 
THE CSRB WAS CORRECT IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
DIRECTLY RELATED WORK EXPERIENCE COULD BE 
USED TO DETERMINE SALARY AND THAT NO 
VIOLATION OF RULE OR LAW HAD TAKEN PLACE. 
A. Petitioner was treated the same as every other 
person in her class. 
Petitioner has never contested the fact that the same 
criteria for establishing a salary level were applied to her as 
were applied to all other agents in her class, including Scott 
Pepper. She was treated the same as everyone else. The 
Department acted appropriately and applied the same standards to 
all. 
Petitioner wants this Court to impose different criteria on 
Corrections than it has been using for several years. Petitioner 
has presented no responsible argument or pointed to anything in 
the record to show that the procedure Corrections was using was 
arbitrary, capricious, or so unreasonable as to amount to an 
abuse of discretion. The bulletins and interpretive letters 
referred to by her do not mandate that Corrections assess salary 
criteria differently. In fact, the three experts to testify all 
declared that using directly related experience as the sole 
factor was appropriate. 
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Utah Admin. Code R468-1-1 (1990) specifically defines 
"class" as: 
A group of positions sufficiently similar in 
the duties performed, degree of supervision 
exercised or required, minimum requirements 
of training, experience, or skill and such 
other characteristics that the same class 
title and salary range and the same test 
standards may be applied to each position in 
the group. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Admin. Code R468-7-2 (1990) further states: 
Each class of positions shall be allocated 
to a salary range on the pay plan, except for 
executive positions which are allocated in 
statute. Other criteria will be applied for 
unique situations. 
7-2.(1) Each class shall be 
assigned a salary range which takes 
into consideration both the 
classification plan and market 
data. Market research shall be 
carried out by DHRM through 
comprehensive labor market surveys 
and surveys prompted by analysis of 
turnover, vacancy rates and 
recruitment indicators. 
The position related to this appeal is Probation and Parole 
Officer, Grade 23 (R. 146-47). Scott Pepper was hired as a Grade 
23 Agent (R. 37, 122) and placed at midpoint (R. 123-24, 671). 
Petitioner was already a Grade 23 Agent (R. 49). Both Pepper and 
Petitioner were in the same class and were within the same pay 
range. 
Utah Admin. Code R468-7-3.(2) answers the question of who 
has the right to set actual salary levels: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the 
minimum of the approved range. However, 
20 
agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. The department head is 
responsible for providing funding and for 
preventing inequities as determined by agency 
management. 
It is the Agency, not DHRM or the CSRB, that has authority 
to determine individual salary placement for new hires --at 
least up to midpoint of the salary range. Pepper was placed at 
midpoint, which was fully in compliance with that rule. 
Petitioner has never claimed that that portion of the rule has 
been violated. She simply has alleged that an inequity was 
created because Pepper was given credit for all his law 
enforcement background but that Corrections had not added her 
educational years to her years of directly related experience to 
arrive at a compensation figure. This, she contends, was 
"unfair." 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized the right of an 
agency to set salary from allocated funds in State Code Agencies 
v. Department of Pub. Inst., 364 N.W.2d 44 (Neb. 1985): 
Although the Legislature has appropriated 
funds generally for the departments and 
agencies of the state in the cases before us, 
the appropriations bill enacted by the 
Legislature does not specifically allocate 
sums as salaries or wages for particular jobs 
or positions of employment in those 
departments or agencies. Allocation of funds 
among employees as salaries or wages is a 
matter for discretion in administration of 
the department or agency. 
Id. at 4 6 (emphasis added). 
The appropriation acts of the Utah Legislature are replete 
with the exact analysis of the Nebraska Court: the Legislature 
21 
appropriates money, DHRM gives broad guidelines of how money is 
to be allocated to new hires, and then the agencies have the 
obligation to establish entry salaries so as to not create 
inequities with existing employees. Agencies have the right to 
assess their needs and implement a procedure for establishing 
salary under the rule cited as long as "inequities" are 
prevented. 
It is not the actual salary a person receives, but 
consistency of treatment within the class and among the agents 
within that class that is required. Differences in pay need only 
have justifiable reasons. 
In Municipal Assessors v. Barneqat Township, 619 A.2d 1042 
(1992), the Township was sued because the association of 
assessors had been given a smaller percentage raise than other 
employees. In ruling in favor of the assessors, the court ruled 
that the township had not shown "good cause" or a reasonable, 
justifiable reason to differentiate between the raises given to 
the different groups. id. at 1044. 
This issue of consistent treatment was addressed in Scime v. 
County Legislature of Erie County, 395 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1977) where 
the court said: "They need not be treated in identical fashion 
in all circumstances, but any significant difference or 
distinction must be founded upon grounds having fair and 
substantial relationship to the accomplishment of a valid state 
objective." Id. at 956. 
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The Iowa Supreme Court in Brightman v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of 
City of Pes Moines, 204 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1973) addressed the 
"equality of treatment" issue in a contested classification and 
compensation case. In holding that persons in different classes 
could be paid differently, the Court also noted: 
Only those in the same class have a right to 
be paid alike. . . . The object of the civil 
service classification is equality of 
treatment within a class, not between 
classes. 
Id. at 591. 
This position was adopted by the Indiana Court of Appeals in 
Arden & Coulter v. State Employees' Appeals Comm'n, 578 N.E.2d 
769 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1991). 
Abdul Baksh, the Human Resource Director for Corrections, 
testified that "directly related" work experience was the 
criterion used to determine placement at a salary level (R. 660). 
Educational background was not used for that purpose (R. 743). 
This was the process for all Agent 23 employees. Petitioner 
never presented any evidence to the contrary and concedes that 
her directly related work experience is less than Pepper's (R. 
533-35). She simply desires this Court to rule that it should 
adopt her theory of how to compensate employees because if it 
were done a different way than it had been for years, she might 
get some more money. It is not her right to choose which method 
to use for compensation. Her argument should be rejected. 
The CSRB stated in its Conclusion No. 14: 
Pepper's 17 years' directly related law 
enforcement experience reasonably justifies 
his higher pay rate of $13.81 over each of 
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the Appellants' lesser rates. Based upon 
Pepper's greater law enforcement service 
length, his higher pay rate of $13.28 upon 
entry to AP&P Agent service was neither 
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, nor an 
abuse of discretion. Moreover, the record 
evidence does not support any claim to a 
violation of either a personnel rule or a 
statutory provision. 
The CSRB held that there was a justifiable and reasonable 
reason for the difference -- Pepper's law enforcement experience, 
which was greater than Petitioner's. 
If the object of a civil service system is "equality of 
treatment within a class," Corrections has complied with that 
requirement. By rule, it had the right, authority and directive 
to set Pepper's salary "anywhere" up to midpoint. In applying 
the same criterion to Pepper as it had to every other agent in 
Petitioner's class - directly related experience - it prevented 
any inequity and complied with the specifics of the rule and the 
spirit of fairness in how it treated its employees. The CSRB 
found that approach reasonable and rational. Petitioner and 
Pepper were treated equally. 
B. The setting of a salary level is separate and 
apart from determining minimum qualifications. 
Petitioner confuses the issue of meeting minimum 
qualifications for a position with her belief that such 
qualifications should also be used to set salary. The two are 
separate and distinct and her confusion should not be allowed to 
overturn reasonable and rational policy for establishing salary. 
24 
Exhibit G-15 (Addendum C) is the official Class 
Specification for the Agent Grade 23 position held by both Pepper 
and Petitioner. It sets forth the following: (1) a description 
of the types of duties that one would perform in the position; 
(2) a section termed "KSA" or "Knowledge, Skills and Abilities" 
setting forth what one must be able to do or know to successfully 
handle the position; and (3) a section called "Education and 
Experience." 
This last section establishes minimum qualifications of 
education and/or experience that are necessary in order to 
qualify for the position. In this particular position, G-15 sets 
forth the following minimum qualifications: 
Bachelors degree with major study in social 
work, police science, sociology, psychology, 
counseling, corrections, or related fields, 
plus (3) years of full time paid professional 
employment in a related field, 
OR 
graduate study in social work, psychology, 
sociology, police science, counseling, or 
related field for the required employment, 
OR 
full-time paid professional related 
employment for the required college study. 
Any one of the three or combination of the three provisions 
above meets minimum requirements for the position. The meeting 
of the minimum requirements is only to determine whether one 
satisfies the requirements to become a Grade 23 Agent. If those 
requirements are not met, then one would not be qualified for and 
would not be allowed to be a Grade 23 Agent. 
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Petitioner met the qualifications because she had a 
Bachelor's degree in a related area as well as three years paid 
professional service (R. 49). On the other hand, Pepper also met 
minimum qualifications in that he had 16.5 years of paid 
professional experience as a police officer for Murray City (R. 
122, 275). Both employees were appropriately classified as Grade 
23. 
Richard McDonald, Compensation Bureau Director for DHRM and 
Petitioner's own expert witness, testified that "class 
specifications" are generic in nature (R. 378) to cover many 
possibilities. He testified that education was not even 
necessary to qualify a person for an agent position (R. 404). 
Further, he testified that directly related experience without 
any educational degrees could be the sole basis for meeting 
minimum requirements (R. 4 04). 
Education was simply one factor that could qualify a person 
for the position, but it had no bearing on salary. McDonald 
testified that an agency could give "more or less" credit for 
education as it chose (R. 402). 
Felix McGowan, Executive Director of DHRM and former 
Compensation Bureau Director for DHRM, an expert in his own 
right, testified that it was management's discretion to use or 
not use education to establish salary (R. 757). Baksh testified 
that education was only viewed to determine minimum 
qualifications and not to establish salary levels (R. 659-60) . 
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Meeting minimums through educational degrees had no bearing 
on the placement of salary. Meeting minimums and one's actual 
salary level in the Department of Corrections were and are two 
distinct matters. Petitioner's belief that somehow her 
qualifications should justify her getting a larger salary is 
neither justified by existing policy and practice, nor has she 
presented any justifiable reason why that should be the case. No 
other agent has had his/her salary established through the method 
she is propounding. Her contention should not be allowed to 
overturn valid and reasonable compensation policy. 
C. The difference in Petitioner's and Scott Pepper's 
directly related experience justifies the decision 
to provide a higher salary to Mr. Pepper. 
The CSRB stated at Conclusion of Law No. 28: 
The Department was not required by law 
(neither by statutory provision nor 
administrative rule), or by UDC's own 
policies and procedures, to credit equally 
years of educational experience along with 
directly related work experience for purposes 
of salary setting . . . . Appellants have 
failed to meet their burden of showing any 
direct, actionable, unreasonable, or 
unjustified inequity, including any personnel 
rule violation, even with timeliness 
questions aside. 
Contrary to the statements in Petitioner's brief, the 
hearing officer never used education as a factor in his decision. 
He did place educational comparisons in his Decision, yet held 
that Corrections didn't need to consider them since it was proper 
to use only directly related experience in setting salary. 
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McDonald testified that agencies can use experience alone to 
set salary (R. 382). Baksh testified that directly related 
experience was what was used to determine salary (R. 660). 
McGowan testified that using directly related experience is a 
"valid" reason to determine salary (R. 757). He stated that 
nothing requires an agency to factor education into the equation 
(R. 757) and nothing requires an agency to add education on to 
years of experience to come to a salary (R. 757). 
Baksh clarified that educational background was only used by 
Corrections in determining whether someone met minimum 
qualifications (R. 659) and that education was not used in 
determining salary (R. 659) and had no bearing on it (R. 743). 
The Department did not add educational years to years of 
experience for anyone in the agency (R. 744). McDonald further 
testified that an agency could give more or less credit for 
education (R. 402). McGowan testified that factoring in 
education was at the discretion of the agency (R. 757). McGowan 
further testified that the use of directly related experience as 
the driving force in setting salary did not need his approval and 
that consistency in application was the key (R. 757). 
Petitioner cites a DHRM Bulletin and a personal letter of 
the then DHRM director Earl Banner issued after the filing of her 
grievance and after the rule in question had been modified to 
establish that somehow she was improperly denied a pay raise. 
First, neither of the two items referred to by Petitioner 
constitute enforceable rules, but are interpretations and 
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guidance. Second, neither of the documents suggest that 
education must be included. They simply identify that in certain 
circumstances education may be used as a variable in determining 
whether employees are paid equitably. Third, variables have 
different values and nowhere in the documents cited is there any 
attempt to tell agencies what value to place on education versus 
experience or that one has more value to an agency than another. 
Fourth, the documents themselves identify numerous reasons why 
actual salary on the ranges may be different. 
Testimony of both McDonald and McGowan, two experts from 
DHRM, established that Petitioner's extremely "narrow" reading of 
the bulletin and letter are in error. Both, however, recognized 
that under certain circumstances and in different agencies, 
education could be given more weight and could have an effect on 
salary placement. That, however, was at the discretion of the 
individual agency. 
The method used by Corrections was a legitimate method and 
serves a legitimate state interest because of the type of agency 
it is. The Department of Corrections is a "police agency." Gary 
Deland, former Executive Director of the Department, insured that 
the emphasis within the department was that of law enforcement 
(R. 83 8, 871). This included law enforcement techniques, 
training and emphasis (R. 871). Every agent, whether a grade 23 
such as Petitioner and Pepper or lesser grades, was required to 
be trained in law enforcement (R. 651-52). Myron March, former 
Director of Field Operations both before and after Gary Deland 
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became Executive Director testified that law enforcement became a 
focus of the agency and training took place (R. 871). 
With this in mind, police work and other law enforcement and 
other directly related work became a key factor in determining 
where salaries were placed, particularly of employees being hired 
from outside the agency. 
Police experience was not the only type of experience given 
credit for determining salary placement. As noted in the 
Statement of Facts to this brief, several co-grievants of 
Petitioner received year for year credit for experience such as 
counselors, prison guards, workers in correctional settings, and 
county jailers, as well as experience in other similar agencies. 
When Pepper was hired, Baksh reviewed his directly related 
experience to determine where he should be placed on the pay 
range (R. 660, 669-74, 678-80). He made comparisons of 
experience of agents within Corrections to insure proper 
placement pursuant to the rule (R. 670-71, 678-80). Directly 
related experience has been for years the only factor in 
determining placement of salary of agency positions (R. 660). 
Education was not used to determine anyone's salary, only to 
determine minimum qualifications (R. 659). 
Petitioner had, by her own admission, 13 years 10 months 
directly related experience at the time of the grievance (R. 221, 
343-37). Scott Pepper had 17 years directly related experience 
at the time of the Grievance (R. 122, 275). Petitioner was paid 
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$13.34 per hour and Pepper was receiving $13.81 per hour or a 
difference of $.47 since per hour. 
When Pepper applied, Baksh looked at his experience as a 
police officer and determined that it was directly related 
experience (R. 670-71). He took a sample of other agents and 
determined through that personal comparison of directly related 
experience, placing Pepper at midpoint of the range was proper 
(R. 671). Baksh stated that from his analysis, Pepper's 
placement at midpoint did not impact others (R. 671). 
In law enforcement, it is those who have the experience in 
the field who are most beneficial to the agency. Whether one has 
a degree in a related field and the other doesn't is not as 
critical when it comes to performing the job. 
The policy statement cited by Petitioner and found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19-2(6) (1993), is most applicable: "It is the 
policy of this state to ensure its employees opportunities for 
satisfying careers and fair treatment based on the value of each 
employee's services." 
It is the directly related experience which offers a 
significant merit factor as to placement of salary. In 
Corrections, one's value comes from the experience and background 
of those serving in related positions. In an educational 
setting, a combination of educational training and experience 
could perhaps justify differences in salary. However, 
Corrections has determined that it is the experience in the field 
that brings value to the organization. This is neither 
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arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable. The hearing officer and 
the CSRB both held this to be a reasonable approach to take. 
Petitioner wants this Court to overturn that rational and 
reasonable approach of administering the Department's mission as 
well as its compensation and personnel system because she 
believes she should have year for year credit for her education. 
Corrections asserts that at no place in the transcript or record, 
or even in her brief before this Court is there any evidence or 
testimony that the additional educational credit adds anything to 
the "value" of Petitioner to the agency. 
It is Petitioner's obligation to prove that the criteria 
relied on by Corrections to determine differences in salary were 
either unreasonable or arbitrary. Different departments may do 
it differently. That is not counter to merit principles because 
different departments have different needs. The key, under the 
rule, is consistency in treatment of employees with the policies 
and determinations made. That determination was never contested 
by Petitioner. She simply would have liked Corrections to choose 
her method instead of the one Corrections had used for years. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Murphy v. Grand 
County, 1 Utah 2d 412, 268 P.2d 677, 680 (1954): 
The determination of what is a reasonable 
compensation for a particular service 
rendered by a public officer rests in the 
discretion of a public board and the court 
will not revise its action in the absence of 
clear evidence of such manifest abuse of 
power as to show that the board failed to 
exercise a legal discretion. 
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While Murphy is different in circumstances, the concept is 
certainly applicable. It is within the discretion of the agency 
to establish the salary of individuals within its jurisdiction 
pursuant to the rules and provisions discussed above. Absent a 
showing that that discretion was abused or that there was no 
reasonable basis upon which the Department and the CSRB acted in 
sustaining the decision, the Petitioner's plea to this Court must 
fail. 
D. The use of directly related experience to 
determine salary placement to the exclusion of 
educational degrees is appropriate and is not 
counter to merit principles. 
Petitioner cites Thoreson v. Department of State Civil 
Serv., 433 So.2d 184 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983), as support for her 
proposition that this Court has the right to order a salary 
adjustment placing her equivalent to or ahead of Pepper in 
salary. She misreads the case. The court held that two separate 
classes were really the "same" class because the educational and 
experience requirements (minimum qualifications) were the same 
and the positions required the same duties to be performed. 
Therefore, the court reasoned, the two "classes" should be on the 
same pay range. Id. at 195. Thoreson does not stand for the 
proposition that the pay level of every employee be the same 
regardless of differentiating factors. Whether one employee 
should be paid X dollars and another employee Y dollars was never 
addressed. On the other hand, Petitioner and Pepper are on the 
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same pay range already and have been since Pepper was hired. In 
essence, the Thoreson concern is inapplicable to this case. 
Relative to issues this Court must address, the Louisiana 
court clarified the Thoreson holding in Laytona v. Department of 
State Civil Serv., 492 So.2d 27 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986), in which 
it acknowledged that differing educational or professional 
qualifications served a valid governmental purpose in 
differentiating between classes of similar responsibility through 
varying salary grade levels. In essence, education can be used 
as a differentiating feature to establish a separate "class," 
which could then be treated differently as far as pay range is 
concerned. .Id. at 30. 
As noted above, however, for the Grade 23 Agent position, 
education is not a unique factor to meet qualifications of the 
position. Therefore, individuals with myriad backgrounds can all 
qualify for inclusion in the class. 
Those few courts that have addressed the issue of setting 
salary have recognized that the issue of using education as a 
factor to determine salary is suspect, but that using directly 
related experience is not only a merit relative factor, but is 
the essence of pay equity. 
In Gandv v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 498 So.2d 765, 769 
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1986), appellants alleged that they had not been 
given credit for relevant experience in the setting of their 
salaries and that this was discriminatory to them and others who 
were paid more for the same job. While the issue before the 
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court was one of jurisdiction the court recognized the veracity 
of their argument and ordered the Commission to hear the appeal. 
The court stated: 
They contend that non-merit factors were used 
in computing their pay rates. Use of non-
merit factors is discriminatory according to 
Rule 1.14.1. . . . These appeals raise a 
question that goes to the heart of any civil 
service system: were the pay rates set for 
all workers based uniformly on merit, on 
relevant, job-related service, as the Civil 
Service rules require? 
Id. at 769. The court reasoned that the Commission had a special 
expertise in public sector employment matters to determine the 
issue. 
In Ramirez v. Department of Social Serv., 603 So.2d 795 
(1992), the Louisiana court again dealt with the issue and 
questioned whether "education" was even a "merit" factor since 
substitutions for minimum qualifications which did not require 
education was permitted to qualify for a position in question. 
In that case, employees were again attempting to appeal to the 
Commission and the argument centered around whether they had that 
right. The Plaintiffs alleged that employees within the same 
classification who had Master's degrees were paid more than they 
and this was a non-merit factor and therefore discriminatory. In 
holding that the employees had alleged a proper ground for appeal 
to the Commission, the Court said: 
We question the Commission's implicit premise 
that education attainment is in all cases a 
merit factor consideration, especially where, 
as here, various substitutions are allowed in 
each class to satisfy the stated minimum 
qualifications; substitution options 
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allegedly waived the need for a master's 
degree; and where the advantaged and 
disadvantaged employees allegedly perform 
identical tasks. 
Id. at 800. 
As in Petitioner's case, substitutions were permitted to 
meet the minimum qualifications for the job. That is a "non-
merit" factor as far as salary is concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter is governed by rule and whether the Corrections 
and the CSRB had a reasonable and rational basis upon which it 
acted and applied the rule. Equity does not mean exactness under 
all circumstances. The issue is one of whether Petitioner and 
Pepper were treated "fairly" by applying the same valid criteria 
for determinations of salary placement. 
Petitioner asks this Court to order Corrections to include 
education as a factor in determining salary placement. She has 
presented no authority for this request. There has been no 
showing that Corrections erred or abused its discretion in 
choosing the uniform method of applying directly related 
experience to establish an individual's salary with the agency. 
The burden was not only on Petitioner at the hearing level, 
but also before the CSRB and before this Court. She has failed. 
Corrections and the CSRB were correct in their holding that the 
criteria used were reasonable and rational and that Petitioner 
had failed to meet her burden to prevail. 
36 
Therefore, Respondents urge this Court to sustain the 
decision of the CSRB and reject Petitioner's arguments. 
DATED this _£?^~day of March, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
U t a h Code A n n . § 6 7 - 1 9 - 2 (1993) 
67-19-1 s i i E • ::: if i i DEI i: s AND EMPLOYEES 876 
6' Appointments to Schedule B positions 
— Examinations — Certification on 
appropriate registers — Probation-
• ary sei vice — Dismissal. 
6'. i.-i . Reappointment of employees not i e 
tained in exempt position. 
6r *" • *- Dismissals and demotions — Grounds 
— Disciplinary action — Procedure 
— Reductions in force. 
67 19 1H. Political activity of employees — 
Rules and regulations — Highway 
patrol — Hatch Act. 
67-19-20 u i 67-19-25. Repealed. 
67-19-26 Severability of provisions — Compli-
ance with requirements for feder-
ally aided programs. 
6 Leave of absence with pay for disabled 
employees covered under other civil 
service systems. 
67-19-28. Repealed. 
67-19-29. Violation a misdemeanor. 
67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction. 
67-19-31. Classification or position schedule as-
signment grievances — Procedure. 
67-19-32. Discriminatory/prohibited employ-
ment practices grievances — Proce-
dures. 
67-19-33. Controlled substances and alcohol use 
prohibited. 
67-19-34. Rulemaking power to executive direc-
tor. 
67-19-35. Reporting of convictions under federal 
and state drug laws. 
67-19-36. Drug testing of state employees. 
67-19-37. Discipline of employees. 
67-19-38. Violations and penalties. 
67-19-39. Exemptions. 
67-19-40. State benefits for servicemembers ac-
tivated due to Operation Desert 
Shield and Operation Desert Storm. 
87.19.1. short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Utah State Personnel Management Act." 1979 
67-19-2. Policy of state. 
(1) It is the policy of this state tha t the governor be 
responsible for the administration of the personnel 
system and that the governor direct the system in a 
manner tha t will provide for the effective implemen-
tation of the policies and programs under the gover-
nor's direction. 
(2) It is the policy of this state tha t the Utah s tate 
personnel system be administered on behalf of the 
governor by a strong central personnel agency. Any 
delegation of personnel functions should be according 
to standards and guidelines determined by the cen-
tral personnel agency and should be carefully 
monitored by it. 
(3) It is the policy of this state tha t comparative 
merit or achievement govern the selection and ad-
vancement of employees in Utah state government 
and tha t employees be rewarded for performance in a 
manner tha t will encourage excellence and 
strengthen the system. 
(4) It is the policy of this state to provide for equal 
employment opportunity by ensuring tha t all person-
nel actions including hire, tenure or term, and condi-
tion or privilege of employment be based on the abil-
ity to perform the duties and responsibilities assigned 
to a particular position without regard to age, race, 
creed 01 religion, color, handicap, sex, national origin, 
ancestry or political affiliation. 
(5) It is the policy of this state, if there are substan-
tial disparities between the proportions of members of 
racial, ethnic, gender or handicap groups in state em-
ployment and the proportions of such groups in the 
labor force in this state, to take affirmative action to 
ensure tha t members of the groups have the opportu 
nity to apply and be considered for available positions 
in state government. 
(6) It is the policy of this state to ensure its em 
ployees. opportunities for satisfying careers and fail 
t reatment based on the value of each employee's ser-
vices. 
(7) It is the policy of this state to provide a formal 
procedure for processing the appeals and grievance 
of state employees without discrimination, coercio: , 
restraint or reprisal. ,t! 1 
67-19-3. Defini t ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means an> depai tment 0:1 111 li t of 
Utah state government 1 ith am ithority to employ 
personnel. 
(2) "Career .service*' means positions under 
schedule B as defined in Section 67-19-15. 
(3.) "Career service employee" means an em-
ployee who has successfully completed a proba-
tionary period of service in a position covered by 
the career service. 
(4) "Career service status" means status 
granted to employees who success! ully complete 
probationary 'periods for competitive career ser-
vice positions. 
(5) "Classified service" means those positions 
subject to the classification and compensation 
provisions of Section 67-19-12. 
(6) "Committee" means the Human Resources 
Advisory Committee created by this chapter. 
(7) "Controlled substance" means controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(8) "Department" means the Department of 
Human Resource Management. 
(9) "Employee" means any individual in a paid 
s tatus covered by the career service or classified 
service provisions of this chapter. 
(10) "Examining instruments" means written 
or other types of proficiency tests. 
(11) "Executive director," except where other-
wise specified, means the executive director of 
the department. 
(12) "Probationary employee" means an em-
ployee serving a probationary period in a career 
service position but who does not have career ser-
vice status. 
(13) "Probationary period" means tha t period 
of t ime determined by the department tha t an 
employee serves in a career service position as 
part of the hiring process before career service 
s ta tus is granted to the employee. 
(14) "Probationary s ta tus" means the status of 
an employee between the employee's hiring and 
the granting of career service status. 1991 
67-19-4. Discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices. 
The state of Utah, its officers and employees shall 
be governed by the provisions of Section 34-35-6 of 
the Utah Antidiscrimination Act concerning discrim-
inatory or unfair employment practices. 1979 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Admin. Code R 468-7-2 and 3 (1990) 
£468-7 Compensation 
K468-7-1 Pay Plan 
DHRM shall develop or modify one or more State pay plans designed to 
compensate each position for that incumbent's services. The Executive 
Director, DHRM, may authorize special exceptions to provisions of this rule 
when permitted by law and when justified compelling individual and agency 
circumstances. 
1468-7-2 Allocation to the Pay Plan 
Each class of positions shall be allocated to a salary range on the pay 
plan, except for executive positions which are allocated in statute. Other 
criteria will be applied for unique situations. 
7-2.(1) Each class shall be assigned a salary range which takes into 
consideration both the classification plan and market data. 
Market research shall be carried out by DHRM through 
comprehensive labor market surveys and surveys prompted by 
analysis of turnover, vacancy rates and recruitment indicators. 
K468-7-3 Appointments 
7-3.(1) All appointments shall be made within the salary range approved 
by DHRM for a specific position. Salary offers made without 
prior approval that are not consistent with the state's pay plan 
and policies shall not be honored. 
7-3.(2) Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to midpoint of the approved range. The 
department head is responsible for providing funding and for 
preventing inequities as determined by agency management. 
7-3.(3) Partners sharing a job-shared position may be assigned different 
salary ranges within the same class series for that position 
based upon fair employment practices. 
E468-7-4 Salary 
7-4.(1) Merit increases 
(l)(a) Full time non-probationary employees and regular part-time 
employees who work 50% time or more per week shall be eligible 
for a merit increase according to merit percentage increase 
guidelines adopted effective July 1 of each year. 
(l)(b) Regular part-time probationary employees who work 50% time or 
more per week shall be eligible for a merit increase based on 
the full-time equivalent. 
ADDENDUM C 
Class Specification, Agent 23 (Exhibit G-15) 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
APPROVED CLASS SPECIFICATION 
CLASS TITL£; ' 
PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER 
SALARY RANGE; £> 1 CLASS CODE: 9064 
OVERTIME CODE; N J ££Q CODE: 2 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 9-9-88 | PRQBMTIONARY PERIOD: 12 
PURPOSE/DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: 
The incumDent in this class performs complex and specialized pronation and parole 
officer duties in either Adult or Juvenile correction settings; may conduct family, 
individual and group conuseiing. Incumoents may also supervise subordinate personnel. 
EXAMPLES OF WORK 
(These are intended as general illustrations of the work 
all Inclusive for specific positions). 
DUTY! 
NO.I DESCRIPTION 
in this class and are not 
1. Performs the most difficult and specialized probation and parole officer 
outies; conducts anc prepares very difficult investigations and reports which 
are used oy the state's courts in determining the disposition of complex 
criminal cases. 
2. Counsels probationers and parolees to achieve maximum rehabilitation and social 
adjustments. 
3. Conducts interviews and home visits with clients and family memoers to 
Determine and identify proolem areas. 
4. Maintains case records on probationers and parolees reflecting their treatment 
plan progress ana acnievement. 
5. Develops employment opportunities for probationers and parolees. 
6. Secures the cooperation of various business, law enforcement, religious, 
meoical, education, and socils welfare agencies to nisure that a comprehansive 
xenabilitation program is effected. 
7. Apprehends, processes and transports probation ana parole violators. 
8. Participates in special studies or surveys. 
9. Must satisfactorily compelte in-service training annually according to agency 
stanoaros and policies. 
10. Performs other related duties as assigned. 
LASS CLPS: 9064 
EXA^LES OF WORK 1 
DUTY] " — | 
NO.l DESCRIPTION | 
QUALIFICATION SlAlbfeNTS 
KNOWLEDGES, SKILLS AND ABILJYlES; ~ ~ 
Knowledge of: 
Social case work principles, methods and techniques; principles, methods and 
techniques of effective supervision personnel practices; the organizations, functions, 
relationships ana practices of organizations having relation to this field of work; 
effective interviewing principles, metnoos and tecnniques. 
Ability to: 
Apply effectively general principles to specific conditions; communicate effectively 
in both oral and written form, follow written procedures and instructions. 
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE: 
Bachelor's aegree with major study in social work, police science, sociology, 
psychology, counseling, corrections, or related fielos, plus three (3) years of full-
time paia professional employment in a related field, OR graouate study in social 
work, psychology, sociology, police science, counseling, or related field for the 
requireo employment, OR full-time paid professional relatea employment for the 
required college study. 
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS/REQUIREMENTS: 
WORKING CONDITIONS: 
PREPARED ON 9-9-88 BY 
DATE ANALYST 
Specific Example of Work: 
a. Adult Corrections: Performs investigative services for District Courts, Justice 
of tne Peace Courts ana Board of Pardons; supervises aault criminal offenders 
placed on probation by the court and/or released on parole by the Board of 
Paroons. Require satisfactory completion of P.O.S.T. training requirements for 
Category II correctional pleace officers. 
fa. Youth Corrections: Performs investigative services for the Juvenile Court 
and/or secure confinement facilities for delinquents; supervises delinquents 
committed to Youth Corrections oy the Juvenile Court for treatment in the 
community and/or delinquents released on* parole from a secure confinement 
facility. In exigent circumstances, at tne direction of tne Regional 
Administrator, may be requireo to perform snift work in secure or non-secure 
state operateo Youth corrections programs. Must be aole to interpret 
psychological test reports and meaningfully incorporate such information in 
comprehensive treatment plans, may be required to interpret and utilize complex 
statistical research ana management information to develop programs; supervise 
specializeo caseload requiring unique and specfic treatment approacnes; 
represents the agency with the public ariarge, legislature, etc., as to agency 
program, goals, policies, etc. 
ADDENDUM D 
Crawford, et al., v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 
5 CSRB 45 (1993) 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
CATHY CRAWFORD, et al., 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency. 
DECISION AND FINAL 
AGENCY ACTION 
Case Nos. 5 CSRB 45 (Step 6) 
8 CSRB/H.0.119 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level 
review of the above-captioned case on June 17,1993. The following Board Members heard 
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, 
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L Trujillo. Cathy Crawford, Dale Hansen and 
Sherry Morgan (Appellants) are a remnant group of three employees who have jointly 
appealed a Step 5 Decision, which originally included 20 employees. Phillip W. Dyer, 
Attorney at Law, represented Appellants on behalf of the Utah Public Employees' 
Association (UPEA). Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman represented the 
Utah Department of Corrections (Department and UDC). A certified court reporter made 
a verbatim record of this proceeding, consisting mainly of oral argument before the Board, 
which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.) 
This case proceeded properly through the Stated grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumed jurisdiction over this appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the codified Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407, and -408, as well as 
constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the UtaJi Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). All the UAPAfs formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRBfs 
proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. The Board entered into an executive session for 
deliberation and decision-making, but did not conclude its deliberations until August 12, 
1993, when the Board closed the case record and made an ultimate decision. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During July 1990, 20 UDC employees filed individual grievances that were 
consolidated into one group grievance at Step 5 pursuant to §67-19a-401(7)(a) and R140-1-1 
Definition, ('Consolidation11), Utah Administrative Code (1990 Supp.). The CSRB 
designated this case as Cathy Crawford, et aL, v. Utali Department of Corrections 
('Crawford'1). UPEA represented all aggrieved employees in the Crawford case in contrast 
to the companion case of Michael Hansen, et aL, v. Utafi Department of Corrections 
('Hansen'), in which the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), Local 1009, provided counsel for a smaller group of eight aggrieved employees. 
Both the Crawford and Hansen cases involved allegations of pay equity complaints by 
aggrieved employees who claimed greater years of service and related job experience 
compared with certain more recently hired UDC employees. The Departmentf s Field 
Operations Division employed all Grievants in both group grievances as Adult Probation 
and Parole Agents (AP&P Agents) at the time these grievances were filed. The same CSRB 
hearing officer heard and ruled upon both the Hansen and Crawford cases. Consequently, 
the Board » s examiner made common references between both cases during their procedural 
processing, as well as during the actual Step 5 evidentiary hearings of both cases, as did each 
party's counsel. 
Initially, both group grievances had been combined for a joint hearing under 
R140-1-1, Definition ("Joint Hearing"). However, as case management of both the 
Crawford and Hansen group grievances became unworkable on a consolidated basis due to 
certain recognizable distinctions, the CSRB administrator separated the cases effective 
March 8,1991. 
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Almost three years have elapsed between the time Grievants filed their statements 
of grievance and the presentation of oral argument at Step 6 before this Board in the 
Crawford case. The three Appellants deserve a brief explanation for this long processing 
period. 
Grievants filed their statements of grievance during July 1990, with the CSRB 
hearing officer^ Step 5 or evidentiary decision being issued two years later. During this 
24-month period, the first appointed CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference, issued a Prehearing Conference Order, then upon a party's request, recused 
himself based upon good cause. The second CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference to sort out the issues, dealt with several motions to dismiss, received several 
other motions on which he made rulings, requested written briefing on specific legal issues, 
and entered a few interim orders (in both cases). The Step 5 hearing was noticed up with 
four separate dates, along with an additional half-dozen continuances being requested and 
issued. After Appellants Crawford, Hansen1 and Morgan appealed the Crawford Step 5 
Decision, nearly three months passed before the evidentiary proceedingsf transcript became 
available to the parties. Upon access to the Step 5 proceedings • transcript volumes, 
Grievants1 counsel requested and received four separate month-long extensions for 
submitting his brief. Next, Agency• s counsel requested and received a single month-long 
extension. Overall, more than eight months elapsed between requesting the Step 5 
proceedings • transcript and the filing of both parties • Step 6 appeal briefs. 
As only three of the twenty original aggrieved employees participating in the 
Crawford grievance case have perfected an appeal to Step 6 (Appellants Cathy Crawford, 
Dale E. Hansen and "berry Morgan), this Step 6 Decision is applicable only to Appellants • 
particular appeal. Thus, this decision is not directed to nor intended for any other former 
Crawford case participants. 
ISSUES 
A, Issues Adjudicated at Step 5 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing as the 
proper issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Are the grievants entitled to prevail on their respective 
salaiy grievances? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
During the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings held on June 18 and July 22-23,1992, the 
CSRB hearing officer dismissed the individual cases of 9 of the 20 aggrieved employees • 
cases. Next, after conducting the de novo evidentiary hearing during which all testimonial 
and documentary evidence were received into the record, the CSRB trier of fact reached 
an ultimate conclusion that denied all 11 remaining Grievants their requested remedy and 
relief. 
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6 
Appellants1 Brief asserts that the CSRB hearing officer fs Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Step 5 Decision) is an inadequate legal decision. 
Appellants have characterized their confusion over the Step 5 Decision in the following 
passages: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue this case on appeal for 
one very simple reason, to-wit: The Hearing Officer has not 
made specific, detailed findings of fact which can be pointedly 
addressed, refuted or supported. Instead, the Hearing Officer 
has labeled his rather rambling discussion as being Findings of 
Fact when, in fact, many of his findings are conclusions of law 
. . . [Example omitted.] Grievants are thus prohibited from 
pointing out facts that support or refute the conclusions because 
no finding exists to support the conclusions . . . . 
It is thus Grievantsf initial position that the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer has failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
so as to permit this Tribunal to effectively review his analysis 
and decision (Brief, pp. 1-2). 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision is ambiguous in its factual findings and legal 
conclusions, and that the evidentiary decision lacks both factual sufficiency and specificity. 
Therefore, they have identified the four most "pertinent issues" needing resolution. 
Appellantsf four pertinent issues constitute their four legal arguments at Step 6, which they 
have expounded on in their Brief as follows: (1) the hearing officer committed reversible 
error by not properly interpreting certain provisions of the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act consonant with its policy provisions, (2) the hearing officer erred when 
determining that law enforcement experience was directly related to an AP&P Agent fs 
position for pay equity analysis, (3) the hearing officer erred when not comparing 
Appellants* salary data with all (i.e., meaning Bassi's and Bensonfs) of the 
•comparables • • salary data presented into evidence, and (4) the hearing officer erred when 
concluding that Appellants had not been Jui ined bv existing pay inc.. \a • t the Step 6 
proceeding, Appellants emphasized and expanded upon their first anc *n while 
leaving the second and third points to their Brief. 
C The Board • s Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2,1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision 
.il I-! IT? 1-2, 1) T'nys, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Appellants1 appeal to this Board-level review , The Board's review standards state 
D. The Board • s Standards of Review. The board • s standards 
of review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance 
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted 
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
Ilu? Board leview s this appeal based upon the above-quoted provisions. 
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
Appellants are the moving party at Step 6 and therefore shoulder both the burdens 
of proof and of persuasion. To prevail, Appellants must demonstrate under the standards 
set forth at R137-1-21 DM above, that reversible error is present in the Step 5 Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board now exercises its vested discretiona iy ai ithority in making and entering 
into the case record its own findings of fact and legal conclusions, in addition to those 
findings already made at the proceedings below. 
A, General Findings 
1. Initially, there were 20 Grievants in this pay equity group grievance. Nine 
Grievants had their respective cases dismissed during the evidentiary proceedings held on 
June 18, July 22-23, 1992. 
2. The Step 5 Decision denied remedies to the following 11 Grievants: Karl Bartell 
(Bartell), Cathy Crawford (Crawford), Patricia Dennis (Dennis), Dale E. Hansen (Hansen), 
Jeffrey MacLeod (MacLeod), Sherry Morgan (Morgan), Lisa Shavers (Shavers), 
Katherine Straten (Straten), Beverly Thomas (Thomas), Paul Truelson (Truelson) and 
Gerald White (White). 
3. None of the just-named 11 Grievants prevailed at the Step 5 or evidentiary level. 
The Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that no salary inequities had been created when 
the Department credited three former police officers with their respective years of law 
enforcement experience. Nor did any of the eleven Grievants prevail when they compared 
themselves with two State employees who had accepted lateral pay-rate transfers into AP&P 
Agent positions from other State agencies. 
4. All the just-named 11 Grievants were AP&P Agents within the Department's 
Field Operations Division during the processing of this grievance. 
5. At the grievance's filing date (July 26,1990), the 11 Grievants1 various lengths 
of service time as AP&P Agents ranged from Morgan fs 13 years, 10 months down to 
Truelsonf s 2 years. Ten Grievants held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 23, while only 
Truelson held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 21. 
6. Crawford, Dennis, Straten, Shavers, and Tbomas had the same pay rate of $11.23 
at the grievance filing, while the other six had various pay rates: Morgan ($1334), 
Bartell ($14.29), Hansen ($12.47), White ($1134), MacLeod ($11.73) and Truelson ($9.81). 
7. All 11 Grievants claimed personal harm based upon the Departments filling 
AP&P Agent positions either by hiring new employees or by the acceptance of current State 
employees transferring into Field Operations. Grievants1 specific complaint was against five 
recruited AP&P Agents who had been offered salaries at pay rates above the minimum 
entry levels. 
8. The five newer AP&P Agent hires used as "comparables" by the three Appellants 
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were: William Brad Bassi (Bassi), Ronald W. Benson (Benson), Kenneth Lee Bingham 
(Bingham), Soon P<:ppn (1'epner) ami R:md> Richins (Richins) All five newer AP&P 
Agents had been hired (or transferred) above the minimum entry level pay rate for their 
respective salary grade, whether on Grades 19, 21 or 23. These five newer agents were 
designated as "comparables" during these proceedings, which term is still applicable. 
B. Appellant Cathv Crawford 
9. The Department hired Crawford in July 1986, as an AP&P Agent, at entry-level 
Grade 17 (A-3, G-24). 
10. On a yearly basis, Crawford received promotions through AP&P Agent ranks as 
she advanced from Grade 17 to Grades 19,21 and 23. Crawford »s most recent promotion 
occurred in July 1989, when she advanced to the senior working level of AP&P Agent, 
Grade 23. 
11 Ai ihe lilnifc! ol this group grievance (July 1990), Crawford had exactly four 
years' dired W&.V Ageni experience. Ai that tune, her r 'ait- was $11.2? pei houi 
12. Crawford, at her grievance filing, had been created with an additional three 
years and two months of directly related job experience for her prior service as a 
Correctional Officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff • s Department. Thus, along with her 
four years • AP&P Agent service, Crawford • s total directly related job experience for both 
AP&P Agfnt and prior CuiTcctional Officer duty amounted to seven years, two months of 
service. (0-.U, r.J-Jl, 1 I ,<p 154, 16" ) 
13. Crawford selected Bassi, Benson, Bingham, Pepper and Richins as her 
•comparables" for grieving "new hire" pay equity comparisons (Grvts. Exht 24; T. I 
pp. 174-75). 
.£.,. Appellant Dale E. Hansen 
14. Hansen began his employment with l!DC in April 1975. Appellant Hansen 
commenced as a Probation Aide, later advanced to an AP&P Technician, and still later he 
received a promotion to Correctional Counselor at Grade 17. Hansen served as a 
Correctional Counselor from October 1979 through January 1986. During this time, he 
advanced to Counselor, Grade 19. In 1986, Hansen received promotion to Correctional 
Agent Hansen had accrued six years and months of counseling exp 
period was credited to his total service as being directly related AP&P Agent experience 
(Agency Exht. 3). 
15. In January 1986, Hansen transferred from a Grade 21 Correctional Counselor 
to a Grade 21 AP&P Agent, at his same pay rate. In March 1986, Hansen was promoted 
to AP&P Agent, Grade 23. (T. 1.16-17; Agency Exht. 5.) 
16. At the time of grievance filing (July 1990), Hansen had four years, six months 
of AP&P Agent experience (Agency Exht. 3). Additionally, Agent Hansen also received 
credit for his prior tenure (i.e., six years and four months) as a Correctional Counselor, 
which brought his total credited AP&P service to ten years, ten months.2 In July 1990, 
Hansen's pay rate was S12.473 per hour as a Grade 23 Agent. (Agency Exht. 3, 5.) 
17. Hansen compared his AP&P Agent employment experience and pay rate with 
those of newer Agents Bassi and Pepper. (G-l; T. I p. 19.) 
P. Appellant Sherry Morgan 
18. In 1966, Sherry Morgan began employment with the State' s Division of Family 
Services in the former Department of Social Services (now Human Services) as a Social 
Service Worker, Grade 17. In March 1973, Appellant Morgan transferred from Social 
Services into an AP&P Agent position with UDC. As her Social Services' duties were not 
directly related to AP&P duties, she received no credit for her prior State employment 
(Agency Exhts. 3; T. I. p. 227). 
19. From 1973 into 1977, Morgan advanced in the AP&P Agent career ladder series 
from Grade 15 to Grade 23. In late 1977, Appellant Morgan resigned for personal reasons 
(Agency Exht. 3; T. I p. 227). 
20. In 1980, the Social Services Department re-hired Morgan as an Eligibility 
Examiner, Grade 21, while placing her in an exempt or Schedule A position. The following 
year Morgan worked as an Eligibility Technician, Grade 15, at a lesser pay rate but in a 
Schedule B or career service position (Agency Exht. 3). 
21. On May 30,1981, Morgan transferred to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position 
with UDC's Field Operations Division. Effective May 29, 1982, Appellant Morgan was 
promoted to an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, position, which position she continued to serve in 
until her grievance filing (July 1990). (T. I pp. 227-28; Agency Exht. 3.) 
22. At grievance filing, Morgan had 13 years, 10 months of directly related AP&P 
Agent experience as credited by UDC (Agency Exht. 5). Agent Morgan credited herself 
with only 13 years and 4 months of directly related AP&P Agent experience (Grvts. 
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Exht. 33). Morgan • s pay rate at the grievance filing was $13.34 (Agency Exht. 5), although 
Morgan erroneously stated her pay rate as $12.84 in her Summary Status document (Grvts. 
Exht. 33). 
23. Agent Morgan selected comparables Bassi and Pepper for pay equity 
comparisons. 
E. Comparable William Brad Bassi 
24. Bassi had been employed with the State's Juvenile Court from February 1975 
until mid-May 1989. Bassi began his career as a Probation Aide, advanced through the 
ranks as a Probation Officer from Grade 15 to 26, finally attaining supervisor status. 
25. As a State employee, Bassi transferred into UDC initially and temporarily as a 
Corrections Trainee, Grade 13, (essentially during his POST Academy certification training), 
at which time he retained his higher Grade 26 Juvenile Court pay rate. After POST 
certification, Bassi received placement at the AP&P Agent, Grade 23, level effective 
August 19, 1989, again retaining his former Juvenile Court pay rate due to his lateral 
transfer action from one State agency to another. (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07.) 
26. Bassi was not a "new hire," but rather a State employee who had transferred 
from one State jurisdiction to another while continuing his State service. 
27. Bassi, with his 15 years' service as a State Juvenile Court Probation Officer, was 
accepted and treated by UDC as a career service employee, not a probationary employee. 
UDC accorded Bassi immediate recognition of his prior merit or tenured status with the 
Juvenile Court (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07). 
28. All three Appellants—Crawford, Hansen and Morgan—selected Bassi as a 
comparable new hire for comparison purposes. 
F. Comparable Ronald Benson 
29. The Department hired Benson as z Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21 on 
May 12,1986. During October 1987, Benson's position was reclassified to a Security and 
Enforcement Officer, Grade 21, with the same grade and pay rate (Agency Exht. 2). 
30. Effective April 16, 1988, Benson transferred from his Utah State Prison 
assignment to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position in UDC's Field Operations Division. 
For his intra-departmental transfer, Benson received no pay increase (Agency Exht 2; T. II 
pp. 9,11-12,19,21,26). According to State policy R468-7-4.(7), Benson's lateral transfer 
did not entitle him to a salary increase. 
31. Benson received a promotion to AP&P Agent, Grade 23, one year later, on 
April 15,1989. 
32. Appellant Crawford selected Benson as a comparable for comparing her service 
length and pay rate (Grvts. Exht 24). 
G. Comparable Kenneth Lee Bingham 
33. Bingham was employed by the Department on April 2, 1988. As a new hire, 
Bingham began as an AP&P Agent at Grade 19. Bingham advanced to AP&P Agent, 
Grade 21, after completing a full year as a Grade 19. After a second full year, Bingham was 
promoted to Grade 23 (Agency Exhts. 2, 4). 
34. Upon leaving the Weber County Sheriff's Department, Bingham accepted a two 
dollar per hour pay cut to join Field Operations as an AP&P Agent (T. I p. 137). 
35. Bingham had been an AP&P Agent for over two years when Appellants filed 
their grievances in July 1990. As of July 1990, Bingham's pay rate was $12.59 compared 
with Crawford's lesser $11.23 per hour, a difference of $136 per hour (Agency Exht. 4, 5; 
T. I pp. 124, 130). 
36. The Department credited Bingham with approximately 14 years and 6 months' 
law enforcement experience at the grievance filing. Bingham's full service credit was based 
upon a combination of law enforcement experience gained with the Weber County Sheriff • s 
Office, U.S. Army military police duty, and his AP&P Agent service with Field Operations 
(T. I. pp. 127,130, 133; Grvts. Exht. 22; Agency Exht 2). 
37. Only Appellant Crawford selected Bingham as a comparable (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
H. Comparable Scott Pepper 
38. Pepper hired on as an AP&P Agent Grade 23, effective December 23, 1989 
(Grvts. Exht. 48). Pepper' s initial pay rate was $13.28. When the Crawford group grievance 
was filed, Pepper's salary rate had increased to $13.81 per hour (Agency Exht 2, 4). 
39. The Department credited Agent Pepper with 16 1/2 years' directly related work 
experience (with the Murray City Police Department) upon his hiring, and he had 17 years' 
experience when the grievance filing commenced (Grvts. Exhts. 47,48). 
40. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable for length of service and pay rate comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33). 
41. As of July 1990, Pepper's 17 years' directly related job experience exceeded 
Crawford's 7 years, 2 months; exceeded Hansen's 10 years, 10 months; and exceeded 
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Morgan's 13 years, 10 months of directly related experience. 
42. Correspondingly, at the time of the grievance filing, Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81 
exceeded Crawford's $11.23 by $2.58 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
43. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Hansen's $12.47 
by $134 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
44. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Morgan's $13.34 
by a more narrow $0.47 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
I. Comparable Randy Richins 
45. UDC hired Richins on July 11,1990, as an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, at the pay 
rate of $12.17 per hour (Agency Exht. 2). 
46. The Department credited Richins with 14 years, 8 months of directly related job 
experience based upon his prior law enforcement experience (Grvts. Exhts. 46, 48). 
47. Appellant Crawford selected Richins as a comparable for comparing her length 
of service and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
48. Richins • pay rate of $12.17 at the grievance filing exceeded Crawford' s $11.23 
by $0.94 (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
J. Additional General Findings 
49. In 1985, Gary W. DeLand became the executive director of the Department. 
Director DeLand established policy that resulted in greater law enforcement training, 
emphasis, and capabilities for certain staff, including AP&P Agents. 
50. Director DeLand established a training academy within the Department that 
provided more stringent law enforcement and correctional training leading to Category II 
peace officer certification, in place of the former Category I training of prior years for 
AP&P Agents. 
51. To further emphasize the change to a higher level of peace officer standards 
within the Department, Director DeLand directed that law enforcement training and 
experience should be given equal weight with the more traditional AP&P roles of 
supervision and counseling in the recruitment of new AP&P Agents. 
52. Under Director DeLand, UDC's Field Operations Division created a new 
program known as the Intensive Supervision Unit (ISU). DeLand directed his managers to 
especially recruit new employees who had extensive law enforcement experience, particularly 
from sheriffs' offices, local police departments, and from other law enforcement sources and 
agencies, to staff the ISU. 
53. Some new recruits transferred into the ISU from other State agencies. Thus, 
Bassi and Benson, for example, are transferees who retained their prior agencies% pay rates, 
who continued their State employment as permanent employees with career service status, 
and who were precluded from needing to serve another probationary period. 
54. A few other newly hired agents had been recruited for AP&P duty in the ISU 
due to their lengthy law enforcement experience. Comparables Pepper, Richins and 
Bingham each had extensive law enforcement experience. At the time of their respective 
hirings, Pepper had 16 1/2 years • law enforcement experience; Richins had 14 years, 8 
months; and Bingham had 14 years, 6 months. 
55. Bingham and Richins had been hired as AP&P Agents at Grades 19 and 21, 
while Pepper had been hired at Grade 23. 
56. Appellants Crawford, Hansen and Morgan selected the following comparables 
for their respective pay inequity comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33): 
Crawford Han^n Morgan 
Bassi Bassi Bassi 
Benson 
Bingham 
Pepper Pepper Pepper 
Richins 
57. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable. All four were at Grade 23 in July 1990. Appellantsf years of directly related 
experience and salary rates at the grievance filing compare with Pepperf s, as follows: 
Name Experience Salary fiate? Jyly }990 
(years and months) 
Pepper 17-00 13.814 
Morgan 13-10 13.34 
Hansen 10-10 12.47 
Crawford 07-02 1123 
58. A bachelor fs degree in law enforcement or criminal justice meets the State fs 
educational requirement for AP&P Agent service along with a half-dozen other fields of 
major study, or on a year-or-year work experience substitution (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15,45,49). 
Specified other designated "directly related experience" also qualifies new hires or 
transferees for job experience in addition to law enforcement and criminal justice. Some 
-12-
of the original Grievants qualified for AP&P Agent placement based upon their directly 
related experience such as counseling, correctional officer, jail duty, etc., as alternatives to 
law enforcement experience. 
59. Some individual AP&P Agents perform a lesser amount of law enforcement 
duties, while others perform a greater amount (Grvts. Exht. 35, pp. 6-7; T. n, pp. 45). Thus, 
some AP&P Agents perform more at the law enforcement end of a continuum; others 
perform more at the social work/counseling end (T. II, pp. 62, 64 BAKSH; T. I, pp. 74-75 
McDONALD; T. IH, pp. 310-11 GILLESPIE). 
60. State agency management, such as UDC officials, may determine how much or 
how little directly related work experience may be credited to new hires for given job titles, 
but must do so on a consistent, even-handed basis (T. I, pp. 73-75 McDONALD). 
61. Appellant Morgan holds a bachelor of science degree in the directly related 
academic field of sociology (Grvts. Exht. 33). Comparable Pepper received a bachelor of 
science degree apparently in the nondirectly related field of international business (Grvts. 
Exht. 42). Pepper • s prior law enforcement experience meets the DHRM Grade 23 AP&P 
Agent classification specification. Pepper1 s 17 years1 directly related experience exceeds 
Morgan • s 13 years, ten months • AP&P Agent experience. Pepperf s $0.47 per hour more 
than Morganf s pay rate is not unreasonable, violative of rule or law, improper nor arbitrary. 
Pepper *s more than three years • directly related experience justifies his greater salary over 
Morgan's lesser pay rate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Those terms used in the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at 
Utali Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) §67-19-2, under the heading "Policy of state," such 
as "comparative merit" (3), "fair treatment" (5), and so forth, are broad policy statements. 
As broad policy statements of intent and purpose, they provide both guidance and 
philosophic credence. However, as very general policy statements, they do not contain a 
precise measurable gauge for assessing alleged violations of such terms as "merit 
principles," "fairness" or "inequity." Because these terms are used in a very broad and 
general context, they lack the specificity necessary to be self-executing. 
2. Human Resource Management Rules, July 1, 1990, (hereinafter mDHRM Rules9) 
defines the personnel action of a transfer as: "Movement of an employee within an agency 
or between agencies from one position to another position for which the employee qualifies, 
including a change of work location or organizational unit." (R468-1-1.) 
3. DHRM R468-5-5.(4) states that career service employees of one jurisdiction or 
merit system may transfer into another, including transferring into and between Utah's 
executive branch departments, which would include UDC. 
4. Bassi was placed in an AP&P Agent position by the Department under provision 
of a lateral transfer. Substantial evidence shows that Bassi was accorded continuous State 
employment from one merit system jurisdiction to another, specifically from the Juvenile 
Court to UDC. 
5. Both the pay rate and work experience comparisons between Crawford, Morgan 
and Hansen with Bassi1 s as AP&P Agents are inappropriate and legally insupportable. 
Bassi was not a "new hire* and his pay rate as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, was, in fact, only 
a continuation of his leaving pay rate from the Juvenile Court. 
6. R468-7-4.(7) states: "Individuals may not be offered salary increases to leave one 
position for another if the positions are of the same salary range whether in the same or a 
different agency." While it may be asserted that DHRM Rules are not applicable or even 
binding on judicial employees (R468-2-l.(l)), UDC treated Bassi as if he had already been 
an executive branch career service employee and the Department properly applied 
DHRMfs transfer provisions to Bassi1 s employment circumstance. Thus, Bassi was not 
offered a salary increase to join UDC, but merely retained his former jurisdictionf s leaving 
pay rate upon entering AP&P service. No violation of rule or statute resulted. 
7. Appellants • allegations of a pay rate inequity based upon Bassi' s "hiring rate" 
are legally insupportable inasmuch as Bassi was accorded transfer status from the Juvenile 
Court, not new employee status. Appellantsf premise of Bassi as a "new hire" is based 
upon a legally defective comparison, which precludes any measurement of similarly situated 
employment comparisons. Bassi fs transfer status and pay rate fully complied with 
DHRM's transfer requirements. There was no violation of rule in setting Bassi's starting 
pay rate. It was neither unreasonable nor inappropriate to begin Bassi • s employment with 
Field Operations by maintaining his Juvenile Court's leaving pay rate. 
8. Benson clearly was not a "new hire." Agent Benson had been hired by UDC in 
1986 as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21. Later, the Department reclassified Benson 
as an Enforcement and Security Officer, also at Grade 21. In April 1988, Benson 
experienced an intra-departmental transfer into an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position. The 
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grieving of a personnel action occurring in 1988 on the grievance filing date of July 26,1990, 
is untimely by Crawford (§67-19a-401(5)(a)). A grievance may only be filed within 20 
working days from the event giving rise to the grievance, or within 20 working days from 
knowledge of the event, but nevertheless, not more than one year after an event fs 
occurrence (§67-19a-405(5)(b)). 
9. As Benson entered AP&P as an Agent, Grade 21, and the three Appellants were 
all at Grade 23 upon their grievance filing, the comparison, particularly Crawford fs, is 
inappropriate. Appellants may only compare themselves with incumbents if they are in the 
same position title (i.e., AP&P Agent) and at the same grade level (i.e., Grade 23). 
Crawfordf s comparison with Benson is fatally defective because she compared her Grade 23 
status to his initial Grade 21 status. Not until one year after his AP&P Agent appointment 
did Benson actually receive a promotion to Grade 23. 
10. UDC treated Benson as an intra-departmental transfer; as such, he was accorded 
all the rights and privileges of a career service employee who had been transferred pursuant 
to DHRM fs R468-7-4.(7). Benson was not a new hire who began serving a probationary 
period as an AP&P Agent; instead, Benson actually continued his accrued annual leave, sick 
leave, career service status, and all the other entitlements of an employee who had already 
been vested with career service status. Crawford fs case against Benson is fatally flawed by 
untimeliness and an inappropriate position comparison, thus by law must fail. 
11. Crawfordfs comparison with Bingham's pay rate upon his being hired is 
untimely (§67-19a-401(5)(a) and (b)). Bingham was hired in 1988, and Crawford's 
grievance not filed until two years and nearly four months later in 1990. By law, that 
constitutes a fatally defective filing based upon an untimely event, which must result in 
Crawford's grievance being dismissed. 
12. Bingham WES first hired by UDC as an AP&P Agent, Grade 19. Crawford was 
already at Grade 23. Crawford's comparison to Bingham is inappropriate due to differing 
position levels and salary grades. During a two year period (1988-90), Bingham received 
two promotions, first to Grade 21 then to Grade 23. These two promotions substantially 
increased Bingham' s pay rate over his initial hiring rate of $ 1037. But for Bingham' s two 
promotions subsequent to his hiring, his pay rate at the grievance filing ($12.59) would not 
likely have exceeded Crawford's by $136 per hour as it did. 
13. The Department was justified in setting Bingham's starting pay rate at $1037 
due to his 14 yearsf prior law enforcement experience. 
14. Pepper1 s 17 years1 directly related law enforcement experience reasonably 
justifies his higher pay rate of $13.81 over each of the Appellantsf lesser rates. Based upon 
Pepper's greater law enforcement service length, his higher pay rate of $13.28 upon entry 
to AP&P Agent service was neither arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, nor an abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, the record evidence does not support any claim to a violation of 
either a personnel rule or a statutory provision. 
15. Prior to July 1, 1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) stated: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to the midpoint of the approved range. 
The department head is responsible for providing funding and 
for preventing inequities as determined by agency management. 
Effective July 1, 1990, DHRMfs R468-7-3.(2) was amended to read: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum pay of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority at their discretion to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. Hiring above the minimum of the range shall 
not be used as justification to increase the salary of current 
encumbents [sic] except where approved market data supports 
such increases. (Emphasis supplied to amended wording.) 
16. The amended language of R468-7-3.(2), effective July 1, 1990, eliminated the 
specific responsibility of the department head for 'preventing inequities as determined by 
agency management." The "anti-inequity* proscription was eliminated prior to the 
grievance filing on July 26, 1990. 
17. Claims arising out of the "anti-inequity" rule prior to July 1, 1990, may include 
proven economic losses. However, any alleged losses would have to be quantified and 
limited to back pay and accompanying benefits, not general psychological damages nor 
speculative considerations having an impact only on future prospects. 
18. Appellants shoulder the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is substantial 
evidence (§67-19a-406(2)). 
19. The three Appellants must be able to identify specific new hires whose starting 
pay rate differentials relative to theirs cannot be objectively justified. 
20. Department officials did not act in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable, nor did they violate any administrative rule or statue when crediting the 
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comparables for their prior law enforcement experience upon their being hired or 
transferred into AP&P Agent positions. To credit the comparables for their actual law 
enforcement experience fell within the acceptable ambit of management prerogative. 
21. All three Appellants selected Bassi as a comparable. Crawford also selected 
Benson as a comparable. Both Bassi and Benson were current State employees who had 
transferred from one State agency to another. Bassi and Benson retained their prior 
individual pay rates after being transferred. By neither increasing nor decreasing Bassi1 s 
and Bensonf s pay rates, the Department complied with DHRMf s R468-7-4.(7) (Transfers). 
Therefore, Bassi and Benson are not appropriate comparables for any of the three 
Appellants. 
22. All three Appellants, Crawford, Hansen and Morgan, selected Pepper as a 
comparable. At the grievance filing, Pepper had 17 yearsf directly related experience 
compared with Crawford fs 7 years and 2 months; Hansen fs 10 years and 10 months; and 
Morgan fs 13 years and 10 months. Pepper's more extensive directly related experience 
adequately justifies his higher pay rate. Given Pepper *s greater directly related work 
experience, the difference in pay rates is reasonable and rational. 
23. Crawford also selected Richins as a comparable. Richins was hired on July 11, 
1990, subsequent to the elimination of the so-called 'anti-inequity* portion of the pre-
July 1, 1990 version of R468-7-3.(2). 
24. Crawfordf s selection of Richins for wage comparison was inappropriate because 
Crawford was then positioned on Grade 23 while Richins was hired on Grade 21. 
Furthermore, Richins had 14 years, 8 months of directly related work experience, while 
Crawford had less than half as much with 7 years, 2 months. In light of Richinsf greater 
directly related work experience (including law enforcement), no inequity existed between 
Richins• and Crawford »s pay rates at the grievance filing. 
25. Crawford also selected Bingham as a comparable. This comparison is 
inappropriate because Crawford was on Grade 23, while Bingham was hired at a Grade 21. 
Additionally, Bingham had 14 years, 6 months of directly related experience at his hiring as 
compared with Crawford1 s 7 years, 2 months1 experience. Therefore, Crawford's 
comparison to Bingham is acutely flawed. 
26. It properly falls within the managerial prerogative of agency management to 
determine relevant qualifications for agency assignments and staffing, including the 
qualifications and criteria appropriate to recruiting and selecting AP&P Agents so long as 
such qualifications are reasonable and rational. Pursuant to DHRMf s classification system 
and its promulgated classification specifications, State agencies, including UDC, may assess 
applications for filling positions. 
27. UDC complied with DHRM • s classification system and recruiting strictures. It 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for Director DeLand to place prior law 
enforcement experience on a par with prior AP&P Agent experience, or even other types 
of relevant correctional experience, including counseling. 
28. UDC considered, evaluated, and credited educational background for purposes 
of qualifying persons to meet DHRM • s 'minimum qualifications" (MQs) for AP&P Agent 
positions. The Department was not required by law (neither by statutory provision nor 
administrative rule), or by UDC • s own policies and procedures, to credit equally years of 
educational experience along with directly related work experience for purposes of salary 
setting. The three Appellants have not shown a violation of any statutory provision, 
administrative rule or promulgated policy or procedure in the comparables • hiring process. 
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing any direct, actionable, unreasonable, 
or unjustified inequity, including any personnel rule violation, even with timeliness questions 
aside. 
29. The hiring of Bingham, Pepper and Richins, along with the transfers of Bassi and 
Benson, did not create pay inequities for Appellants Crawford, Hansen or Morgan. 
Consequently, their appeals must fail and be denied. 
30. The three Appellants1 claims of pay rate inequities anent any or all the 
comparables, are not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Appellants • complaints are 
determined to be without merit, and their grievances fail for reason of not meeting their 
burden of proof by showing that they have been directly harmed by the Departmentf s 
employment practices (§67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii)), or that they have been subjected to any 
personnel rule violation regarding applicable salary provisions. 
31. The Departments acceptance of certified law enforcement experience for 
placing "new hires" above the entiy pay rates and/or up to the midpoint was accomplished 
in conformity with both DHRM's Rules and DHRMfs General Classified State Pay Plan. 
Furthermore, that acceptance was not an unreasonable exercise of managerial discretion. 
The Department is entitled to some reasonable discretion in assessing the type of experience 
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most applicable to hiring AP&P Agents as long as such discretion does not violate DHRM's 
Rules nor evidence inconsistent or unequal treatment within a department's work force, 
32. The Department's officials did not act inappropriately, unlawfully or 
unreasonably in determining that directly related law enforcement experience may be used 
as a substantial factor in setting individual salary rates of newly hired AP&P Agents. 
33. The State's, i.e., DHRM's, classification specifications for AP&P Agents at 
Grades 17, 19, 21 and 23 (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15) along with other documentary evidence 
(Grvts. Exhts. 2,35,45 and 49) constitute more than sufficient substantial evidence to show 
that law enforcement experience or law enforcement education, or a combination of both, 
are acceptable in meeting minimum qualifications (MQs) for AP&P Agent entry 
requirements. 
34. The Department relied upon directly related experience, not education, in setting 
newly hired AP&P Agents' individual pay rates. This practice conforms with DHRM' s 
rules and policy, and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of discretion under the facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
35. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Pepper's greater salary rate is not 
unwarranted vis-a-vis Morgan's slightly lesser pay rate given his more than three years of 
directly related experience over Morgan' s total directly related experience. 
36. Pursuant to R137-1-21 D. 2., the Board concludes as a matter of law that its 
hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies, rules and statutes. Furthermore, the 
Board concludes that the Step 5 Decision is both reasonable and rational based upon the 
totality of its factual findings and the record evidence as a whole. 
DISCUSSION 
At Merit System Term? Within thg USPMA 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision errs by failing to interpret certain USPMA 
terms consistent with some of its overall policy provisions. Gawford, Hansen and Morgan 
claim that the following evidentiary paragraph contains reversible error: 
The Hearing Officer concluded in the Hansen case and applies 
the same conclusion to the Crawford case that general language 
in State law and Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM) rules promising a personnel system based upon 
•merit principles" and manifesting "fairness" and eschewing 
•discrimination," while valid as statements of policy and intent, 
do not comprise enforceable rules of managerial conduct (Ibid., 
P. 2) 
Appellants are referring to the following twofold provisions at §67-19-2: 
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or 
achievement governs the selection and advancement of 
employees in Utah State government and that employees be 
rewarded for performance in a manner that will encourage 
excellence and strengthen the system. (Appellants • emphasis.) 
(6) It is the policy of this state to insure its employees 
opportunities for satisfying careers and fair treatment based on 
the value of each employee's services. (Appellants1 emphasis.) 
Appellants maintain that the Hearing Officer erred by holding that the above-quoted 
provisions are "statements of policy and intent," but are not self-executing or enforceable 
rules of managerial conduct. By the Hearing Officerf s so holding, Appellants also posit 
that the trier of fact was "predispos[ed] toward favoring management in this particular 
grievance" (Brief, pp. 6-7). 
Appellants appear to read the above statutory provisions according to the way in 
which they desire to have them read, rather than giving these words their plain meaning as 
the Legislature intended (§68-3-11). For example, each of the seven subsections under §67-
19-2 begins, "It is the policy of this state . .." (emphasis supplied). The CSRB Hearing 
Officer neither stated nor implied that merit system principles are inapplicable to grievance 
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hearings. Rather, the CSRB examiner simply stated that these provisions do not comprise 
enforceable rules per se, but constitute broad policy statements. Analogously, in this 
tribunalf s most recent decision we made the following statement about these same statutory 
provisions and terms: •These, of course, are broad policy statements rather than explicit 
legal provisions." {Sylvia Tfwmpson v. UtaJi Department of Employment Security, 
5 CSRB/H.O. 43 (1993), p. 20.) The introductory statutory phrasing so affirms in each 
instance. Moreover, the record of the entire Step 5 proceedings for both the Crawford and 
Hansen cases evidences many instances where the Hearing Officer allowed all Grievants to 
amend their grievance statements, to search out "comparables" of their choosing not 
previously designated in their grievance statements, to disregard strict time lines, to reject 
several motions to dismiss on various grounds (some of which may have been proper 
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grounds), and to allow Grievants their opportunity for a fair hearing despite some 
procedural and jurisdictional elements working against Grievants. In consequence, the 
Board concludes as a matter of law that the Hearing Officer did not commit reversible error 
regarding any USPMA provisions under §67-19-2 as alleged by Appellants. Nor does the 
entire case record show any predisposition to Agency management. 
B. Law Enforcement Experience as AP&P Agent Experience 
According to Appellants, -The Hearing Officers analysis appears to confuse the 
issue of meeting minimum qualifications for the Adult Probation and Parole position with 
the issue of what are equitable salaries for persons occupying an Adult Probation and 
[P]arole position," (Brief, p. 8). The three Appellants as well as the other 17 Grievants 
claimed that their job duties comprise only ten to twenty percent law enforcement duties. 
Therefore, argue Appellants, the newer comparables as AP&P Agents should not receive 
credit for their prior years of law enforcement experience, otherwise salary inequities arise. 
In Finding number 58, we found substantial evidence showing that law enforcement 
experience qualified as one of many types of directly related experience for AP&P Agent 
service as set forth on DHRM fs classification specifications. Although directly related law 
enforcement experience justified above-entry level pay rates for the comparables, many of 
the Grievants also received credit for other types of directly related qualifying work 
experiences for being counselors, correctional officers, and county jailers, etc. The DHRM 
classification specifications for AP&P Agents, Grades 17-23, provided a variety of directly 
related work experiences that benefitted many of the original 20 Grievants with additional 
years of service beyond just their AP&P Agent yearsf service. Bartell received credit for 
his prior Correctional Officer and his Enforcement Officer service. Crawford received credit 
for her Salt Lake County jailer tenure. Hansen received credit for his prior half-way house 
Counselor years. 
Most of the original 20 Grievants defined their pure law enforcement duties as 
consisting of between only ten to twenty percent of their overall AP&P Agent duties. In 
contrast, comparables Bingham, Pepper and Richins, each of who had over 14 years • police 
experience, placed their law enforcement duties as AP&P Agents at 70-80 percent or more. 
They even viewed the non-ISU agents as performing at least 40-50 percent law enforcement 
duties. Human Resource Directors McDonald and Baksh spoke in terms of more social 
work/counseling at one end of the AP&P Agent spectrum and almost pure police work at 
the other end. Yet all are AP&P Agents whose particular duties and assignments may range 
up or down the continuum as assignments change from time to time. The evidence in the 
record does not support Appellants1 argument that the Hearing Officer erred in 
determining that law enforcement experience was not directly related AP&P Agent work. 
The weight of the evidence, in fact, supports the opposite finding. 
The Board concludes, as a matter of law, that law enforcement experience and its 
qualifying variants as found on DHRM • s class specs, such as police science, criminal justice 
and correctional supervision, directly relate to AP&P Agent duties and may be considered 
for assessing prior experience, and hence for setting pay rates of newly hired agents. 
C Assessing Status of Transferees 
Appellantsf third issue is that the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to compare the 
Appellantsf pay rates with those of Bassi and Benson. The latter comparables transferred 
into AP&P Agent service, one from Juvenile Court and the other from within UDC's 
Institutional Operations Division to the Field Operations Division. As shown in 
Conclusions, above, numbers 2-10, Bassi • s and Benson • s entry pay rates into AP&P Agent 
status were governed by DHRM's R468-M (Transfer"), R468-5-5.(4) and R468-7-4.(7). 
Accordingly, neither Bassi nor Benson received pay rate increases upon their being 
transferred into Field Operations to AP&P Agent positions. The proper administrative rules 
were fully complied with and no violations occurred. Therefore, Appellantsf complaint 
regarding any impropriety as to Bassif s or Benson • s pay rate status is moot. Appellants 
err in asserting that a "transferee [should] not be treated differently than a private applicant 
for the position" (Brief, p. 14). Instead, transferees are entitled to those rights as set forth 
in DHRM's Rules (1990) at R468-5-4.(3) -(4) and -5-5. 
D. Alleged Pav Rate Inequities: Crawford and Pepper 
Appellants maintain that the Step 5 Decision erred in limiting the pay rate 
comparisons between Appellants and the comparables solely to work experience and not to 
education also. The decision below concluded that if Morgan • s 13 years, 10 months • work 
experience was added cumulatively to her four years spent in obtaining a directly related 
bachelors degree in sociology, her cumulative total would be greater than comparable 
Pepper's 17 years* directly related experience, where no cumulative total included a 
bachelors degree in a related field. In that light, the Hearing Officer opined that: 
That one differential of $0.47 per hour does not seem sufficient 
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to refute the management decision that education be used as a 
minimum requirement for entry and that salaries be based on 
directly related experience, Grievants having been credited for 
experience in counselling and other activities in addition to 
probation and parole supervision. (Page 5.) 
The Board agrees with Appellant Morgan that a $0.47 per hour difference would not be 
de minimis absent any justification for the difference. Albei he Hearing Officer • s analysis 
is correct, and no salary inequity exists between Morgan fs and Pepper's pay rates. The 
trier of fact concluded that in UDC only directly related experience applies to adjusting new 
hiresf entry pay rates-exclusive of years spent in getting an education, advanced degrees, 
or other credentials, etc. Human resource management officials McDonald, McGowan and 
Baksh each testified that only directly related work experience is used in setting initial pay 
rates, not educational attainments. Educational years are applied only against the minimum 
qualifications for each job title' s classification specification. The Hearing Officer noted that 
once an applicant had met the positions educational prerequisite, then education was not 
used again as a management tool or criterion for setting salary ("does not seem sufficient 
to refute the management decision that education be used as a minimum requirement for 
entry and that salaries be based on directly-related experience . . . •). In sum, the Step 5 
Decision held that Morgan may not add her four years for a college degree to her 13 years, 
10 monthsf work experience and thus surpass Pepperf s 17 years • work experience. We 
agree. Pepper' s higher salary rate is reasonable, justifiable, not violative of rule or law, nor 
an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, to raise any issue in 1990 at grievance filing regarding the salary freezes of 
FY1986-88 is untimely. Matters such as these are governed by the administrative rules 
applicable at the contemporary time period. 
DECISION 
Appellant Crawford's pay equity comparison with Benson fails because: 
(1) Benson's entiy into Field Operations and AP&P Agent service was through an intra-
departmental lateral transfer, and (2) Benson began as a Grade 21 Agent while Crawford 
held the higher level of Agent, Grade 23—an inappropriate comparison, and (3), the event 
giving rise to the grievance (Benson fs pay rate at transfer) was untimely filed. 
Ms. Crawford's salary equity comparison with Bingham is fatally defective because: 
(1) the event giving rise to the grievance, i.e^ Bingham's hiring, is untimely given that the 
hiring occurred in April 1988 and the grievance filing in July 1990, (2) Bingham was 
originally hired as an Agent, Grade 19, while Crawford held the higher level of Agent, 
Grade 23, making an improper comparison, and (3) Bingham had twice as many years of 
directly related experience as Crawford. 
Agent Crawfordf s comparison with Richins is impermissible and defective because: 
(1) Richins was hired after the DHRM provision at R468-7-3.(2) was amended on July 1, 
1990, when the department directors former obligation to prevent salary 'inequities" 
under the so-called "anti-inequity" proscription was removed, and (2) Richins, upon his 
hiring, had twice as much directly related experience as Crawford. 
The comparison cases of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Bassi are wholly 
defective because Bassi was accepted into Field Operations and AP&P Agent duty through 
an interjurisdictional, merit system transfer of a State employee from one State agency to 
another, at no pay increase, but with retention of tenure and career service status. 
Finally, the comparisons of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Pepper are defective 
because Pepper had been properly credited with more years of directly related experience 
than each Appellant. 
Based upon the entire record evidence, Appellants appeal must be denied with the 
Step 5 Decision being affirmed. There is no appropriate remedy to the Appellants1 
grievances. 
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DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
u. DATED this J/* day of August 1993 
Chairman 
Career Service Review Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. Grievant Dale E. Hansen in the UPEA case is not to be confused with grievant Michael Hansen in the 
AFSCME (Hansen) companion case. 
2. The Step 5 Decision assigned Hansen with ten years seven months total directly-related AP&P Agent 
experience (Table 1, p. 4). However, Agency Exht. 3 shows the Department crediting Agent Hansen with ten 
years ten months directly-related experience. 
3. Hansen testified that his July 1990 pay rate was $1233 per hour (T. I p. 18), and so stated and affirmed in 
his Summary Status document (Grvt. Exht. 1). Nevertheless, that figure is in error; Hansen's actual pay rate was 
$12.47 as shown on Agency Exht. 5, an individual departmental computer-generated salary history on Hansen. 
4. Pepper's salary rate upon being hired on December 23,1989, was $1328; as of July 1,1990, his pay rate had 
increased to $13.81. During the Step 5 proceedings most, if not all, pay rate comparisons between all the 
Grievants and comparables were measured from the date of the grievance filing—July 26,1990. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated §6M6b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
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ADDENDUM E 
Gallegos v. Office of Recovery Serv. 
2 PRB 20 (1986) 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of: 
PATRICIA B. GALLEGOS, 
Appellant, 
v. 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, 
Respondent* 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on July 31, 1986, pursuant 
to notice, in the Governor's Board Room, State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Personnel Review Board ("Board"J members were present: Chairman 
Peter Fillmore, Mary Graham-Payne and L)aim~.$ H. Nelson. Excused absence: 
Anita C. Bradford. Recused: Jose L. Trujillo. At the appeal hearing's onset 
it was learned that Patricia B. Gallegos1 ("Appellant") attorney, Mr. Fred 
Wasilewski, was then hospitalized and could not be present. Chairman Fillmore 
offered the Appellant three choices: an opportunity to make her own oral 
presentation to the Board, to have the Board issue a decision based upon the 
previously submitted briefs, or to continue the hearing to a date when her 
attorney could be present. Appellant selected the proffered continuance and 
the hearing's postponement was stipulated to by the Board's Chairman and the 
Appellant. 
Pursuant to notice the appeal hearing was next scheduled for August 19. 
However, that date was cancelled on the day before when it became known that 
the Board could not assemble a quorum. Thereafter, notice was mailed and the 
appeal hearing scheduled for and held on September 16, 1986 in Room 405, State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah. Board members present on that occasion 
included: Chairman Peter Fillmore, Anita C. Bradford and Dalmas H. Nelson. 
Recused: Jose L. Trujillo. Absent: Mary Graham-Payne. 
Patricia B. Gallegos was present and represented by legal counsel, Fred 
Wasilewski, attorney for the Western Alliance of Government Employees. The 
Office of Recovery Services ("0RS"j was represented by Assistant Attorney 
Case No. 2 PRB 20 (1986) 
General Neal T. Gooch with Ken Matheson, Management Services Coordinator, 
present as the management representative. 
This proceeding constituted Step 6 in the State Employees1 Grievance 
Procedure which is the final administrative level to hear and review 
grievances brought by career service employees against State agencies. See 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 67-19-20(5)(b). 
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the appeal hearing. Both 
counsel made oral argument on behalf of their respective parties, which, 
together with the transcript of the Step 5 (evidentiary level) proceeding, ail 
exhibits and the briefs, constitute the entire record of the proceeding. 
Following oral argument and the closing of the record, the Board took the 
matter under advisement and deliberated in an executive session. 
This case came properly before the Personnel Review Board which has 
appropriate jurisdiction over the appeal. The Boardfs statutory authority is 
found within the State Personnel Management Act, especially Sections 67-19-20 
through 25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Therein the Board's 
authority and appellate jurisdiction are set forth. Regulatory provisions 
have been enacted administratively and promulgated as the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeals Procedure (1983 ed.), commonly referred to hereinafter 
as Board Rules. 
The Board, having been briefed in the facts and issues of the instant 
case, now enters its findings, conclusions and decision. 
I. 
Patricia B. Gallegos has been continuously employed by the Office of 
Recovery Services, a division within the Department of Social Services, State 
of Utah, since April 2, 1984. Appellant was initially hired by the agency as 
an Investigator/Recovery Services, Level I (at salary grade 17;. By April 2, 
1985 Appellant had completed one year of service in this position. She then 
had expectations of being promoted to Investigator/Recovery Services, Level II 
(at salary grade 21). After Ms. Gallegos' promotion was denied by the 
agency's personnel officer, Ken Matheson, she had an exchange of 
correspondence with the personnel manager for the Department of Social 
Services ("Department") regarding her eligibility for the ORS 
Investigatoi 1 e el II position After her promotion was denied at the 
Department level, Ap pel] ant filed a grievance dated August 15, 1985 claiming 
that she had been improperly der lied a promotion to ORS Investigator, Level II, 
Ms. Gallegos1 gravamen stated, "I feel I have been unjustly denied a 
promotion to a Level 11 Investigator I position] with the Office of Recovery 
Services ,lf She stated her remedy to be: " Qn retroactive promotion to a Level 
II Investigator [positionj effective date Lsicj April 2, 1985, ' Si it • = •  = quently 
Appellant's grievance proceeded through Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the Statefs 
grievance procedure, 
The Step 4 process consisted of a departmental hearing in which an 
administrative law judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, When the Step 4 
decision was issued to Ms. Gallegos, that decision resolved a timeliness 
questioi i ii i her favoi t)i it denied her grievance in its entirety on grounds that 
she had fa ;i 1 ed to support her claim with substantial evidence. 
Ms, Gallegos thereafter requested a Step 5 heari ng before a Board hearing 
officer, The second de novo hearing was held on Mara \ ,1 3, 1.986. Board 
(1) Was the grievant [Patricia B. GallegosJ 
improperly denied a promotion to a Level 11 
Investigator with the Office of Recovery Services? 
C - is the appropriate rem* 
After making findings of facts and conclusions Hearing Officer Adams 
denied Appellant's grievance as i t: pertained to her request for promotion to 
an ORS Investigatoi , I e * eJ II Cat grade 21) position, wi th a requested 
retroactive date effective April 2, 1985, on the basis of her not meeting 
minimum qualifications as of that date I i :: i that determination, Ms. Gallegos 
brought her appeal to ti ie 'Board at Step 6. 
Ms. Gallegos is the appealing party at Step 6, As such, she shoulders tl ie 
burdens of proof and persuasion , She must show that the hearing officer's 
findings of facts are either critically erroneous or that by omission they 
lack substance, so as to constitute reversible error in either situation; or, 
that the Step 5 Decisioi ifs conclusions are not warranted by the 1 "acts and 
circumstances of the case. Accordingly , ti ie Board will give considerable 
weight and deference to the hearing officer's findings and conclusions. 
Hearing Officer Adams1 findings and conclusions are legally entitled to a 
presumption of correctness and should not be overturned so long as they are 
supported by credible substantial evidence in the record. It is a 
well-established judicial principle that in examining evidence to determine 
whether it supports the findings and judgment of the trier of fact, all 
reasonable presumptions must be in favor of the evidentiary findings and 
judgment, and the appellate body must consider the evidence in a light most 
favorable to those findings. Further, the Board will not — as a rule — 
substitute its judgment on matters relating to evidence for that of the 
hearing officer, unless prejudicial or reversible error is present. (See 73 A 
C.J.5., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 225, "Harmless or 
Prejudicial Error," p. 300.; 
The Board does not consider its function to be one of determining the 
weight and credibility of testimony; that responsibility is within the 
discretion of the hearing officer. However, the Board's scope of review on 
appeal includes determining whether the Step 5 determination is arbitrary or 
capricious, and more importantly, whether the evidentiary decision is 
supported by credible substantial evidence and whether that decision is 
warranted by the facts and circumstances. (Board Rules, Section 19.8.2J 
II. 
In his findings of fact, the hearing officer made in part the following 
pertinent findings: 
* * • 
(5) The Appellant was hired by the State of Utah to fill a 
position in Recovery Services as an Investigator Level 
I on April 2, 1984. 
(6) That the State of Utah Office of Personnel 
Management approved class specifications for 
Investigator/Recovery Services II, illustrates 
minimum qualifications: (1) Bachelor's degree 
plus two (2J years of full-time paid professional 
related employment. (Exhibit 1) 
(7. " e Appellant requested promotion to leveJ 
he premise of prior employment as Youth 
~~s Counselor 17 and completion o f a ^ n 
v.uw
 w_w,> military interrogator school. 
• • • 
(9j That personnel management responsible for 
employees in Recovery Services determined the 
Appellant's prior employment was not sufficiently 
related to accommodate the minimum requirements 
for Level II on the date in question. 
From the just-quoted findings, the hearing officer set forth the 
following conclusions wf deb are herein summarized from, pages 3-«-i m: jl the 
Step 5 Decision: 
— Appellant Initially met the required minimum qualifications for the 
ORS Investigator I position tluuugh her bachelor's degree in 
snrioloq 
— fn i UIILIJ about Ujji.il , j - when Appellant sought to trigger her 
promotion to ORS investigator ii did the Issue of two years1 "related 
experience" become a factor of consideration In I ner circumsta -• *L 
that time an additional two years of related job experience or 
education ^as required for her to meet I p»r " II n ii i ii mi im 
qualifications from hnr rinfr nf run*, 
— Ihu Division nil Per jjnnel Manajeuiei it s [ Hill i juoroveiJ class 
specifications are the controlling document jri setting fnrth mi.u .i 
qualifications, not job announcements I upon whirn Appelant nan 
relied). 
— DPMf s Personnel Management Rules and Regulations t ly8i ed. j, 1;. ei, L ,i on 
7,ef, (2Ke), requires an employee to meet minimum qualifications as a 
pre-requisite to being promoted: 
To be eligible for career service promotion, an employee 
must meet the minimum qualifications specified In the class 
sp deification for the position i 
— The Investigator II position is that of an "experienced administrator of 
collections." (Emphasis added) 
~ The hearing officer determined that his scope of authority did not include 
comparing Appellant with other employee-ORS Investigator II candidates to 
determine the most qualified or to re-write the minimum standards and 
qualifications for a given position title. 
On the basis of the just-cited — albeit condensed — conclusions, the 
hearing officer denied Appellant's grievance at the evidentiary level. (Step 
5 Decision, p. 5) 
III. 
Appellant contended during oral argument that her case requires a 
consideration of equity in-her behalf. Ms. Gallegos asserts that while the 
denial of her promotion was not necessarily a clear abuse of discretion, 
nonetheless there was jan abuse of managerial discretion which turns on the 
principle of equity. Because she was not treated in a fair manner, Appellant 
posits that ORS's decision to deny her credit for prior work experiences was 
an arbitrary and capricious decision. 
Specifically, her complaint focuses on a comparison between co-worker 
Larry Green ("Green") and herself. ORS manager Ken Matheson granted Green, a 
former entrepreneurial photographer, credit for eight months1 of work-related 
collections1 experience for some twelve to thirteen years of experience for 
operating his own business and performing his own collections' work, including 
court judgments. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2; T. p. 81) Presumably that eight 
months' credit awarded to Green, allowed him to be promoted to ORS 
Investigator II sooner than the two years' time-in-grade pre-requisite at 
Investigator I which otherwise would have been required. (T. pp. 73-74) In 
contrast, Ms. Gallegos was denied prior employment experience credit for three 
work experiences in her past employment history, which she contends are each 
"professional related employment" experiences. 
Hypothetically, had Green been denied employment credit for his 
entrepreneurial collections' experience, then Appellant's case would also 
fail. Only because Green received credit for prior collections1 activities 
can Ms. Gallegos assert her case. She has choosen to link her work experience 
claim to Green's situation. However, given the decision that ORS management 
made anent Green, that decision is not dispositive in Appellant's situation. 
Her case turns on the analysis of her three prior work experiences: whether 
or not the experiences individually, or two or more collectively, qualify her 
for the Investigator II position. Consequently, equity per se is not the 
threshold issue. Job-related professional level employment experience (as 
defined by the State) is the paramount issue. 
Regarding the principle of equity, the Board previously addressed that 
issue in a case in which it rejected one of its (former) hearing officer's 
decisions which had been based solely upon a "matter of equity." Division of 
Environmental Health v. Jay B. Pitkin and Calvin K. Sudweeks (2 PRB 15, 1984), 
p. 8. After citing Black's Law Dictionary's definition, we stated: "Equity 
alone, however, is not a controlling principle upon which employment 
relations' remedies are conditioned." Ibid. Ms. Gallegos' gravamen must 
either stand or fall based upon whether the evidence supports her claim toward 
meeting the established criteria in the class specification for ORS 
Investigator II. 
It is not sufficient to assert that equity or fairness per se should 
supplant managerial discretion. Appellant, to prevail, must show that rules 
have been breached and that such breaches caused her harm. 
IV. 
ORS, and in turn, the Department of Social Services, are part of a much 
larger body, the State of Utah workforce under the executive branch of 
government. To provide a reasonable as well as a manageable system of 
organizing that workforce laws and rules are in effect. Utah law authorizes 
DPM to design and administer a state-wide system of classifying job titles, 
duties and responsibilities and of setting qualifications to fill job 
positions. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 67-19-8(2). 
Furthermore, DPM is empowered to establish procedures to implement its 
classification system. (Ibid.) 
DPM, through its administratively promulgated rules, directs agencies and 
departments toward the end of implementing these rules and procedures, 
including the setting of qualifications for filling career service positions. 
DPM's Personnel Management Rules and Regulations C1985 ed.), Section 2.C 
states: 
Compliance responsibility 
Individuals are employed by the State of Utah but 
directed in their assignments by agencies, which 
agencies have the responsibility to manage their 
own human resources in compliance with these 
Li.e., DPMJ rules. 
A chief purpose of a classification system is to treat employees 
equitably. Equity is attained by qualifying those individuals who meet the 
requirements for skills, knowledges, abilities, certification/licensing, 
education, training and experience while disqualifying others. Without a 
position classification system, there would likely be little semblance of 
equity. Thus, position classification enhances the equity concept by 
grouping, ranking and ordering positions so that employees can prepare and 
plan for career opportunities in advance. 
In sum, DPM Rule 2.c. empowers the employing agencies to "manage their own 
human resources" under the aegis of DPM rules and statutory parameters. 
Employing agencies are to function with reasonable managerial discretion, such 
as that regarding the assessment of whether their employees meet promotion 
requirements. The grievance procedure serves as a conditional check on any 
abuse of that discretion. 
V. 
Throughout the grievance procedure Appellant has claimed that she was 
eligible to be promoted to an ORS Investigator II position, either prior to 
completing one year as an Investigator I or least by the time of completing 
one year in that capacity. lExh. 9, 10, 11; T. pp. 22, 24, 52 ) In asserting 
her claim, Ms. Gallegos relied upon: (1) several Investigator I-II job 
announcements, which were issued during February, 1984, (Exh. 1, 2, 3); and 
(2), two prior employment experiences considered either individually or in 
combination, which preceded her ORS employment together with a brief military 
schooling. Both ORS management and Department personnel sta^f rejected her 
claim to entitlement to the Investigator II position as of April, 1985 in 
Exhibits 9 and 10. A Departmental legal decision (."Step 4 Decision11 J and the 
hearing officer's Step 5 Decision addressed her issues of complaint and 
provided adequate explanations. The Board's review and decision is one more 
explanation to the several already provided to her. 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 are job announcements issued by the Department of 
Social Services. Essentially these announcements are the same except for some 
distinguishing opening /closing dates and announcement numbers, although a 
slight difference exists in the texts of the examples of duties. (Cf. Exh. 3 
with Exh. 1 and 2). 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 each state in pertinent part under the caption 
"Minimum Qualifications": 
Level I: A Bachelor's degree or substitutions on 
a year-for-year basis as follows: Full-time paid 
Level II investigative technician or professional 
employment in law, accounting, mathematics, 
public or business administration, law 
enforcement, social services, or related fields 
for the required college education. Level II: 
Meets Level I minimums with an additional two 
years of education or experience as outlined 
above. 
In those job announcements, Appellant has relied upon the phrasing of 
"professional employment in . . . social services" to satisfy the Level II 
requirement of "an additional two years. . . experience" beyond the ORS 
Investigator I minimums. Appellant argues that because these job 
announcements stated that credit for employment experience could be granted 
for professional employment in the social services, then any or all of her 
three previous job/Military schooling experiences should be credited toward 
fulfilling the time-in-grade promotion criteria. 
Concededly if the job announcements were the governing document, that 
might be the case. However, Personnel Management Rules and Regulations 11985 
ed.), Section 7.d.(2)(e), establishes the supremacy of classification 
specifications I"class specs"J over job announcements in the promotion of 
career service employees. Such employees must meet the minimun qualifications 
set forth in the class specs. That provision takes precedence over job 
announcements, particularly if the latter happen to be inaccurate or 
out-dated. Exhibits A, 5, 6 and 7 are class specs for ORS Investigator I and 
II respectively. 
Exhibit 6, an ORS Investigator II class spec, was issued effective June 1, 
1983. Exhibit 7 is also an ORS Investigator II class spec but with the 
currently effective date of March 15, 1985. It is only reasonable to conclude 
that the latter nullified or replaced the former class spec. Yet regardless 
of the effective date of issuance, both contain identical wording under Item B 
of Paragraph IV, which is a "Qualifications Statement." Item B states on both 
the 1983 and the 1985 ORS Investigator II class spec as follows: 
B. Education and Experience 
C D Bachelor's degree plus two (2) years of 
full-time paid professional related 
employment 
OR 
(2) Substitutions on a year-for-year basis 
as follows: 
(a) Full-time paid employment as an 
Investigative Technician or 
professional related employment for 
the required college education. 
(bj Graduate study in law, law 
enforcement, public or business 
administration, social sciences, or 
related field, for the required 
employment. 
Importantly, it is to be noted that Item B is headlined as "Education and 
Experience." Both pre-requisites must be satisfied to meet minimum 
qualifications — either directly or on a year-for-year substitution basis. 
In the above criteria, sub-item (2Kb; would not apply to Appellant 
because she lacks graduate study in any of the areas listed (T. p. 35; 
Sub-item (2)(a) is also not relevant to Ms. Gallegos1 situation. She has not 
held the job title of "Investigative Technician" and the "professional related 
employment" is offered only as a substitute for college education for that 
particular job title. Hence, to qualify for the Investigator I position, 
Appellant had to rely upon her bachelor's degree to meet minimum 
qualifications. Therefore, sub-item (2;(a; is also not applicable to her 
circumstances. 
Turning to sub-item (1), a bachelor's degree is specified (which Ms. 
Gallegos fulfills by her degree in sociology) together with two years of 
"full-time paid professional related employment." Ms. Gallegos avers that she 
meets that two year job experience requirement due to her twelve months (April 
2, 1984 - April 2, 1985} of service as ORS Investigator I and through a 
combination of three prior experiences: ten weeks' attendance at a military 
interrogation school, eight months as a counselor-aide with IHRD and nine 
months of service with the State as a Youth Corrections Counselor I. 
Each of these employment situations will be reviewed briefly below. 
Appellant attended the United States Army Intelligence School at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona for a specialized interrogator's course, which lasted about 
10 weeks. (T. p. 26-27) That experience occurred while she served on active 
duty with the Army in 1981-82. (Ibid.) No certificate of completion was 
introduced into evidence to authenticate her training. Nonetheless, an 
interrogator's schooling experience such as Appellant's, would not qualify as 
professional related employment. Concededly, a schooling experience — 
depending upon its nature and content — might be credited toward training or 
education requirements. Clearly in the instent case, personnel staff 
discounted any credit for the interrogator's schooling due to its being 
unrelated to ORS functions, despite Ms. Gallegos' opinion to the contrary. 
Next, Appellant sought credit for eight months' employment as a 
counselor-aide with the Institute of Human Resource Development. In this 
position she functioned under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
program, more commonly known as "CETA." During its life-span CETA provided 
government-funded employment, primarily in the public sector, and usually at 
the entry or training levels. A major CETA objective was to provide paid 
employment opportunities to Vietnam era veterans, the unemployed, the 
underemployed, AFDC mothers, minorities, etc., so that public employers might 
absorb such individuals from time-limited or temporary into permanent 
positions; or, that such work experiences would allow CETA-trainees to be 
accepted into the mainstream of private sector employment. 
Ms. Gallegos1 IHRD employment shows, through her own testimony, that she 
participated in a CETA-sponsored training experience which was not "full-time 
paid professional related employment." The following information, based upon 
her testimony, substantiates that her IHRD employment was not that of a 
regular or permanent employee with "professional" status, as defined by the 
Personnel Bureau in the Department of Social Services (Exh. 13, p. 2): 
Ms. Gallegos was a counselor-aide, not a counselor. CT. pp. 
27,33) 
She, herself, suggested the job title of "counselor-aide." CT. 
p. 36) 
The regular counselors were on higher pay scale; she was not. 
CT. pp. 27, 29, 34; 
She acknowledged that her CETA experience was a training 
program. IT. p. 28; 
The length of her employment at IHRD was contingent on CETA 
funding. CT. pp. 27-28; 
— While employed with IHRD, she was concurrently enrolled as a 
senior at the University of Utah, so that her workload was 
lighter. CT. pp. 28, 35, 61) 
— She worked directly under a lead counselor CPatty Welch; and 
under a supervisory head counselor CJanet Alves;. CT. pp. 32-33; 
— Her duties and responsibilities as counselor-aide were of a 
lesser nature than those of the regular counselors. CT. 34; 
A college degree was not required for the counselor-aide 
position. CT. pp. 59-60; 
As the agencyfs attorney has stated on p. 9 of his brief, Appellant's 
testimony shows that "the counselor-aide position was not a professional level 
position. It was a training position or a para-professional position." We 
agree. 
The third employment experience which Ms. Gallegos has attempted to apply 
toward meeting the Investigator II minimum qualifications is that of her 
service as a Youth Corrections Division Counselor I. In that capacity she 
served nine months, beginning January 20, 1983, at a salary Grade 17. IT. pp. 
16-17) The Department has denoted Grade 17 or higher as being at the 
"professional level" of employment. (See Exh. 13, p. 2) Thus, Appellant 
thereby meets part of the requirement for the ORS Investigator II minimum 
qualifications, that a position requires "professional level" employment 
experience, meaning Grade 17 or higher. However, she fails to meet the other 
part of the requirement which focuses on related as in "professional related 
experience." 
Appellant provided information to the hearing officer on eleven duties, 
tasks and responsibilities that she had performed as a Youth Corrections 
Counselor I, which she perceived as being "related" to her ORS Investigator I 
position. (T. pp. 18-20). Yet her testimony, which in reality is opinion 
evidence and stands by itself, remains uncorroborated. Consequently, she is 
unconvincing in her argument that her Youth Counselor I duties are 
sufficiently related to her Investigator I duties. As noted by Respondent's 
counsel, "On cross-examination Gallegos admitted that she had no 
responsibility to collect monies or serve papers or garnishments or orders to 
show cause in either the Youth Corrections position or the IHRD job." IT. pp 
48, 49) Nor did Appellant engage in locating dependents' financial assets, 
verify their income, determine ownership of property or search out employment 
records in her work activities at IHRD or Youth Corrections, as do ORS 
Investigators. (T. pp. 48-49, 78, 80) 
Two documents introduced into evidence are probative in showing that a 
Youth Corrections Counselor I is sufficiently distinguishing in duties, 
responsibilities and examples of work compared with an ORS Investigator I as 
to be unrelated for classification purposes. These documents are Exh. 4 
(class spec for ORS Investigator I, effective March 15, 1985) and Exh. 8 
(Youth Corrections Counselor I, effective November 15, 1982.) Under Paragraph 
III, "Examples of Work," Exh. 4 states: 
Examples of Work: Determines the obligation of 
absent parents to pay child support and establish 
orders on obligations; assess and verify 
earnings, liabilities and assets and determines 
acceptable repayment agreements LsicJ; reviews 
cases where defendants have failed to make 
support payments; determine appropriate civil 
remedy and prepare cases for such actions which 
include garnishment of wages, executions on bank 
accounts, attachment and sale of real personal 
property or court action; conducts conferences 
with defendants and/or attorney and negotiates 
settlements; testifies as necessary in court; 
prepares for criminal prosecution cases in which 
clients are receiving services illegally; reviews 
cases and conducts investigations to determine if 
a first or third party coverage exists for 
Medicaid recipients and establishes liability of 
insurance carriers; presents claims to insurance 
carriers for reimbursement for payments and 
negotiates settlements; investigates cases of 
public assistance overpayments and negotiates 
repayment agreement; may deliver and serve civil 
papers and orders, i.e., Notices of Support Debt, 
Supplemental Procedure Orders, Orders to Show 
Cause, Summons and Garnishments; may be required 
to do locate work in finding defendants who have 
moved or are hiding; prepares returns of service 
to appropriate court; may be required to locate 
assets, income, property ownership or employment 
of defendants by searching public and private 
records; correlates activities with county 
sheriff's offices, meets with the court as to 
service legality on challenged cases; performs 
other related duties as assigned. 
In contradistinction, Exh. 8 states, under "Examples of work": 
Develops and implements specific treatment plans 
and supervision needs for severely delinquent 
adolescents in consultation with the senior 
counselor, program coordinator, parole agent and 
other community professionals; conducts 
therapeutically confrontive, supportive and 
management oriented counseling sessions with 
groups, individuals and families; provides 
program facilitation including planning, 
supervision, evaluation of contingency planning 
for individuals/groups of delinquent adolescents; 
provides intensive supervision of delinquent 
youth in group setting, individual encounters, 
visitation, community treatment needs and 
standards for adolescents in custody; provides 
security for individual group, center and 
community; is educated on and assists in 
preparation of clinical documentation for parole 
boards, treatments and disciplinary teams, 
juvenile court, program coordinators and other 
professionals; attends and participates in 
meetings; orally presents plans, recommendations, 
treatment goals, and progress with ability to 
defend, verify and factually interpret 
recommendations; works closely with high 
risk/violent adjudicated offenders with respect 
to implementing treatment plans, apprehension of 
absconding youth, transporting, critical incident 
investigation with respect to chain of evidence; 
performs other counseling related duties as 
assigned. 
The above documents provide conclusive evidence to show that the Youth 
Counselor I class spec is sufficiently unrelated to the ORS Investigator class 
spec so as to fail the "relatedness" standard. Appellant did not meet the 
minimum qualifications of two years' of "professional related employment" as 
ORS Investigator I as of April 2, 1985 to qualify for promotion to the ORS 
Investigator Level II. 
In oral argument Appellant has charged that the State's criteria are both 
vague and ambiguous. However, the Board finds the above-quoted class 
specifications' work examples to be reasonably clear and unambiguous. 
Importantly, the Department's established criteria define job-relatedness. 
(See p. 2 of Exh. 13). And, classification analysts received adequate 
guidance to evaluate an individual's training and experience pursuant to the 
"Criteria for Training and Experience Evaluation" form {Exh. 13, p.i;. 
Thereon, job related experience is categorized as either "directly related" or 
"generally related." 
Directly related job experience is defined thus: 
Directly related: Investigation and preparation 
of obligation or debt cases for court to 
establish judgments and initiate legal 
enforcement remedies such as garnishment of 
wages, execution on property, etc. Prepare 
criminal cases for prosecution, negotiating 
monthly repayment agreements and lump sum 
settlements. 
Generally related job experience has been identified per Exh. 13 as: 
Generally related: Investigation liabilities and 
assets for collection /enforcement purposes. 
Testifying in court on civil debt and criminal 
prosecution based on investigations and case 
notes. Insurance adjusters, DSS investigators, 
and eligibility examiners are considered 
generally related for all investigator positions. 
After careful consideration of the class specs (Exh. 4, 8), the criteria 
for evaluating training and experience (Exh. 13), Appellant's and Ken 
Matheson's testimony, and all of the other evidence in the record, the Board 
concludes that Ms. Gallegos was not improperly denied a promotion to ORS 
Investigator II during April, 1985. At that time she failed to meet minimum 
qualifications due to lacking one year of the required two years of 
"professional related employment," as previously determined by the hearing 
officer. The Step 5 decision is supported by credible substantial evidence; 
it was neither arbitrary nor capricious and the decision is found to be 
warranted by the facts. 
DECISION; 
The appeal is denied. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
%X> D A T E D th is .J- - day of October, 1986. 
rM^0 
Chairman, Peter Fillmore 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
-"^ JM- ^c^k. 
Robert N. White, SPHR 
Administrator 4 Executive Secretary 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made w;.:hin 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive* Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, 
Section 67-19-25(6). 
MilkIMS ££&I££I£&1& 
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing STEP 6 PERSONNEL 
REVIEW BOARD DECISION has been mailed to the following: to Patricia Gallegos, 
Grievant, at 1109 South 1100 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104; her attorney, 
Fred Wasilewski at 1121 East 3900 South, Suite C-150, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84124; and to the following from the Utah State Department of Social 
Services: Norman G. Angus, Executive Director; John P. Abbott, Director, 
Office of Recovery Services; Ken Matheson, Management Service Coordinator, 
ORS; Dennis Moore, Manager, ORS; Jan Tyler, Personnel Manager; and to their 
legal counsel, Neal T. Gooch, Assistant Attorney General; Brian E. Harris, 
Director, Division of Personnel Management; and to the Personnel Review Board 
members. 
D A T E D this^-^""day of October, 1986. 
^l^yQ--^9 ff^t 
Penny G. Wright 
Secretary 
Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County* 
On appeal to District Court, the Boardfs findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, 
Section 67-19-25(6). 
ADDENDUM F 
Patel v. Division of Envtl. Health, 
4 CSRB 37 (1991) 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
C. C. PATEL, 
Grievant and Appellant, 
v. 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH, 
Agency and Respondent. 
DECISION 
AND 
OPINION 
: Case Nos. 9 CSRB/H.O. 
: 4 CSRB 37 
122 Step 5) 
(Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level review 
of the above-captioned matter on November 12, 1991. The following Board members were 
present at the hearing for oral argument and deliberation: Bruce T. Jones, Chairman, 
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig, Kathleen Hirabayashi, and Jose L. Trujillo. C. C. Patel 
(Patel and Appellant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, on 
behalf of the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. 
Schwendiman represented the Division of Environmental Health (Division). Daniel J. Brentel, 
Human Resource Manager, for the Division, was also present. A certified court reporter made 
a verbatim record of the oral argument during this proceeding, which is commonly referred to 
as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Unannotated (Supplement 1991), Sections 67-19a-101 et seq. 
I. AUTHORITY 
The Board's authority is found at Sections 67-19a-101 through -407 of the just-mentioned 
statutes. The CSRB's regulatory provisions or administrative rules are published in the Utah 
Administrative Code at R140-1-1 etseq., and in the Board's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Manual (1989 edition). 
This case has proceeded properly and timely through the State's grievance procedures, 
and the Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant's appeal to Step 6 of those 
procedures. The Step 6 or Board-level review constitutes the final step and is the highest level 
of administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to 
Sections 67-19a-202(l)(a), and -407, as well as constituting a final agency action under Section 
63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Following oral argument, the Board 
closed the record, and entered into deliberation and decision-making. Being apprised in the facts 
and legal premises, the Board now makes and enters its factual findings, legal conclusions, and 
decision. 
n. ISSUES 
A. Statement of Grievance and Remedy 
Patel filed a statement of grievance on October 26, 1990. That grievance statement is 
quite lengthy; therefore, only the following portions are quoted below. 
I am bringing this action as a salary inequity grievance caused by 
the hiring of a new employee at a salary rate higher than mine as 
a current employee. . . . 
Mr. John Kennington was hired in the Bureau of Water Pollution 
Control, Division of Environmental Health, and started working as 
[a] Level HI Engineer on October 15, 1990. It is my 
understanding that Mr. Kennington (new hired) will be making 9% 
higher salary than mine. I am now making $18.55 per hour as [a] 
Level IV [E]ngineer, which is a higher position than Level III 
[E]ngineer. I worked in this Bureau for 7 years as [a] Level III 
Engineer. I was then promoted on May 2, 1988, to [a] Level IV 
Engineer position. I now have worked as [a] level IV Engineer in 
this Bureau for 2 1/2 years. 
Appellant stated the following as the remedy to his October 26, 1990, grievance: 
1. That my salary be adjusted upward by 22% of my current 
salary. 
2. That this adjustment be made retroactive to October 15, 1990, 
which is the hiring date of the new hired [i.e., John Kennington]. 
3. That the ensuring market adjustment in my salary resulting 
from the [D]HRM's market survey be based upon this new salary, 
and 
4. [Tjhat this grievance be treated separately from and without 
prejudice to my April 25, 1990 grievance. 
2 
B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding 
The Notice of an Administrative Hearing Before the Hearing Officer, dated January 17, 
1991, set forth the following two issues to be adjudicated: (1) Is the Grievant [Patel] entitled to 
prevail on his salary issue grievance?, and (2) If so, what is the appropriate remedy? The CSRB 
hearing officer re-worded the first issue in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision 
and Order (Step 5 Decision) as follows: "Does a salary inequity exist between grievant and a 
new hire?" 
C. Step 5/Evidentiarv Determination 
The evidentiary trier of facts ultimately determined that Appellant's grievance was 
without merit, and ordered that his grievance be dismissed. From the evidentiary decision 
below, now comes Patel bringing his appeal on the Step 5 Decision to the Board at Step 6 of the 
State's grievance procedure. 
P. The Board's Scope of Review 
R140-1-21 D sets forth the Board's scope of review and its standards of review, as 
follows: 
Standards of Review The board's decision shall be based upon the 
following: 
1. The board's appellate decisions shall be supported by credible 
substantial evidence. 
2. The board's standards of review consist of determining: 
(a) whether the hearing officer's evidentiary decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is 
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; 
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the 
evidence in the record. 
E. Burden of Proof 
Patel is the appealing party in this matter before the Board. Therefore, Patel shoulders 
the burden of proof based upon the Board's just-stated standards of review. 
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidentiary Factual Findings 
Neither party has disagreed with nor objected to the hearing officer's findings of fact. 
Hence, those factual findings are adopted and incorporated herein in the same numerical 
sequence, although with some slight change of syntax. 
1. Appellant has been employed by the Division of Environmental Health's Bureau of 
Water Pollution Control1 Bureau for 9.5 years. 
2. Appellant has been classified as an Engineer IV since May 1988. Prior to that Patel 
was an Engineer III for six years. 
3. Appellant has 20 years* experience as an engineer with ten years' experience as an 
environmental engineer. 
4. Appellant received his BS degree in 1962 in Civil Engineering; a Master's degree in 
Civil Engineering-Hydraulics, in 1967; and a Master's degree in Civil Engineering-Sanitary, in 
1971. 
5. Patel's performance appraisals as an Engineer IV have been rated exceptional. 
6. Patel is the only Engineer IV in the Bureau of Water Pollution Control. 
7. Engineer IVs perform work similar to Engineer Ills except that the former must 
possess a higher level of expertise and competence. An Engineer IV is similar to a lead 
consultant who is able to move from project to project, based upon the stage of complexity of 
the project and when technical expertise is necessary. 
8. As an Engineer IV Patel is expected to perform at a higher level than an Engineer 
HI by performing the following: 
a. Independent research of current technologies in water pollution control; 
b. Evaluate proposals received by management; 
c. Interpret rules and policies for staff; 
d. Keep abreast of trends to update staff; 
e. Assist with proposals being recommended as projects to be undertaken. 
9. On or about October 15, 1990, Kennington was hired as an Engineer III at the Bureau 
of Water Pollution Control, Division of Environmental Health. 
10. Upon being hired, Kennington's base salary was 95% of the maximum salary for 
his pay grade (or pay range). 
11. On October 15, 1990, Kennington earned approximately 9% more than Patel, i.e., 
$20.16 to Patel's $18.55 per hour. 
12. On October 15, 1990, Kennington had less education and less total engineering 
experience than did Patel. Kennington also lacked regulatory agency experience. 
13. Appellant believes that the hiring of an Engineer III with less experience and 
education at a higher pay rate created a salary inequity, and he pursued internal resolution 
through the grievance procedure. 
14. Patei met with Don Ostler, Director of the Bureau of Water Pollution Control. 
Ostler met with Richard McDonald of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM). McDonald, according to Ostler, informed him that, generally, inequities in pay were 
correctable, but only when comparing inequities within the same classification. 
15. Upon Kennington's being hired, a comparison was made of the salaries of all 
Engineer Ills within the [Division]2. A spreadsheet, with information obtained from the 
Division, was generated to remedy any pay inequity that might result from Kennington's higher 
starting pay rate. Only Engineer Ills were considered on the spread sheet, as they were all in 
the same classification. 
16. Kennington was hired at a salary rate above the midpoint of the Engineer III pay 
range after DHRM approved the hiring action by the Division, and after exhaustive recruitment, 
search and attempts to hire a qualified engineer at a lower pay rate. 
17. Robert Haywood, Human Resource Director for the Department of Health [then the 
Division's parent organizational unit], reviewed the register prior to an offer being made to 
Kennington. Haywood telephoned Kennington in an attempt to convince Kennington to work 
for the starting salary of an Engineer III, including benefits plus job security. Kennington 
agreed to begin at a pay rate of $20.16 an hour, rather than $20.43 an hour. Haywood was 
convinced that based upon the limited applicant pool, the experience of Kennington and the 
nonsupervisory responsibility of the position that the offer was reasonable, given the market 
salaries of comparable engineers. 
18. Pursuant to policy, DHRM needed to approve the salary offer to Kennington because 
the offered rate was above midpoint on the pay range. Felix McGowan of DHRM approved the 
hiring offer on August 21, 1990, after he had reviewed all relevant data, including the spread 
sheet comparison of the all Engineer Ills in the Bureau. 
19. On or about April 3, 1990, Richard McDonald, Director, Division of Compensation 
and Classification, DHRM, issued a memorandum entitled "Compensation Issues." (See Grvt. 
Exht. 5.) 
20. On or about August 8, 1990, Earl J. Banner, then Executive Director, DHRM, 
wrote to Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director, Department of Health. In correspondence, 
Banner referenced McDonald's memorandum of April 3, 1990, and replied to specific questions 
from Dr. Dandoy regarding pay inequities and special pay adjustments. (See Grvt. Exht. 9.) 
21. Patel affirms that he is not alleging that an inequity in salary exists upon an illegal 
discriminatory hiring practice nor based upon Patel's race, color, national origin, sex, religion, 
creed, age, disability, or his political affiliation. 
B. The Board's Factual Findings 
The Board makes and enters the following findings of fact based upon the record below: 
1. The Division's higher rate of pay offered to Kennington was based upon a rationale 
justification relating to (a) an extremely lengthy recruiting period which began in November 
1989 and ended with Kennington's hiring in October 1990 (RUPP, T. p. I l l ; OSTLER, T. p. 
65; HAYWOOD, T. p. 152-53), (b) all the Engineer III candidates who qualified for the 
position (eventually filled by Kennington) were then earning more money in the private sector 
than what was being offered to any of the candidates for the State position. (RUPP, T. p. 111-
12.) 
2. The Division's final salary offer to Kennington was equal to that being paid to another 
Engineer III (Tim Pine) who had quite similar qualifications to Kennington's. Of 20 Engineer 
Ills in the Division, three had higher salary rates than Kennington's, 16 were paid at a lesser 
pay rate, with Kennington's pay rate matched to Tim Pine's based upon comparable 
qualifications. (RUPP, T. p. 112; Agency Exht. 7.) 
3. The Division relied upon market data factors to hire Kennington and fill the 
long-standing, vacant Engineer position at a salary of $20.16. The salary offer to Kennington 
was wholly market-driven. (HAYWOOD, T. pp. 150, 161, 164, 165, 169, 192; RUPP, T. pp. 
111-12; McDONALD, T. p. 143-44; CLAWSON, T. p. 210-11; Agency Exht. 7.) 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Board and its hearing officers lack jurisdiction over classification complaints 
pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated §67-19-31(1) and R140-1-1. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over issues and disputes involving wages, salary matters, 
and pay complaints generally, as well as over allegations of violations of personnel rules (§67-
19a-202(l)(a)). 
3. DHRM has sole direct responsibility and authority to design and administer both the 
State's pay plan and the State's classification system (§67-19-8(1) and (2)). These 
responsibilities and functions may not be delegated or contracted to any other State agency. 
4. §67-19-12(3) specifies DHRM's role in establishing the State's position classification 
plan. §67-19-8(4) specifies DHRM's role in developing, adopting, and implementing the State's 
pay plans for all positions in the classified service. 
5. §67-19-6(l)(d) authorizes DHRM to develop, implement and administer ua statewide 
program of personnel management," including the adopting of rules for personnel management 
(§67-19-6(l)(a) and (d)). 
6. The personnel management rules by DHRM which are applicable to this case are 
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1990). 
7. DHRM R468-7-2 broadly allocates all classified positions to one of the State's several 
pay plans: aEach classification of positions [sic] shall be assigned to a salary range on the pay 
plan . . . ." 
8. R468-7-2.(l) states: 
Each classification [of position] shall be assigned [to] a salary 
range which takes into consideration the classification plan, market 
and other data. Market research shall be carried out by DHRM 
through comprehensive labor market surveys and surveys prompted 
by analysis of turnover, vacancy rates and recruitment indicators. 
9. R468-7-3.(2) states: 
Individuals will typically be appointed at the minimum pay [rate] 
of the approved [salary] range. However, agencies have full 
responsibility and authority at their discretion to hire up to [the] 
midpoint of the approved range. Hiring above the minimum [rate] 
of the range shall not be used as justification to increase the salary 
[rates] of current encumbents [sic] [,] except where approved 
market data supports such increases. 
It has not been shown that the just-stated rule was abused or violated by the Division 
inasmuch as none of the 20 Engineer III incumbents had their salary changed as a result of 
Kennington's being hired. 
10. R468-7-2.(l) states that each classification of position takes into consideration salary 
market data, salary surveys, and such relevant hiring information as turnover rates, position 
ft 
vacancy rates, and other recruitment factors. Such market conditions may be relevant to justify 
the higher pay rate for a new level III appointee over a longer term level IV incumbent (or in 
comparison to other level Ills). 
11. In Patel's case, a pay differential or pay discrepancy does not necessarily constitute 
a pay equity situation even though a more recently hired employee's pay rate exceeds that of a 
longer service employee (i.e., Patel) provided there is adequate justification and a fully 
supportable rationale that does not offend. Certainly any such justification may not be based 
upon such clearly impermissible factors as race, sex, color, national origin, age (40 years and 
above), religion, or disability. 
12. The pay differential or salary discrepancy between Kennington and Patel does not 
constitute a pay inequity to the latter: (a) where the market conditions require the Division's 
year-long recruiting efforts, (b) where several offers that are extended to other individuals are 
turned down due to higher salary expectations, and (c) where an agency has to offer an 
exceptional above midpoint pay rate-together with the required approval of DHRM~in order 
to fill a critical position with a qualified candidate. These kinds of market condition factors do 
not rise to the level of pay inequity or pay discrimination. 
13. Where a grievant alleges a discriminatory pay practice, the burden of proof is on 
the grievant to compare his or her pay rate with that of the appropriate group for comparison 
purposes. 
14. In the instant matter, Appellant has not shown that his pay rate vis-a-vis 
Kennington's constitutes a pay rate inequity, an unlawful discriminatory pay practice, or an 
improper or abusive pay differential or discrepancy given the facts and circumstances that 
required the Division to rely upon then current salary market data and conditions to set an 
exceptional pay rate for Kennington. The Board further concludes that the Division's reliance 
upon salary market data and conditions is fully supportable, reasonable in the circumstance, and 
wholly justifiable. Therefore, it is not necessary to enter into comparisons between the pay rates 
of Engineer III versus Engineer IV position titles and salary (grade) ranges at this time. 
V. DISCUSSION 
There is no factual dispute regarding the following points: (1) that Kennington as the 
more recently hired employee was employed as an Engineer III, whereas Patel is an Engineer 
IV, (2) that Kennington was hired on the Engineer III salary range but at a rate of nearly 95% 
of that range, (3) that Kennington's pay rate as an Engineer III exceeded Patel's rate as an 
Engineer IV, (4) that Patel generally has more relevant education, work experience, and 
governmental service than Kennington, (5) that Kennington's pay rate at $20.16 is approximately 
nine percent above Patel's rate at $18.55, although Patel presently has the opportunity to reach 
a greater maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range, (6) that Patel avers 
that a pay inequity exists between his salary and Kennington's, (7) that Patel argues against 
making a distinction in position classification (i.e., Engineer III as opposed to Engineer IV), but 
instead avers that the duties and responsibilities of these two incumbents' are so similar that job 
comparability exists between Kennington's and Patel's respective positions, and (8) that the 
Division conducted a spread sheet analysis of all 20 Engineer Ills in the Division (which ranked 
three incumbents at a higher pay rate than Kennington, 16 below him, and one at a matching 
pay rate), although no analysis was performed regarding Patel's pay rate as Engineer IV with 
Kennington's hiring rate as an Engineer III. 
The evidentiary decision of the hearing officer concluded that Patel's grievance lacked 
merit because Patel and Kennington were in different "classifications." The hearing officer 
stated: 
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA 
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined 
to employees within the same classification. Equal pay is not, as 
Mr. Patel argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different 
classifications. Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work 
within his classification. (Emphasis added.) 
The hearing officer further concluded that Engineers at levels I, II, III, and IV comprise a class 
series. Even though Appellant argued below that some State agencies allow equitable salary 
adjustments based upon class series, the Step 5 Decision held that "classification inequity is and 
has been the determining factor for salary adjustments" within this Division. According to the 
CSRB hearing officer, if other departments provide salary adjustments based upon a class series, 
then it is DHRM's (and not this Division's) role to ensure accurate comparisons of class series. 
Thus, DHRM and not this Division should carry out such comparisons, concluded the trier of 
facts. The evidentiary trier essayed that "DHRM, it appears in this case, has established a 
policy of allowing equitable adjustment only to correct inequities within a classification. 
Agencies doing otherwise may be outside their scope of authority." (Step 5 Decision, p. 10.) 
The Board, however, has chosen to make a more reserved conclusion regarding whether 
employees on different salary ranges and with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV) 
in the same class series may compare their individual pay rates under the aegis of pay inequity 
claims or pay discrepancy grievances with other employees. The Board concludes that it is not 
necessary to reach such a conclusion, given the circumstances of this case-
As the Patel case turns on the rational justification of salary market data and conditions, 
including an exceptionally long position vacancy rate, it is not necessary to decide at this time 
whether grievants with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV) may compare 
themselves with employees on other salary ranges as Mr. Patel has chosen to do. 
Notwithstanding, the burden of proof remains with the aggrieved employee or group of 
employees to compare their salary or pay rates with the appropriate job title and salary range 
in order to determine if an inequity exists in light of the Board's Conclusions of Caw and 
discussion contained herein. 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job title are paid at 
the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not contemplate identical pay rates for similarly 
situated employees because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in employees' 
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments, 
varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost 
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans1 entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings, 
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors. In prior decisions we have 
noted some of these distinctions and reasons for differing pay rates between employees due in 
part to "the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its change in 
philosophies by different administrations and department executives, its rather persistent 
changing of personnel rules to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other 
germane reasons that need not be included herein." A. Paul Lund v. Division of Health Care 
Financing, 3 PRB 24, at 11 (1987). In that decision, the Board held that the several divisions 
within the same department might-for justifiable reasons, such as budgetary or business 
necessity—offer differing salary increases among employees of the several divisions or even 
within the same division but at different times during the fiscal year based upon allocation of 
funding and available budget. Salary application to given situations should be reviewed on the 
basis of existing rules, where applicable use of proper discretion, application of consistency, and 
availability of funding, among other relevant factors. (Ibid.) 
Inasmuch as the State1 s compensation system has been set up by the Legislature to 
compare its "comparability of state salaries to wages and salaries paid by private enterprise and 
other public employment for similar work" (§67-19-12(4)(b)(ii)), it is not unreasonable to believe 
that some stresses and strains will result on occasion concerning salary comparisons between 
certain employees. That, however, is why this Board exists: to review and adjudicate those 
matters brought through the grievance procedure, including disputes and complaints anent salary 
and wages. 
Finally, while Mr. Patel may continue to feel that an unfairness exists regarding the 
higher pay rate offered to Kennington at the latter's hiring, Patel is not without certain 
advantages and benefits which he has accrued over his 9.5 years with the Division. Patel enjoys 
9.5 years of investment with the State's retirement program compared with Kenningtuii's zero 
investment upon the latter's commencement with the State. Appellant's accrual rates for earning 
sick leave and annual leave are much more than Kennington's. In general, Patel has benefited 
from his participation in the State's health and welfare plans for nearly one decade while 
Kennington just began as a new employee in October 1990. The State's employer-paid health 
and welfare plans, including annual leave and sick leave, translate into a substantial monetary 
value which Patel has benefited from for nearly a decade compared with Kennington's lack of 
such past advantages. Importantly, Appellant also has an opportunity to reach a greater 
maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range as an Engineer IV. 
Kennington's salary progress will be restricted as an Engineer III before Patel's. In sum, while 
market conditions served to justify a higher starting salary for Kennington, which even exceeded 
Patel's pay rate as a long-term and higher level employee, there is a monetary off-set in that 
Patel has benefited by 9.5 years of steady State employment, progression of salary and 
promotion, participation in quite favorable health and welfare plans, and nearly a decade's 
accumulation and accrual of sick leave and annual leave, and such other benefits as eleven paid 
holidays per year not available in the private sector. 
VI. DECISION 
The appeal is denied. The evidentiary decision at Step 5 is affirmed. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Board Member 
David M. Hilbig, SPHR, Board Member 
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Board Member 
Dr. Jose L. Trujillo, Board Member 
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Administrator 
Utah Career Service Review Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. The 1991 General Session of the Utah Legislature enacted legislation which changed the 
Division of Environmental Health to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality effective 
July 1, 1991. Hence, the former Bureau of Water Pollution control then became the Division 
of Water Quality. See Utah Code Unannotated §§19-1-101 et seq. 
2. The Step 5 Decision states that the spread sheet was performed within the Bureau of Water 
Pollution Control on all Engineer Ills. However, the record is corrected to read that the spread 
sheet analysis on all Engineer Ills was at the Division level, not just the Bureau level. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through Rl40-1-21 J and Utah Code 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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ADDENDUM G 
Thompson v. Utah Dep't of Employment Sec. 
5 CSRB 43 (1993) 
COURTESY COPY 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
SYLVIA THOMPSON, : DECISION AND FINAL 
Grievant and Appellant, : AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, : 
: Case No. 10 CSRB/H.O. 149 (Step 5) 
Agency and Respondent. : 5 CSRB 43 (Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellant level 
review of the above-captioned case on April 7,1993. The following Board members heard 
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, Jean 
M. Bishop, Kathleen Hirabayashi and Jose L Trujillo. Sylvia Thompson (Ms. Thompson 
and Appellant) was present; she was represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The 
Utah Department of Employment Security (Department and UDES) was represented by 
Lorin R. Blauer, Legal Counsel for Department A certified court reporter made a verbatim 
record of this proceeding and oral argument before the Board, which is commonly referred 
to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) and in the CSRB's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Manual (1993 edition). On November 2, 1992, the CSRB's rules at R137-1-20 C. and D. 
were amended through the State's rulemaking procedures at §§63-46a et seq., with those 
amended provisions being applicable to this appeal hearing. 
This case proceeded properly through the State's grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumed jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or 
Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the 
codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, according to §67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -408, as 
well as constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utaii Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA). All the UAPA's formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to 
the CSRBfs proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. After closing the record following oral 
argument, the Board entered into an executive session for deliberation and decision-making. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At the time of the Step 5 proceedings, Ms. Thompson had been employed 
continuously for over 21 years by the Department since her initial hiring in August 1970. 
During that period, Ms. Thompson advanced to more increasingly responsible positions up 
through and including her current position of Field Audit Supervisor, Grade 27. Appellant 
has held the latter job title with its accompanying duties and responsibilities for the past 11 
and one-half years (T. I, p. 15). Ms. Thompson was still in the Field Audit Supervisor 
position when she filed her grievance that gave rise to this appeal. 
Ms. Thompson was one of ten candidates who had applied for a Field Audit 
Manager, Grade 29, position. All ten applicants proceeded through the Department's 
multi-layered assessment process. Even though ten candidates had met the minimum 
qualifications for the Field Audit Manager position, only one could ultimately be selected 
and promoted because there was only a single position to be filled. 
The Departmentf s selection process officially commenced when the UDES personnel 
office issued Internal Job Announcement 92-45 on July 19, 1991, for the Field Audit 
Manager position. That document summarized the Field Audit Manager (hereinafter 
•Manager") position^ duties, described the minimum qualifications, and provided 
instructions on how candidates could apply. To properly apply for the Manager position, 
all ten candidates, including Ms. Thompson, had to initially complete a standard Department 
employee application (Form 494). Ms. Thompson completed a Form 494 on July 31,1991, 
as part of the internal bidding process for the vacant Manager, Grade 29, position. A three-
member Screening Committee reviewed the applications and determined that all ten 
candidates had met the position's minimum qualifications. The Screening Committee 
evaluated each candidate • s application to insure that the Manager positionf s required 
miTiiTniin) qualifications had been met, which constituted the first level of review. 
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Next, a three-person Rating Committee closely evaluated all ten candidates1 
application forms to assess points for each candidate's educational credentials and prior 
related work experience. The Rating Committee reviewed each candidate • s application 
materials and awarded points on the basis of completed post secondary education and 
related work experience, both of which were evaluated as "directly related," "generally 
related," or "marginally related," respectively. This committee scored all candidates solely 
on information placed on the application forms by each of the ten candidates. 
Ms. Thompson received the middle rating of "generally related" credit for her required four 
years of post secondary education. An important aspect is that her four years » post 
secondary education credit was awarded on a substitution basis: the Rating Committee 
awarded her four years • post secondary education credit by substituting on a year-for-year 
basis prior job related experience. In points, this amounted to four years • credit times eight 
"generally related" points for a total of 32 points for her educational background. 
Appellant scored the maximum 60 points for receiving the highest rating of "directly 
related" work experience based upon five years' credit times 12 "directly related" points. 
With 32 points for her "generally related" educational background and 60 points for her 
"directly related" work experience, Ms. Thompson's total raw score of 92 points divided 
by three (weighing factor) ranked her seventh, with 30.67, on the Rating Committee• s 
Application Score process among the ten applicants (/- gency Exh. 3). 
All ten Manager candidates qualified for advancement to an Oral Interview Board 
(Oral Board). To be considered by the Oral Board, each Manager candidate was orally 
examined based upon four preselected, written questions that were distributed to each of 
the applicants just before their respective interviews. (See Jt. Exh. 4.) The four-member 
Oral Board evaluated all ten candidates • responses by a point system that assessed each 
candidate *s responses to the same four preselected questions. In turn, each applicant was 
judged and awarded points based on the following five categories, with separate fixed 
weights assigned to each category, for each of the four posed questions: 
1. Presentation of ideas (35%). 
2. Development and substance (35%). 
3. Tact and interpersonal skills (10%). 
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4. Leadership skills (10%). 
5. Technical knowledge (10%). 
The Selecting Supervisor (Don Avery) over the Manager position, personally composed all 
four questions that were asked of each candidate (Jt. Exh. 4). However, Selecting 
Supervisor Avery was not one of the four Oral Board interviewers who actually assessed the 
verbal responses of each candidate. 
Next, all ten candidates • Application Scores and Oral Board Scores (i.e., each still 
considered as "subtotal scores") were combined in a weighing formula that produced 
combined Application Scores and Oral Board Scores, with each subtotal score comprising 
fifty percent of the Total Rating Score. As with her Application Score ranking, Appellant 
ranked seventh out of the ten applicants in her Total Rating Score. Consequently, 
Ms. Thompson • s Total Rating Score was not among the three highest ranking candidates; 
therefore, her name was not presented to Mr. Avery for his final selection of one candidate. 
Selecting Supervisor Avery received the three highest ranked names, selected one, and 
presented that name to the Departments Executive Committee, for its validation over the 
entire selection process. Ultimately, the Field Audit Manager appointment went to 
David W. Shore. Shore had once held the position of Field Audit Supervisor (first as a 
Grade 25, then as a Grade 27) for more than a year nearly a decade previously, until he was 
displaced due to a Department-wide reduction in force/bumping process that took place in 
1982 (T. I. pp. 6-7). Effective August 19, 1991, Shore was promoted into the Manager 
position, as a Grade 29. 
With Shore's selection, Ms. Thompson realized that she was not the successful 
candidate for the Field Auditor Manager position. Upon being rejected, Ms. Thompson 
filed a formal grievance on August 23, 1991, and subsequently advanced her grievance 
though all levels of the State Employees • Grievance and Appeals Procedures. 
ISSUES 
A Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5 Hearing 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/step 5 hearing as the 
issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Is Grievant entitled to prevail in her August 23, 1991 
promotion grievance? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
The CSRB Hearing Officer, after conducting an evidentiary hearing during which all 
testimonial and documentary evidence were received into the record, reached an ultimate 
conclusion that denied Ms. Thompsonf s grievance and remedy. 
B. Issues Addressed at the Step 5 Proceeding 
In the Step 5 Decision, the CSRB Hearing Officer made conclusive factual findings 
and legal conclusions regarding each of Appellant's five 'Arguments" or points as set forth 
in her August 23,1991 grievance statement. Each of Appellant fs five points is reproduced 
verbatim in italics below, as taken from her grievance statement; the selected, partial 
responses that follow are especially germane quotations taken from the CSRB Hearing 
Officer's analysis of the case: 
1. The selection process was unfair because the successful candidate was "preselected. * 
•Substantial evidence was not presented to establish ti at any 
person manipulated the [selection] process or that there was 
collusion among any of the persons who participated in the 
process . . . Evidence was presented by the Agency which 
showed: that the Screening Committee reviewed Grievant's 
application and determined that she met minimum 
qualifications in accordance with their own policies and 
procedures; that the Rating Committee reviewed Grievant's 
education and work experience consistently with their own 
policies and procedures and consistently with the other 
applicants; that the Oral Interview Board followed consistent 
procedures by asking each of the ten applicants the same four 
questions and then by rating them each on the same five 
criteria; and that the final selection was made in a logical, 
rational methodical manner than was fair to all the applicants." 
(Step 5 Decision, pp. 6-7.) 
2 The [RJating [CJommittee did not give adequate weight to [this] employeef's] 
educational credentials. 
•Grievant would have received more credit for [her] education 
if she had filled out the application more completely. Three 
instructions stated that the education and work experience 
would be based solely on the information contained in the 
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application: 1) the job announcement, 2) the application itself, 
and 3) Agency policy memo 91-1. The Rating Committee gave 
credit based solely on the application; they did this to be fair to 
all the applicants involved in the bid process." (Step 5 
Decision, p. 7; emphasis in the original.) 
3. The selection process utilized by the Oral Board did not give proper weight to 
Employee's supervisory experience. 
"The oral examination rating sheet for [Ms. Thompson] was 
introduced into evidence and there was nothing to indicate that 
[Ms. Thompson] had been improperly or inadequately 
evaluated." (Ibid., 8.) 
4. The Oral Board was given prepared questions which over-emphasized [sic] the 
positive attributes of the other candidates. 
•No substantial evidence was introduced to show that the 
ratings were arbitrary or capricious, and the rating scores 
appear to be reasonable. The Hearing Officer must find that 
the same reasonable exercise of discretion was made in the case 
of each of the applicants, and that none of the candidates had 
his or her positive attributes (or negative attributes) 
overemphasized any more than [Ms. Thompson] had her 
positive or negative attributes overemphasized." (Ibid) 
5. The promotion selection process in this case has been tainted through favoritism and 
not based upon true merit principles. 
•Not a single person has been cited to have shown favoritism, 
bias, or prejudice in the selection process. No group of persons 
has been cited to have exhibited collusion or conspiracy or 
manipulation in the process. The selection process used has 
withstood careful scrutiny; it has been shown to have been 
conducted in a manner consistent with the principles of fairness, 
equality, integrity, consistency and merit principles." (Ibid., 9.) 
The above-quoted five points were the issues of Ms. Thompsonf s grievance that were 
addressed, responded to and ruled upon in the decision issued from the Step 5 proceedings. 
C. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6 
Appellant has not contested any of the 17 evidentiary findings of fact as being 
inaccurate or flawed. Neither has Ms. Thompson challenged any of the CSRB Hearing 
Officer * s eight legal conclusions as being erroneous. Rather, Appellant • s appeal platform 
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is based upon her objection to the selection procedures relied upon by the Department in 
filling the Manager, Grade 29, position, Ms. Thompson argues that UDES• selection 
procedures are "inconsistent with the Utah [State] Personnel Management Act," thus 
resulting in the Department • s reliance upon illegal procedures that "unfairly prejudiced and 
denied a promotion because of the faulty policy." (Grievant's Step 6 Brief, pp. 11-12.) 
Appellant presented the following three legal arguments during the Step 6 
proceeding: (1) that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred in concluding that UDES "had" to 
devise a method to assess differences in the ten applicants • educational and job experience 
credentials; (2) that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred in determining that UDES 
appropriately weighed Appellant's educational and job experience; and (3) that UDES1 
selection procedures violated State policy because past job performance is not taken into 
account. These arguments are addressed below. 
D. The Board' s Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision 
at R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Ms. Thompson • s appeal to the Board-level review at Step 6. The foregoing provision states: 
D. The Board»s Standards of Review. The board ' s standards 
of review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance 
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted 
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
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3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The above-quoted provisions of the Boardf s administrative rules constitute the standards 
of review by which this case will be reviewed. 
E. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
Ms. Thompson, as the moving party to this appeal at Step 6, shoulders the burden 
of proof and the burden of going forward. To prevail, Appellant must demonstrate under 
the standards set forth at R137-1-21 D., above, that reversible error is present. 
SELECTION PROCEDURES AND MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
Appellant's primary challenge to the Step 5 Decision is that the CSRB Hearing 
Officer erred by finding that the Department did not abuse its discretion by giving greater 
weight/value to educational attainment than to professional work experience. In particular, 
Ms. Thompson strongly objects to two statements in the CSRB Hearing Officer• s analysis 
of the Department • s selection procedures • methodology. Appellant remonstrates against 
the Step 5 Decision • s language that states, "a method had to be devised to assess the 
differences"1 between all applicantsf job experience and education. (Step 5 Decision, p. 7.) 
(Emphasis supplied.) Associated with Appellantf s objection to the Departmentf s selection 
procedures, Ms. Thompson also objects to the following Step 5 Decision analysis: The 
Agency used its discretion to devise a method to weigh education in a certain way." (Step 5 
Decision, p. 8.) (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant maintains that although the Department 
deliberately chose a means of finding differences in the applicants • educational backgrounds 
and work experiences, that such was not a condition or prerequisite to proper selection 
methodology. Moreover, avers Ms. Thompson, the CSRB Hearing Officer failed to make 
any factual findings to support a conclusion that the Department "had" to devise a means 
of differentiating between educational attainments and work experiences among the ten 
candidates. We agree with the Departments Brief (p. 2) that one of Ms. Thompson's 
original five gravamina of, "Was adequate weight given to the Grievant's educational 
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credentials?" has now evolved from Step 5 to Step 6 into Ms- Thompson»s new challenge 
that the CSRB Hearing Officer failed to determine "that the Department did not [sic] abuse 
its discretion by giving greater weight (value) to educational instruction than to professional 
work experience." Consequently, in assessing the validity of Appellant' s challenge, we 
review the evidentiary evidence and record in their entirety. 
As Ms. Thompsons original grievance and this appeal concern both an agency's 
selection procedures and promotional policies, we turn first to the Utah Code Unannotated 
(1992 Supp.) for guidance. Section 67-19-2(3) stipulates "that comparative merit or 
achievement govern the selection and advancement of employees in Utah state 
government." Given the construction and syntax, we presume that "or" in this context 
means a "synonymous or equivalent expression," rather than the slightly more common 
meaning of an alternative expression.2 Thus, we believe the Legislature intended to equate 
"comparative merit" with "achievement" for a synonymous reading. Black's Law Dictionary 
(6th ed.), at 990, informs us that "merit system" means: the "hiring and promoting [of] 
governmental employees to civil service positions [the] basis of compete ce." Some 
dictionaries include language stating that merit system also means an employment structure 
that is "determined by competitive examinations."3 
Appropriately, we now turn to the actual selection procedures used by UDES1 
officials to ascertain whether the merit system principles of "competence" and "competitive 
examinations" are present in the Manager, Grade 29, selection process. Additionally, we 
review the Step 5 record to determine whether the Department abused its managerial 
discretion in the manner in which it valued education experience vis-a-vis work experience. 
A. Announcement Process 
Department officials informed current employees anent the promotional opportunity 
for the Field Audit Manager, Grade 29, position through Internal Job Announcement 91-45, 
dated July 19, 1991 (Jt Exh. 2). This document summarized the positions duties and 
responsibilities, stated the requisite minimum qualifications and informed prospective 
applicants on how to apply. Ten qualified departmental employees completed the 
application process and proceeded from the initial application screening process all the way 
through the Oral Board exam, the third competitive level of review. 
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B. The Screening Committee 
First, a three-person Screening Committee composed of staff from the Department • s 
personnel office screened all ten candidates1 applications to ensure that minimum 
qualifications were met in each instance (T. I, pp. 26-27). All ten candidates passed this first 
level of review. The applicable standard of review was the State fs approved class 
specification for the Manager, Grade 29, position (Grvt. Exh. 6). 
C. The Rating Committee 
A UDES memo dated May 7, 1991, stated the policy that when employees bid on 
positions at Grade 25 and above, all applicants would have their educational background 
and related work experience "rated and scored" by a three-person Rating Committee. This 
committee, composed of a chairperson from the personnel office and two members chosen 
by the selecting supervisor, was instructed to score each applicant "entirely on information 
included in the Employee Application, Form 494" (Jt. Exh. 1). Again, all ten candidates 
passed this competitive review and received two individual raw scores, one for their 
educational attainment and another for their related professional work experience (Agency 
Exh. 3). All candidatesf two raw scores (one for education and one for related work 
experience) were added together and then divided by three as a weighing factor to produce 
a fifty percent value. This resulted in a single "Application Score," (T. I, pp. 32-33), for 
each candidate. (Later, each candidate • s Application Score would be combined with that 
candidate^ Oral Board score, resulting in a "Total Score," which constituted a final or 
single grand score for each candidate.) 
D. The Oral Interview Exam 
TTie Oral Board was composed of four interviewers or "raters." All ten Manager 
candidates received a copy of the four questions they were to be asked just before their 
individual interviews (Agency Exh. 4). Not the Oral Board, but the selecting supervisor 
formulated these four questions posed to all ten applicants (Jt. Exh. 4). The four Oral 
Board raters evaluated and scored the candidates1 answers in five categories. Two 
categories were weighted at 35% each, and three categories were rated at 10% each, for a 
total of 100% grading on each of the four predetermined questions. All applicants were 
rated only on their verbal responses. There was no further questioning, probing or 
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discussion by the Oral Board raters. Each rater completed an Ora: Examination Rating 
Sheet, dated August 6,1991, on each of the ten candidates (e.g., Agency Exh. 6). The Oral 
Board's purpose was to assess each candidate's real or potential supervisory skills (T. L, 
p. 122). 
The four Oral Board raters assessed all ten candidates1 responses to the four 
preselected questions and awarded points to each candidate in five categories for each of 
the four questions posed. These five categories were then given weighted values by 
multiplying the points awarded in each of the five categories by either 10% (three 
categories) or 35% (two categories), based upon these previously determined weighted 
values. Ultimately the Oral Board raters' formula, along with further computations, 
produced a single, combined Oral Board Interview Score for each candidate. (Agency 
Exh. 3, 6.) 
E. Total Spore Results 
At this point in the selection process, each of the ten candidates had now received 
two subtotal scores: a single Application Score (derived from assessing their combined 
educational background and their related work experience) and a single Interview Score. 
These two scores—the Application Score and the Interview Score—were now combined4 into 
a final or grand Total Score (Agency Exh. 3). In terms of Total Score point value, 
Appellant ranked seventh out of the ten Manager candidates. 
Ft Role of foe Selecting Supervisor 
The names of the three highest ranking Manager candidates per Total Scores were 
given to the Selecting Supervisor Avery, who selected one candidate for promotion from the 
three finalists. The top contender' s name was then ratified by the Department' s Executive 
Committee. David W. Shore was Mr. Avery' s pick for the Manager position, although the 
record does not show the names of the other two highest ranking candidates. Successful 
candidate Shore testified that Mr. Avery told him (Shore) that he "came out on top in the 
selection process," (T. n, p. 14). However, Selecting Supervisor Avery was not told how the 
three highest ranking candidates scored among themselves (T. n, p. 34,35). Avery testified 
that he had "favored no candidates," among the ten (T. II, p. 28). Nevertheless, Avery had 
the option of selecting any one of the top three candidates (T. n, p. 35). 
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G. Role of the Executive Committee 
According to written procedure promulgated in 1990, after the selecting supervisor 
makes a preliminary selection, the selecting supervisor then presents the "top names for 
final selection and presentation to the Executive Committee"5 for those positions at Grade 
25 or higher (Jt. Exh. 1). In this instance, Selecting Supervisor Averyf s choice of Shore was 
approved, resulting in the latter • s promotion into the Manager, Grade 29 position. 
H. Selection Through Competitiveness and Competency 
Having found that merit principles in the public work force are based upon individual 
competence (i.e., achievement) and competitive exams, we may now review the 
Departmentf s selection procedures with these principles in mind. To begin with, UDES 
announced the position and recruited Department-wide. All ten applicants were found to 
have met rninimnm qualifications, which would have entitled any of the ten to be appointed 
had the Department not relied upon an assessment process that sought to determine, if not 
the best candidate, at least one of the three best qualified candidates. Ten current UDESf 
employees constituted a substantial applicant pool from which to draw. Just by the mere 
fact of having ten fully qualified candidates, a very competitive selection process was 
established. 
Additionally, with the process of having three separate committees—each with its 
distinct, but limited participation—minimized, if not eliminated, the influence or any prospect 
of personal favoritism, bias, prejudice or manipulation determining the outcome of the 
selection process. Each of the three selection committees (Screening, Rating, and Oral 
Board) assessed the "comparative merit or achievement" (§67-19-2(3)) of the ten Manager 
candidates from a different perspective, including a different dimension of their 
qualifications. For example, the Screening Committee fulfilled its charge by assessing 
whether or not the ten candidates met the Statefs classification specification's minimum 
requirements (Grvt Exh. 6). The Screening Committee neither ranked candidates nor dealt 
with them personally. At the first level of review, only candidates failing to meet minimum 
qualifications would have been screened out None were. This documentary review simply 
insured that all candidates either met or exceeded minimum qualifications as set forth on 
the classification specification. All candidates were treated consistently and fairly by having 
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the same standards of review applied to their Form 494 applications. 
Next, three different reviewers comprised the Rating Committee, which assessed the 
"technical qualifications for the position" regarding each candidatef s education and work 
experience (T. I, p. 122). Ti JS committee evaluated all candidatesf prior post secondary 
educational backgrounds and the degree of job relatedness of their individual professional 
work experiences. (See Agency Exh. 4.) The Rating Committee applied the same standards 
to all candidates1 applications and assigned general point values to each candidate's 
educational record and work experience. Candidates received point values for post 
secondary education and work experience that was either determined to be "directly 
related," "generally related," or "marginally related." For both education and job 
experience, up to five years • credit was awarded.6 In both cases, the number of years and 
the degree of job relatedness determined each candidate • s point values. The same system 
was applied consistently to all ten candidates1 application materials. Th:>s process offered 
a fair, competitive and uniform evaluation of the candidates • educational and work related 
backgrounds. There was no showing of disparate treatment, or impropriety nor any illegal 
discrimination. The Board concludes that by applying the same standards, reasonable 
standards, that "fair treatment based upon the value of each employeef s services" was 
applied as prescribed at §67-19-2(b). 
The third and final committee—the Oral Board—assessed the ten candidates1 
competency in a competitively structured oral examination. Each candidate answered 
verbally to four preselected questions that had been composed by Selecting Supervisor 
Avery. All ten candidates received the same four questions, under the same conditions, and 
were given a written copy of the exam questions shortly before their respective exam. The 
four Oral Board raters assessed each of the candidates • responses and applied the same 
rating system to their answers (Agency Exh. 6). The oral exam process was open, fair, 
consistent and it reasonably and rationally attempted to measure the candidates» abilities 
and understandings in responding to work related issues as each candidate expressed his or 
her ability to think about and articulate responses to each of the four job-related questions. 
During this process, the candidates were asked questions to draw out their knowledge about 
and to demonstrate their skills regarding certain elements of supervision and leadership 
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considered essential to the Manager position, by Avery (T. II, p. 27). 
Each of the three reviewing committees was composed of different members: one set 
of three served on the Screening Committee, another set of three persons served on the 
Rating Committee, and again, four other persons served as raters on the Oral Board. Thus, 
along with Selecting Supervisor Avery, eleven different UDES • employees participated in 
the Field Audit Manager selection process. This three-level review process together with 
a selecting supervisor component provided integrity in the evaluation of the ten candidates• 
qualifications, offered fair and reasonably equal treatment to all candidates, and provided 
a selection process devoid of 'favoritism, bias, or prejudice in the selection process," as 
stated by the CSRB Hearing Officer (Step 5 Decision, p. 9). 
I. A Process of Differentiating Among Candidates 
Appellant objects to the CSRB Hearing Officer's statement that "a method had to 
be devised to assess the differences in the type of education and experience" of the ten 
candidates because 'most of the applicants had lengthy experience with the Agency."7 
(Emphasis supplied by Appellant.) Appellant avers that "the Department was not required 
to find differences in the experience and education of all of the applicants." (Brief, p. 3.) 
Ms. Thompson argues that although UDES chose to devise a method of selecting 
candidates, the CSRB Hearing Officer made no factual findings to support an analysis that 
the Department •necessarily had to devise a method to differentiate between education and 
experience as it pertains to the position in question." (Ibid.) For the sake of argument, if 
we were to agree that the Department was not required to find differences in education and 
work experience, but did, that does not necessarily mean that such an act was unlawful, 
improper or in violation of administrative rule or statute. In fact, where an agency relies 
upon the merit principles of competence/achievement and competitive examination, it would 
be unusual not to assess differences in the candidates' qualifications. 
Pertinently, Ms. Thompson has not challenged the accuracy of any of the Step 5 
Decision's factual findings or legal conclusions, but on appeal she raises an issue found in 
the •Discussion11 portion of the evidentiary decision. 
The CSRB factfinder first noted that several of the candidates had an employment 
history of 20 or more years ("Most applicants had lengthy experience with the Agency . . 
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. .") as with Ms. Thompson's and Mr. Shored 21 year tenures (T. II, p. 5). The Board 
believes that the CSRB Hearing Officer was merely making a reasonable analysis that 
UDES needed to apply a fair method to assess/value the ten candidates1 educational 
backgrounds and work experiences. We note that the sentence to which Ms. Thompson 
objects is placed in the middle of a paragraph in which the CSRB Hearing Officer explained 
to Appellant that all the applicants had received the same type of assigned values for their 
education (i.e., directly related, generally related or marginally related). 
Importantly, the trier of fact then explained that Ms. Thompson "would have 
received more credit for education if she had filled out the application more completely." 
The Step 5 Decision continued by pointing out that Ms. Thompson had received three 
pieces of information which advised applicants that their education and work experience 
would be assessed for point value based solely on the candidatesf Form 494 applications 
(T. I, pp. 119-20). It is within that fuller context that the CSRB Hearing Officer had 
explained to Appellant that by failing to completely include her education, courses she had 
only weakened her candidacy by receiving a "generally related" value for education instead 
of a possible "directly related" rating with 40 points (8 points x 5 years, instead of 
Appellant' s credited 4 years). We conclude that Appellant • s argument over "had to devise 
differences" is without material substance. We believe there was substantial evidence to 
support the CSRB Hearing Officerf s holding that the UDES fairly assessed the candidatesf 
education and work experience. 
Finally, Appellant asserts that, "To attempt to screen candidates based on education 
. . . is an abuse of discretion." (Brief, p. 7.) Our commor dictionary tells us that the use 
of "screen" in this context means, "To examine systematically in order to determine 
suitability."8 That, we hold, is the essence of those merit principles of competency and 
competitive examinations. Indeed, the Department fs entire selection process was a system 
of examining the ten candidates to determine their suitability through a systematic screening 
or examination that was open, fair, equally competitive and reasonable. The selection 
process used by the Department manifests acceptable merit principles. 
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WEIGHING THE CANDIDATES* EXPERIENCE 
A, Work Experience Credit 
Appellant maintains that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred in determining that the 
Department appropriately weighed Grievant fs experience. First, it is important to correct 
Appellant's misstatement as set forth in her Brief. Appellant claims that she was given 
"marginally related" credit of four years for her work experience (Brief, p. 9, para. 2); in 
fact, she was given "generally related" credit for five years (Agency Exh. 5). Thus, 
Appellant received the maximum allowable total of 60 points for her work experience, not 
the four years times eight points of "marginally related" credit or 32 points she states (Ibid.) 
Appellant further errs by stating she was given four years• work experience credit rather 
than five (Brief, p. 10, para- 2). The record evidence shows Ms. Thompson was given five 
years1 credit for her directly related work experience (Agency Exh. 5). In part, 
Ms. Thompson may be confusing the two different standards applied at two separate and 
distinct levels of the selection process: four years of full-time paid professional related 
employment credited to her on a year-for-year basis as a substitution for her lack of a 
Bachelors degree (normally a four-year academic endeavor), which occurred at the 
Screening Committee level or first level of review for purposes of determining minimum 
qualifications (Grvt Exh. 6); as compared with the second level of review by the Rating 
Committee that assessed only credit value for her prior education and work experience. 
Appellant also asserts that the Departmentf s selection procedures should not have 
placed a "cap" of five years on her work experience. Nevertheless, this cap of five years• 
directly related work experience applied equally to all ten candidates. UDES further 
defined the applicable work experience by stating that work experience performed within 
the last five years counted as "directly related" work experience. Next, work experience 
that occurred more than five but less than ten years counted as "generally related" work 
experience. Finally, work performed more than ten years ago was considered as "marginally 
related." Thus, currentness of work experience was used as a yardstick. This was a fair and 
reasonable method for assessing length of years and degree of job relatedness as long as all 
applicants had the same standards applied consistently to their circumstances. Although 
Ms. Thompson believes that she should have been given more credit for her 11 years of 
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directly related work in Field Audit, nonetheless she received the maximum allowable points 
for her work experience. Under this work related assessing system, Ms. Thompson received 
all the points she was entitled to and no less than any other candidate who was also credited 
with the five yearsf maximum allowable for directly related job experience. 
It was Appellant's Oral Board score and her lack of identifying her educational 
achievements on her Form 494 that caused her overall ranking of seventh place, not any 
lack of credit for her work experience under the evaluation system used by UDES. In 
theory, had she received more than five years credit or even up to 11 years of directly 
related work experience, other candidates may have also received the same or more years 
of credit as these were all long term employees.9 For example, Shore also had over 20 
years and had even held the Field Audit Supervisor position for more than one year. 
Moreover, Ms. Thompson avers that the Department valued education much more 
than it did directly related worked experience (Brief, p. 10). That is not accurate. Under 
UDES • selection system, five years of directly related education (5 x 12 points = 60 points) 
is equal to five years of directly related work experience (5 x 12 points = 60 points). 
Admittedly, however, for one type of position, an agency may reasonably value education 
over work experience; for another position, the same agency may value work experience 
over education. An agency has managerial discretion, with DHRM's approval and in 
conformity with the Statef s approved classification specification, to assess its staffing needs. 
The imperative is that all applicants be treated with consistency and that the same standards 
be applied (with possible legal exceptions for reasonable accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA). 
gT Valuing gdvcation p e r WQrfr Experience 
Ms. Thompson argues that the Department's selection procedures should not give 
•education greater value than directly related work experience,* and that to do so is 
•fundamentally unfair and violates the policy of this State." (Brief, p. 10.) UDESf Internal 
Job Announcement 91-45 (Jt. Exh. 2) established the following minimum qualifications for 
education and experience: 
Edit ion and Experience; 
(1) Bachelor1 s degree in accounting, plus three years of full-
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time, paid professional employment, OR 
(2) On a year-for-year basis: 
(a) Graduate level education in accounting can be 
substituted for the required employment, OR 
(b) Full-time paid professional related 
employment can be substituted for the required 
bachelorf s degree. 
Appellant did not qualify under (1) because she lacks a Bachelorf s degree. Also, 
Ms. Thompson did not qualify under (2)(a) because she lacks graduate level credit. Thus, 
Appellant met the Grade 29 position • s minimum qualifications by credit for (2)(b), which 
permitted her to substitute "on a year-for-year basis" four years of "full-time paid 
professional related employment" in lieu of the Bachelor's degree. In fact, four years of 
Ms. Thompson• s work experience was applied to meet the required four years of college-
level course work. Here again, Appellant contends that she should have been awarded five 
years1 credit instead of the actual substituted four years as credited by the Screening 
Committee. First, it is noted that the Screening Committee only determined whether 
minimum qualifications had been met in a yes/no assessment. The Screening Committee 
awarded no points. The assessment of prior education and work experience was done by 
the Rating Committee which assigned point values and overall ratings. The latter 
committee awarded points on each candidate • s Education and Work Experience Rating 
Sheet (Agency Exh. 5). Appellant has confused the responsibility of the Screening 
Committee with that of the Rating Committee. Consequently, the Screening Committee 
could not have awarded Ms. Thompson any points for her work experience that would have 
been accepted later and counted by the Rating Committee. Thus, the substitution process 
performed by the Screening Committee is not applicable to nor a part of the point 
assessment process performed by the Rating Committee at the second level of review for 
the Manager candidacy. Importantly, the Departments Brief is directly on point with 
valuing education and placing a limit on substituting no more than four years of work 
related experience for a Bachelors degree: 
Since a full-time student will normally earn a Bachelor's 
Degree in four years, it was reasonable for the rating committee 
to place a cap of four years on the number of years of work 
experience that can be used to substitute for the Bachelor • s 
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Degree. It is noted by Mr. Browning at 1st T107, Lines 6-9, 
•the only way that a person could get any credit for more than 
four years of education is if they have an advanced degree.11 It 
is noted that the internal job announcement, Joint Exhibit 
No. 2, only allows work experience to be substituted for the 
required Bachelorf s Degree. It does not allow work experience 
to be substituted for an advanced degree. In evaluating and 
assigning points on the education and work experience rating 
sheet, Agency Exhibit No. 5, it was not unreasonable for the 
rating committee to weigh work experience, which is being 
substituted for the required education, as "generally related" 
rather than "directly related." Mr. Browning explained at 1st 
T100, Line 12 - T101, Line 18, "education is the prime, basic 
qualification for this j o b . . . education is important. If you are 
going to be an accountant or auditor, you have to know certain, 
basic things. The easiest way to gain that is through education 
. . . as a general rule, a person with an educational background 
will be able to handle a larger variety of problems and handle 
them easier." (Respondent's Brief, p. 9.) 
In some circumstances the Department, or any State agency, might value directly 
related work experience as more important than an educational degree. Yet, in other 
circumstances management might need to consider a specific amount of education along 
with a certain number of work experience years to set minimum qualifications. However, 
it is not unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion for UDES ' officials to have valued a 
Bachelor's degree in accounting or a Bachelor's degree in general as slightly more 
worthwhile than comparable work experience. It can be reasonably argued that the exercise 
of obtaining an undergraduate degree, or even a graduate degree, through completing 
rigorous course work and academic programs, provides certain experiences and training not 
found elsewhere. (See, Shore, T. II, p. 17; Aveiy, pp. 40,41-42.) That academic instruction 
received more emphasis or weight in the Rating Committee' s formula for valuing both work 
experience and academic instruction was not unreasonable in the circumstances, nor an 
abuse of discretion, nor an impropriety in assessing the ten candidates' educational and 
work related backgrounds. A Field Audit Manager, Grade 29, position is a fairly high level 
position, one well within the ranks of management. While persons without a college degree 
are not precluded from appointment, it is not unreasonable to anticipate appointees will 
likely hold a college degree, given the span of control and the amount of responsibility 
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inherent in the position. Nevertheless, even without a Bachelor fs degree and without 
stating her full college-level credentials, Appellant was given a sufficient opportunity to 
apply for the Manager position and be considered along with all the other qualified 
candidates. 
PRIOR JOB PERFORMANCE 
Appellant's third issue is that the Department's selection procedures violate State 
policy because Ms. Thompson• s exemplary job performance was not taken into account. 
Ms. Thompson invokes the statutory language of State employees being "rewarded for their 
performance," and that "comparative merit or achievement govern the selection and 
advancement of employees" (§67-19-2(3)). These, of course, are broad policy statements 
rather than explicit legal provisions. Certainly as broad policy statements, this statutory 
provision does not mandate the factoring in of prior job performance appraisals. 
Appellantf s issue of injecting performance appraisals and past performance ratings into the 
selection process was not raised or previously addressed at the Step 5 level for the CSRB 
Hearing Officerf s consideration. Indeed, Appellant • s prior job performance was not among 
the five gravamina set forth in her statement of grievance. See above, pages 5-6. As a new 
issue, one raised on appeal for the first time, we decline to consider it now inasmuch as it 
was not considered by our Hearing Officer previously (R137-1-21 B.). 
APPELLATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Board legally concludes that the CSRB Hearing Officer • s factual findings are 
both reasonable and rational, and supported by substantial evidence contained in the record 
as a whole. 
2. The Board further concludes as a matter of law that the CSRB Hearing Officer 
has correctly applied the relevant State and departmental policies, administrative rules, and 
statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary Step 5 Decision. 
3. Additionally, the Board concludes that the Department• s decision in selecting and 
promoting David W. Shore and rejecting Ms. Thompson for the Field Audit Manager, 
Grade 29, position is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Board further 
concludes that the Department fs original decision on this grievance is both reasonable and 
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rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, 
administrative rules, and statutes applicable to this case, 
4. The Departments selection process that relied upon the efforts of three 
reviewing committees and a selecting supervisor who designates a best qualified appointee 
from the three highest ranked candidates was a reasonable and rational exercise of 
managerial discretion, UDES• officials did not violate any administrative rules, statutes, 
policies nor did they act improperly in the selection of Shore and the rejection of Appellant 
for the Manager position. The Board further concludes that Shore's selection and 
promotion comport with the general understanding of merit system principles. 
5. The Department did not abuse its discretion by considering the candidates1 
educational achievements as part of the Manager 29 selection process. Achievement and 
competency in education may be relied upon as merit factors. 
6. The Department did not violate any State policy, administrative rule or statutory 
provision, nor abuse its discretion or act improperly, when it valuated both work experience 
and educational credentials as directly related, generally related or marginally related. 
7. The Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it selected one of the 
ten highly qualified Manager candidates and rejected the other nine, which included 
Appellant. UDES1 officials acted fairly, consistently and equitably in operating the 
screening and rating processes that evaluated past work performance and educational 
credentials of all applicants, including Appellant' s, 
8. Grievant has not demonstrated by substantial evidence that she was directly 
harmed by any unjust or violative condition of the Departmentf s selection procedures, by 
any defect in the application of the selection procedures, or by the selection of Mr. Shore 
for the Manager position, 
9. Grievant has not shown that the Department did not select the best candidate or 
from the three best rated candidates or alternatively did not select a better qualified 
candidate than Grievant, under the selection process and criteria used. 
10. The Department did not abuse its discretion in developing and using the 
selection procedures relied upon to select and promote Shore into the Manager position. 
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DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing facts of the case and the Boardf s legal conclusions, there 
is no basis upon which to reverse the Step 5 Decision. Therefore, Ms. Thompson' s appeal 
of her April 23,1991 promotion grievance is denied. Importantly, however, the Board also 
commends Ms. Thompson for her more than two decades of successful service to the 
Department and the state of Utah, for her more than eleven years of tenure as the Field 
Audit Supervisor, and for her highly rated performance appraisals that are contained in the 
record. We wish her well and compliment her for being a very dedicated public servant of 
the state of Utah. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this 28th day of May 1993. 
Bruce T. Jom 
Career Servi 
ENDNOTES 
1. The first sentence to which Appellant finds objectionable language is contained in the CSRB Hearing Officer's 
analysis pertaining to Ms. Thompson's second point in her grievance statement ("Was adequate weight given to 
Grievant's educational credentials?") Below, with emphasis supplied, is the objectionable sentence but set within 
its larger context as written by the CSRB Examiner: 
In evaluating education and work experience later in the process, that Rating 
Committee followed its own policies and procedures in assigning values for 
work and experience as "directly related," "generally related," and "marginally 
related" to the requirements of the actual position. All the applicants received 
credit in the same manner. Most of the applicants had lengthy experience 
with the Agency, so a method had to be devised to assess the differences in 
the type of experience and education. 
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2. WEBSTER'S U New Riverside University Dictionary (1988 e&), p. 826. 
3. WEBSTER'S II, p. 743; New College Edition The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(1980 ed.), p. 822. 
4. Personnel and Training Memo 91-1 (Jt. F.xh 1) provides the following instruction on obtaining a final score, 
however, the terms used arc slightly different from those other terms used in the record for scoring purposes: 
Final Selection: Composite scores are computed by combining Rating 
Committee scores with Oral Board scores according to a percentage split 
predetermined by the selecting supervisor, and included in the internal job 
announcement. The selecting supervisor is then given the top names for final 
selection and presentation to the Executive Committee. 
5. The Executive Committee was composed of the following: Floyd G. Astin, Administrator (i.e., chief executive 
office of UDES); Karen Assay, Administrative Assistant; Terry Burns, Director of Unemployment Insurance; 
Dave Turner, Director Employment Services; Rosemarie Carter, Director of Administrative Services; and 
Bill Horner, Director of Labor Market Information (T. II, p. 33). 
6. Appellant has argued otherwise as she received only four years' credit for her 'generally related" education 
(4 years x 8 points * 32 points), instead of the maximum possible five years' 'directly related" educational 
credit (5 years x 12 points • 60 points). In part, Ms. Thompson's lesser point value for education resulted 
because die failed to completely fill in and describe all of he post secondary course work as requested on 
Form 494, on the Job Announcement, and on UDES' memo 9. ,. Admittedly, Appellant received less credit 
for post secondary education due to the lack of a baccalaureate degree. As one candidate had a Master's degree, 
it is reasonable to assume that some of the others had completed some college graduate level course work. See, 
for example, T. II, pp. 31-31. 
7. Appellant has inverted the CSRB Hearing Officer's original wording, which reads: *Most of the applicants 
had lengthy experience with the Agency, so a method had to be devised to assess the differences in the type of 
experience and education." (Step 5 Decision, p. 7.) 
8. The American Heritage Dictionary; p. 1166. 
9. Personnel Specialist Jan Browning testified that due to the high calibre of all ten candidates, that eight out 
of ten would have received the maximum points (•max out,* T. I, p. 108), if everyone had been credited with 
all of their years of work experience substituted for educational credit (T. I, pp. 114-15), which is the way 
Appellant wanted the assessing done (T. I, pp. 33-34, 43-44, 50-51, 53-55, 79, 84). 
For example, Selecting Supervisor Avery characterized the entire group of ten candidates with the following 
description: 
The entire field was very qualified. There was a lot of stiff competition. 
There was a CPA, there was a candidate with a [M]aster's degree, there were 
three current [Contributions supervisors if you include Sylvia, there were five 
field auditors with over ten years of experience each, they were all lead or 
senior field auditors, there was, I believe, two or three people that had 
completed the [State's] [M]anagement [Certification [PJrogram that were not, 
at that time, supervisors, there was one individual who had recently returned 
from Washington, D. C. where he was like one of ten individuals selected 
nationwide to participate in a Department of Labor project to set up a set of 
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quality standards for the entire unemployment insurance operation. So the 
competition was stiff. These were all highly qualified people. These were ten 
very high qualified people (T. n, pp. 31-32). 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated §63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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ADDENDUM H 
H.Wells v. Harris, 
1 MSPB 139, 1 M.S.P.R. 208 (1979) 
£ s Attar AT(> Ruling $ 
96 Objection sustained. The document is illegible. 
99 Objection overruled. Document admitted to show notice. 
02 Objection overruled. Document admitted to show notice. 
103 Objection sustained. The issue raised in this document 
was not previously raised before the Board. This docu-
ment is irrelevant. 
!06 Objection sustained. This document is irrelevant. 
107 Objection overruled. This document is admitted to show 
notice. 
109 Objection overruled. This document admitted to show 
notice. 
6, 6, 86. 90. 160. 
61. 162. 165. 167. 
170. 171. 173. 175. 
176. 177. 179, 182. 
86. 186. 187. 188. 
190. 191. 193, 194. 
195. 197. 198, 200. 
M)8,210 Objection overruled. Admitted generally. 
166. 180. 192. 201. 
!04,206 Objection overruled. Admitted to show malice or 
knowledge. 
During the hearings, rulings were reserved with respect to certain 
documents. With regard to these documents, the following specific 
ruling are made: 
Exhibit No. RuUng 
9 Objection sustained. This document was not introduced or 
identified by any witness at the trial. 
50, 56 Objection overruled. Both documents were shown to have 
been contemporaneously recorded See Volume 1. pp. 
144-145 and 149. 
87 Objection overruled. Although this document appears to 
be incomplete, no lack of fairness in considering these 
partial notes has been shown. See, e.g., FRE 106. 
Moreover, witnesses Russell, at Volume 3, pp. 71-72, and 
Meade, at Volume 3, pp. 189-190, identified this docu-
ment. 
148 Objection sustained. This document was not introduced or 
identified by any witness at the trial. 
Petitioner 
Exhibit 4 Objection overruled. This document was properly iden-
tified as Volume 1, page 89. 
The Board also reserved ruling at Volume 4. page 40, on the ad-
missibility of certain testimony by witness Boyd. The testimony 
appears to be generally within the offer of proof at Volume 4. pp. 
36-37, and generally relevant. Therefore, the testimony is admitted. 
For the Board: 
RUTH T. PROKOP. 
E R S A H . P O S T O N . 
December 17. 1979. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 
THOMAS W. W E L L S . *r at., \ 
v. > Order No. R R - 8 0 - 3 
PATRICIA R. HARRIS , et at. ) 
MEMORANDUM OPINION A N D O R D E R 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background of the case 
This matter comes before the Merit Systems Protection Board 
("the Board") pursuant to its authority under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1205(e)(1)(B).1 In pertinent part that provision states: 
At any time after the effective date of any rule or regulation 
issued by the Director [of OPMJ in carrying out functions 
under section 1103 of this title, the Board shall review any 
provision of such rule or regulation. . . 
(B) on the granting by the Board, in its sole discretion, of any 
petition for such review filed with the Board by any interested 
person, after consideration of the petition by the Board. . . . 
On May 17, 1979, the American Federation of Government 
Employees, AFL-CIO(AFGE) petitioned the Board to review (1) 
certain regulations issued by the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) relating to the demotion or removal of Federal 
employees and (2) the implementation of those regulations by the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. AFGE alleged that the interim regulations 
published by OPM implementing Chapter 43 2 of title 5 of the 
United States Code as amended, were invalid on their face because 
they required the commission of prohibited personnel practices, 
and that the implementation of the regulations by SSA was also in-
valid. 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections of the United States Code 
are to those within Title 5. 
2
 See. 5 C.F.R. §§ 430 and 432 (January 16. 1979). Chapter 43, specifically §§ 4302 
and 4303, of Title 5 governs the establishment of performance appraisal systems for 
most Federal employees and reductions in grade or removals of such employees 
based on unacceptable performance. 
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After providing OPM and SSA an opportunity to respond to the 
petition, the Hoard granted the request for review.3 Additionally, it 
specified that Board review would focus on whether OPM interim 
regulation § 432.206 "on its face or as implemented by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare would require, or has re-
quired, any employee to violate 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l 1)." Finally, the 
order provided for the submission of comments by other interested 
parties and set the proceeding for oral argument.4 
The Board subsequently ordered the scope of the review in the 
proceeding to be expanded to include consideration of OPM's final 
regulations implementing Chapter 43. The order also requested the 
parties to file briefs addressing the issue of whether OPM's final 
regulation on its face would require any employee to violate 
§ 2302(b)(ll) and whether the Board's review of the interim regula-
tion had been rendered moot by OPM's issuance of its final regula-
tion.5 Oral argument before the Board took place on September 27, 
1979.6 
B. Issues Presented 
The central issue presented here is whether, and if so under what 
limitations, removal or demotion actions based on "unacceptable 
performance" may be taken under § 4303 against employees for 
whom a performance appraisal system has not yet been established 
under § 4302. AFGE argues that to take an action under § 4303 
without such a system in place is a violation of § 4302. It further 
submits that such action constitutes a prohibited personnel prac-
tice in that it is a violation of a law which implements or directly 
concerns a merit principle. In response, OPM and SSA counter that 
there is no violation of § 4302 in that Congress provided that § 4302 
systems did not have to be in place until October 1, 19fel. Accord-
ingly, they submit that until that time, adverse actions of this 
s
 While this matter was being considered the Special Counsel, in a parallel action 
on different grounds, pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 1208 filed a request with the Board to 
stay further action against its employees by SSA under OPM's regulations. The 
stay was approved by the Board and later extended. Further action in that matter 
has been delayed by agreement between SSA and the Special Counsel, pending a 
determination in this case. 
4
 44 Fed. Reg. 44857 {July 31, 1979). Comments received and considered by the 
Board in this proceeding included those of the Departments of Agriculture. Defense 
and Navy, the SEC. IRS. FCC. NLRB. EEOC, the National Federation of Federal 
Employees (NFFEI, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the 
Special Counsel. 
5
 44 Fed. Reg 45587 (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 432 205) (August 3. 1979). 
* The Board requested that all interested parties file notices of intent to participate 
in oral argument. All requests were granted. Participants included AFGE, OPM, 
SSA. the Departments of Agriculture, Army. Navy and Transportation, the IRS, 
V A, NFFE. NTEU and the Special Counsel. 
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* nature can be taken against employees if the requirements of 
I § 4303 alone are met by the acting agency. 
I Resolution of the issue is significant throughout the Federal ser-
vice for two reasons: the basis for the action and the standard of 
I proof necessary to sustain the action. Demotions or removals under 
I § 4303 are based on "unacceptable performance" by the individual 
I employee and are to be sustained on appeal if supported by 
I "substantial" evidence. Adverse actions under Chapter 75 of title 
I 6 must be based on the "efficiency of the service" and must be sup-
I ported by the more stringent "preponderance of the evidence" 
I standard.7 
I Because the term "unacceptable performance" as used in § 4303 
I is precisely defined as failure to meet established performance 
I standards in even a single "critical element" of the employee's 
1 position,8 it is a narrower justification for removal than the 
I Chapter 76 requirement of "such cause as will promote the effi-
| ciency of the service."9 Consequently, performance-related 
I removals and demotions are more easily sustained under § 4303 
I than under Chapter 75, thus accomplishing a primary purpose of 
[ the Act. 
I Once a performance appraisal system covering any particular 
I employee is in place, the Act provides clear guidance for relating 
I that employee's performance appraisal to the requirements of 
I § 4303. However, the Act does not specifically address the pro-
I cedures to govern during the interim period. Therefore, the Board 
I has analyzed the structure of the statute and its legislative history 
I to determine the meaning of the Act, the validity of OPNTs regula-
I tions, and the validity of SSA's implementation of those regula-
I tions. 
I C. Summary of the Board*s Conclusions 
I The Board is satisfied that the dominant legislative objective of 
I the Act was to create a single interrelated framework in which the 
I results of performance appraisal systems established under § 4302 
I are to be used, among other things, as a basis for taking actions 
I under § 4303. The streamlined procedures of § 4303 were not in-
l tended to be applied to employees whose performance has not been 
I evaluated under a § 4302 appraisal system. Considering the provi-
I sions of Chapter 43 as a whole, we conclude, therefore, that the 
I regulations under consideration and the actions taken by SSA are 
I invalid. 
7
 5 U.S.C. §7701(0(1). 
8
 5 U.S.C. §430113). 
9
 6 U.S.C. §7513(a). 
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We do not, however, find that performance standards and critical 
elements need be identical for all employees having common posi-
tion descriptions, nor do we discern in the Act or its legislative 
history any requirement that standards and elements be developed 
by each agency on a centralized basis. It is clear that Congress, to 
permit agencies to have maximum flexibility in these respects, re-
quired only that performance standards be based on objective 
criteria "related to the job in question for each employee or posi-
tion" under the particular appraisal system, and that the other re-
quirements of § 4302 be met. 
The Board's conclusions do not prevent agencies from removing 
employees for performance-related reasons until October of 1981. 
The agencies control their own timetables in establishing the per-
formance appraisal systems required by § 4302. Nothing in the Act 
prevents them from doing so earlier than 1981; indeed, § 4302(b)(2) 
expressly requires that the systems be established and com-
municated to employees "as soon as practicable/' Moreover, 
Chapter 76 remains available for adverse actions that are perfor-
mance related. Section 7512(D) excludes from Chapter 75 only 
§ 4303 actions for "unacceptable performance" as defined in 
§ 4301(3). Nothing in § 7512 prevents action under the provisions of 
Chapter 75 merely because the action is performance-based. As 
previously noted, the higher "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard and the "efficiency of the service" requirement would apply 
to such actions, but we have found nothing to indicate that Con-
gress intended to prevent agencies from meeting those re-
quirements where they are able to do so. In this respect the agen-
cies carry no greater burden during the interim period than they 
did prior to the Act, and they have it within their own hands to 
hasten the availability of the more lenient § 4303 standards by 
establishing their § 4302 appraisal systems sooner rather than 
later. 
The issues posed in this case provide the first occasion for con-
struing some of the Act's more significant provisions. We com-
mence our consideration of these issues with a survey of the perti-
nent statutory framework. Thereafter the analysis of the substan-
tive issues relating to §§ 4302, 4303, and 2302(b)(ll) is presented, 
followed by a discussion of the Board's authority under § 1205(e) 
and the relationship between § 4303 and Chapter 75. 
II. STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 
A. The Statutory Framework 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the most comprehensive 
reform of the Federal Civil Service system since passage of the 
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Pendleton Act in 1883,10 is a complex piece of legislation compris-
ing nine separate titles, preceded by Congressional findings and a 
statement of purpose. We are concerned in this proceeding with 
Titles I and II of the Act, both of which amend title 5, United States 
Code. 
Title I adds a new Chapter 23 to title 5, including two sections 
pertinent to this proceeding. The first of these is § 2301, which sets 
forth "merit system principles" with which Federal personnel 
management "should be" consistent. As indicated by the Act's 
findings and statement of purpose, these principles are "expressly 
stated to furnish guidance to Federal agencies in carrying out their 
responsibilities in administering the public business." The prin-
ciples, stated in hortatory terms, are not self-executing.1! 
The other pertinent provision of the new Chapter 23 is § 2302(b) 
which makes it a "prohibited personnel practice" for any employee 
to take, direct, recommend or approve a personnel action under any 
of eleven specified circumstances. These prohibited practices are 
defined by statute "to enable Federal employees to avoid conduct 
which undermines the merit system principles and the integrity of 
the merit system," as stated in § 3(2) of the Act. Most of the pro-
hibited personnel practices are defined by § 2302(b) with a degree 
of specificity and are derived from previously existing law or 
regulation. An exception is § 2302(b)(ll), invoked by AFGE in this 
proceeding. That subsection makes it a prohibited personnel prac-
tice to 
10
 S. Rep. No. 96-969, 95th Cong.. 2d Sees. 1 (1978), reprinted in House Comm. on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sens., Legislative History of the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978, at 1465 (Comm. Print No. 96 2. 1979) [hereinafter refer-
red to as legislative History]. In addition to these materials, the legislative history in-
cludes extensive hearings in both houses of Congress. See Civil Service Reform: 
Hearings on H.R. 11280 Before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (19781 (hereinafter referred to as House Hearings]; Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978 Hearings on S. 2640, S. 
2707, and S. 2830 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs. 95th Cong.. 2d 
Sess. (1978) (hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings] The Markup Sessions of the 
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, to be published as Committee 
Markup of Civil Service Reform Legislation (Comm Print No. 33-782, 1978), are 
available in page proof at the present time thereinafter referred to as House Markup] 
The Markup Sessions of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and of the 
House-Senate Conference, both invaluable as documents of legislative history, have 
not yet been published but are available in stenograhic transcript form (hereinafter 
referred to as Senate Markup and (inference Markup respectively!. 
11
 The Conference Report states: "Unless a law, rule or regulation implementing or 
directly concerning the principles is violated (as under section 2302(b)(l 1)), the prin-
ciples themselves may not be made the basis of a legal action by «n employee or 
agency." Legislative History, at 1970. However, OPM is required by § 1104(b)(2), as 
•mended, to establish and maintain an oversight program to "ensure" that ac-
tivities under any personnel management authority that is delegated to agencies by 
the Director of OPM are "in accordance with the merit system principles." 
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|11) take or fail to take any . . . personnel action if the taking 
of or failure to take such action violates any law, rule, or 
regulation implementing, or directly concerning, the merit 
system principles contained in section 2301 of this title. 
Thus a prohibited personnel practice is not established under 
5 2302(b)(ll) merely by showing that an action violates the merit 
system principles. It must be shown by a two-step analysis that the 
action (i) violates a law, rule, or regulation, and (ii) that the violated 
law, rule or regulation is one which ''implements" or which 
•'directly concerns" the merit system principles. 
Title II of the Act relates to civil service functions, performance 
appraisal, and adverse actions. First, it provides for the statutory 
establishment, powers and functions of OPM, the Board, and the 
Special Counsel of the Board. Pertinent to this inquiry is § 1205(e) 
which authorizes the Board to review regulations issued by OPM 
upon petition or upon the Board's own motion. 
If upon review the Board finds an OPM rule or regulation to be in-
valid on its face or as implemented, the Board must direct agencies 
to cease compliance with the invalid provisions or to correct any in-
valid implementation.12 The criteria for the Board's determination 
are whether the regulation would require, or as implemented has re-
quired, the commission of a prohibited personnel practice. 
Second, Title II sets forth a new Chapter 43 headed "Perfor-
mance Appraisal." Section 4301 contains definitions of terms used 
in that subchapter. One of those terms is "unacceptable perfor-
mance," defined by § 4301(3) to mean "performance of an employee 
which fails to meet established performance standards in one or 
more critical elements of such employee's position." 
Section 4302 requires the establishment of performance ap-
praisal systems. Subsection (a) requires each agency to develop 
such systems; subsection (b) specifies the criteria to be satisfied 
and the purposes to be served by each such system. 
Section 4303 authorizes agencies to reduce in grade or remove an 
employee for "unacceptable performance," and provides the pro-
cedures for such actions. Those procedures include 30 days' notice 
of the proposed action which identifies "specific instances of unac-
ceptable performance . . . on which the proposed action is based" 
and "the critical elements of the employee's position involved in 
each instance of unacceptable performance."13 Section 4304 re-
quires OPM to review each appraisal system for compliance with 
the subchapter, and to "direct" agencies to "implement an ap-
propriate system or to correct" any non-complying "operations 
12
 5 U.SC § 1205(e)(3)(C). 
13
 5 U.SC. § 4303(b)(1)(A). 
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under the system."14 Section 4305 authorizes OPM to prescribe 
regulations to carry out the purpose of the subchapter. 
The balance of Title II of the Act concerns adverse actions and 
appeals. Chapter 75 of title 5 is amended to provide statutory pro-
cedural rights in adverse action cases for all non-probationary 
employees in the competitive service. In all such cases, as under 
prior law and regulation, the action taken—whether removal, 
suspension, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough—must be "for 
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."15 
However, Chapter 75 is made expressly inapplicable to "a reduc-
tion in grade or removal under § 4303 of this title."16 
In addition to being exempted from the "efficiency of the ser-
vice" requirement applicable to Chapter 75 adverse actions, unac-
ceptable performance actions under § 4303 are also treated dif-
ferently in the Act's provision concerning the standard of proof re-
quired to sustain the agency action on appeal. 
Section 7701 in Chapter 77, governing appeals to the Board, pro-
vides in subsection (c)(1) that: 
. . . the decision of the agency shall be sustained only if the 
agency's decision— 
(A) in the case of an action based on unacceptable perfor-
mance described in section 4303 of this title, is supported by 
substantial evidence, or 
(B) in any other case, is supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
This distinction was intended to provide a "lower standard of 
proof" in § 4303 performance cases "because of the difficulty of 
proving that an employee's performance is unacceptable."17 The 
preponderance of the evidence standard, specified by 
§ 7701(c)(1)(B) for all other cases, was regarded as reflecting the law 
previously applicable to all adverse action cases.18 
14
 Agencies are obliged to act upon OPM's directions. 6 U.SC. $ 4304(b)(3). 
18
 6 U.SC. §§ 7503(a). 7613(a). The prior requirements appeared in 5 U.S.C. 
f 7612(a) (1977) and 6 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1978). 
in
 5 U.S.C. § 7612(D). 
17
 Legislative History, at 1981 (Conference Report). See also id., at 1473-1474 (Senate 
Report). 
18
 Id., at 1518 (Senate Report). In other respects, the amended §7701 expands 
employees' statutory rights in adverse action appeals by providing for a right to a 
hearing with a transcript in all cases; placing the burden of proof on the agency in all 
cases; requiring that removal cases be heard only by the Board itself, an ad-
ministrative law judge, or an experienced hearing officer; and authorizing attorneys' 
fees to be awarded to employees who prevail on the merits if payment by the agency 
is found to be "warranted in the interest of justice, including any case in which a 
prohibited personnel practice was engaged in by <he agency or any case in which the 
agency's action was clearly without merit." 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(U, (b). (c). (g). Other 
changes in prior law include the requirement that notwithstanding the agency's 
205 
B. The OPM Regulations 
OPM's interim and final regulations implementing § 4303, issued 
respectively on January 16 and August 3, 1979, included the follow-
ing provisions under challenge here: 
Interim Part 432 Final Part 432 
§ 432.206 Interim procedures § 432.205 Interim procedures 
Until the date, but no later than Oc- Until the date, but no later than 
tober I, 1981, that an agency has October 1, 1981, that an agency has 
established its performance appraisal established a performance appraisal 
system(s) and communicated to each system under Part 430 of this title 
employee the performance standards which covers an employee against 
and critical elements of the employee's whom an action is contemplated: 
position, an action under this part may (a) A notice of action under this part 
only be initiated 30 days after: may be proposed only after: 
in) the critical elements of the (1) The agency has discussed with and 
employee's position and communicated to the employee the 
(bl the performance standards for the critical elements of the employee's job 
one or more critical elements for which and the performance standards for the 
the e m p l o y e e ' s performance is one or more critical element* for which 
unacceptable have been communicated the employee 's performance it 
to the employee against whom an action unacceptable and 
is contemplated. (2) The employee has been given a 
reasonable time and opportunity to 
demonstrate acceptable performance. 
(b) An action may be affected under 
this part only in accordance with all 
other requirements of this part. 
The opening clauses of these regulations both provide for § 4303 
removal and demotion actions to be instituted before an agency has 
established a "performance appraisal system" covering the af-
fected employee. It is in this respect that the provisions set forth 
"interim procedures/* as reflected by the subsection titles. 
Both provide that before a notice of § 4303 action may be pro-
posed, the agency must previously have communicated to the 
employee (i) the "critical elements** of the employee's position or 
job but only Hi) those "performance standards** which are "for the 
one or more critical elements for which the employee's performance 
is unacceptable.*' In the interim regulation such communication 
was required to precede the notice of proposed action by at least 30 
days. 
OPM explained the requirements of the interim regulation in the 
following guidance issued to all departments and agencies in FPM 
Bulletin 432.1 (Attachment 2, Question 23, February 15, 1979): 
meeting its burden of proof, the agency action may not be sustained if the employee 
shows harmful procedural error by the agency in arriving at its adverse decision or 
that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel practice. 5 U.S.C. 
§7701<cM2). 
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Q. Our new agency performance appraisal system is not yet 
in place. However, we have an employee whose performance is 
completely unacceptable to us. 
A. OPM realizes that many agencies may not have their per-
formance appraisal systems finally approved and in place for 
some time after January 11, 1979, the effective date for the 
general provisions of subchapter I of chapter 43. In its interim 
Part 432, OPM has established interim procedures for situa-
tions like yours. These require that the agency communicate 
to an employee against whom it contemplates an action the 
critical elements of the employee's position and the perfor-
mance standards for each critical element for which the 
employee's performance is unacceptable. These must be com-
municated to the employee 30 days before any actions is pro-
posed. [Original emphasis) 
The final regulation replaces the 30-day requirement with the 
more general provision that the employee must have been given 
"reasonable time and opportunity *»• demonstrate acceptable per-
formance" before the action is proposed.19 The other changes made 
by the final regulation are the added requirements that the critical 
elements and the standards in which performance was deficient 
must have been "discussed with" as well as communicated to the 
employee, and that § 4303 actions may be effected "only in accor-
dance with all other requirements'* of the final Part 432. Those 
other requirements, which generally track § 4303,20 include the pro-
vision that a § 4303 action may be initiated at any time the 
employee*s performance becomes unacceptable during the "perfor-
mance appraisal cycle," a term not defined. 
Both interim and final Part 430 require agencies to submit 
"proposed appraisal systems" to OPM for review no later than 
July 31, 1981, to "implement an approved system or systems" on 
or before October 1, 1981, and to "inform all employees . . . of the 
performance standards and critical elements of their positions" no 
later than October 1, 1981. The final Part 430 adds that employees 
must be so informed "as soon as the system is approved."21 But 
neither interim § 432.206 nor final § 432.205 states any criteria for 
ascertaining when an agency has "established" its relevant ap-
19
 This is defined in final § 432.202 as "an amount of time commensurate with the 
duties and responsibilities of the employee's job which is sufficient to allow the 
employee to show whether he or she can meet minimum performance standards." 5 
C F.R § 432 202, 44 Fed. Reg 45594 (1979). 
20
 The entire text of § 4303 is set forth as Subpart A of both interim and final Part 
432, preceding Subpart B which specifies OPM's "Regulatory Requirements." 5 
CFR. §432 101(1979); id., 44 Fed Reg 45593(1979). 
21
 6C.F.R. § 430.301 (1979); Id., 44 Fed. Reg. 45591 (1979). 
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praisal system for purposes of terminating the availability of 
••interim procedures" for § 4303 actions.22 
Both interim and final Part 430 require that performance ap-
praisals under established systems "shall" be used, inter alia, "As 
a basis for decisions to grant awards; grant or withhold pay in-
creases, i.e., within-grade increases, step increases, and quality 
step increases; grant merit pay; reassign; promote; train; retain in 
reduction in force; and reduce in grade or remove."23 
C. SSA Implementation 
ft is undisputed on the record that SSA has failed to establish 
performance appraisal systems under § 4302 and Part 430 covering 
any of its employees. Following the issuance of OPM's interim 
regulations and FPM Bulletin 432-1, Herbert T. Doggette, Jr., 
SSA's Acting Associate Commissioner for Management, Budget, 
and Personnel, issued a memorandum dated March 15, 1979, to all 
SSA Regional Commissioners and certain other officials entitled 
"Implementation of the Unacceptable Performance Provisions of 
the Civil Service Reform Act—INFORMATION."24 SSA agrees 
that this memorandum set forth SSA policy "implementing" the 
OPM interim regulations.25 
The March 15 memorandum referred to inquiries received from 
SSA field personnel as to whether SSA intended to develop perfor-
mance standards and critical elements "centrally" or whether this 
should be done at "a regional or component" level. Doggette stated 
that SSA planned to develop such elements and standards "cen-
trally for all jobs which have standard position descriptions" and 
that field officials would be kept advised of progress. The 
memorandum then stated: 
In the meantime, in order to take action based on new regula-
tions, supervisors should develop interim critical elements on an as-
needed basis to implement the unacceptable performance provision 
of the law. Once these critical elements have been established 
(and reviewed by a higher level of management) the employee 
22
 In a more recent memorandum to Agency Personnel Directors, dated November 
26. 1979, OPM has advised: 
The interim period ends when an agency has implemented an approved per* 
formance appraisal system or systems. Implementation of such systems must 
include informing employees of the performance standards and critical 
elements of their positions. Thus, the issuance of an agency regulation does 
not, in and of itself, terminate the interim period. The period terminates when 
an approved system has been fully implemented. 
2 3
 5 C.F.R. (430.203(1). 44 Fed. Reg. 45591 (1979); see also 5 C.F.R. § 430.204(h) 
(1979). 
24
 Record, pp 39.100. 
25
 Record, p. 388. 
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must receive the required 30-day notice to improve before tak-
ing adverse action. You should consult with your servicing 
personnel office to assure that normal proper documentation 
is achieved in these actions. (Emphasis supplied] 
The March 15 memorandum made no explicit reference to interim 
development of performance standards, as distinct from critical 
elements. However, it is not disputed that the memorandum was 
both understood and intended as directing that performance stan-
dards, like critical elements, be developed by supervisors on an 
"as-needed basis.*'26 The March 15 memorandum was so treated in 
Mr. Doggette's subsequent memorandum to the same SSA officials 
dated May 30, 1979, which reaffirmed the March 15 procedures and 
added the requirement that such ' 'interim critical elements and per-
formance standards'* (emphasis supplied) be reviewed at the Deputy 
Regional Commissioner level before "the elements and standards" 
are communicated to employees.27 
It is undisputed that under this procedure SSA has com-
municated "critical elements" and "performance standards" to 
selected employees only—employees whom SSA management had 
already identified, prior to communication of such elements and 
standards, as deficient performers.28 SSA acknowledges that the 
purpose of communicating critical elements to such employees was 
not to conduct a performance appraisal but to take removal or 
demotion action.29 
Among 86,000 employees of SSA, only 41 had received notice of 
"critical elements" under SSA's implementation of the OPM 
regulation. In each instance, communication of critical elements 
was regarded by SSA management as a step in taking action 
against the employee. SSA had formally proposed or effected the 
removal or demotion of 24 of those 41 employees under § 4303 and 
interim § 432.206 by August 9, 1979, when SSA entered into an 
M AFGE has so alleged (Record p. 731. and SSA has not denied it. See also 
Transcript of Oral Argument. Sept. 27, 1979, at 96-97 (oral argument of SSA) 
(hereinafter referred to as Transcript). 
27
 Record, p. 98. The May 30 memorandum also required that an "informational 
copy" of such "interim elements and standards" be sent to the SSA central person-
nel office where it would be available to all other SSA components having similar 
positions "for their information." 
28
 Record, pp. 2, 27. 72 73. 
29
 SSA states, "When taking action against an employee for unacceptable perfor-
mance, as opposed to appraising his/her performance under 5 U.S.C 4302, there is no 
need, and nothing that requires a supervisor, to notify an employee of those 
elements in which he/she is performing acceptably." Record, p. 378 (emphasis sup-
plied). SSA's acknowledgment that no "appraisal" is involved in these cases ac-
cords with OPM's interim regulations which defined "appraisal" as a comparison of 
•n employee's performance with standards "under an appraisal system," 5 C F R. 
§ 430 203(c) (1979). Since SSA had no "appraisal system," it could not conduct such 
an "appraisal" in any of these cases. 
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agreement with the Special Counsel halting such actions. The 24 
employees include 12 claims representatives in Nebraska* 
Missouri, California, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, the District of Col-
umbia, Maryland and Virginia, and 12 other employees scattered in 
four job classification series and six states. No two of those 24 
employees at the same series and grade are in the same state. The 
remaining 17 employees to whom "critical elements*' had been 
communicated are similarly scattered in four job series.30 
Both AFGE and SSA agree that the merits of any individual 
adverse action are not at issue in this proceeding.31 
As OPM construes its regulations, SSA's implementation did not 
violate those regulations.32 
III. MOOTNESS 
OPM contends that Board review of the interim regulations for 
facial validity has been rendered moot by issuance of the final 
regulations, because all future actions by agencies may be taken 
only pursuant to the final regulations. By this view, the only ques-
tion remaining before the Board as to the interim regulations is 
whether they were invalidly implemented by SSA. We disagree. 
Certainly, issues under the interim regulations remain alive as to 
actions merely held in abeyance by agreement between the Special 
Counsel and SSA, and agencies other than SSA have apparently in-
itiated actions under those regulations.33 Resolution of the issues 
raised by the interim regulations will avoid the repetition of like 
controversies. In any event, the Board is not strictly bound by the 
mootness doctrine. 
The Board as an administrative agency with quasi-judicial func-
tions has powers and limitations distinct from those of an Article 
III court. The Constitutional restriction imposed by Article III 
limiting courts to "cases" or "controversies" would therefore not 
necessarily bind the Board. Moreover, Congress has conferred 
specific powers on the Board to review an OPM regulation on the 
Board's own motion, pursuant to § 1205(e)(1)(A). Congress thus con-
templated the exercise of the Board's review function without the 
*° Transcript at 96 (oral argument of SSA); Record, pp. 208,201. SSA expressly ad-
mits that "notification of performance standards and critical elements" constitutes 
for SSA employees one of the four "stages" in which "actions (arej pending." the 
other such stages being warning that performance is lacking, proposal to take per* 
sonnet action, decision to take personnel action, and personnel action effected. 
Record, p. 108. The Board expresses no opinion as to the appropriateness of the 
"critical elements" and "performance standards" assigned by SSA to these 
employees. 
31
 Record, pp. 54. 105,386. 
32
 Transcript at 81-82 (oral argument of OPM). 
33
 The Special Counsel has advised thst he has entered into agreements with tha 
FTC and IRS similar to his agreement with SSA. Record, pp. 318. 337. 
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action of a complaining party. In addition, however, the proceeding 
before the Board was initiated under § 1205(e)(1)(B) on behalf of all 
employees affected by the interim regulations. 
Moreover, in administrative law cases the courts have recognized 
that the mootness doctrine should not be so applied that resolution 
of continuing issues is ''defeated by short-term orders, capable of 
repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the Government, 
and at another time the (affected persons).. . have their rights 
determined by the Commission without a chance of redress.'* 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 
U.S. 498, 515 (1911). In such cases, "hit is sufficient. . . that the 
litigant show . . . an immediate and definite governmental action or 
policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present 
interest." Super Tire Engineering Co.v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 127 
(1974). The key elements to consider are the likelihood of repetition 
of the controversy and the public interest in assuring appellate 
review. Alton <ft Southern Railway Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 463 
F.2d 872, 878-880 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
That is the situation here. Both the interim and the final Part 432 
provide for unacceptable performance actions to be instituted 
under § 4303 before any "performance appraisal system" covering 
the affected employee has been established by the agency. In this 
respect the final regulation is the same as the interim and the 
changes which have been made have not erased this controversy.34 
Under these circumstances no consideration of judicial efficiency 
or economy of the Board's resources, or of potential impact upon 
parties not before the Board, is served by eschewing consideration 
of the interim regulation. On the contrary, if the Board now con-
siders only the validity of the regulation as implemented by SSA, 
there would remain for review in numerous other Board pro-
ceedings the implementation of that same regulation by dozens of 
other departments and agencies between January 11 and August 3, 
1979. This would entail a burdensome drain upon the Board's 
resources (and upon those of the agencies) that should be un-
necessary to impose if the underlying OPM regulation is itself in-
valid. 
OPM's mere substitution of a "final" for an "interim' regulation, 
with no substantive alteration in the matters at issue, does not 
place the facial validity of the interim regulation beyond the 
Board's reach. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co., supra. Since one of 
the purposes of the Board's § 1205(e) authority is to facilitate strik-
ing at the source of a government-wide prohibited personnel prac-
tice without being obliged to consume resources in attacking each 
34
 Set. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. 293 U.S. 388, 414 (1936); Rodway v. United 
State* Dept of Agriculture. 482 F 2d 722. 726 (I) C Cir. 1973), Abbott* Dairy l)w of 
Fairmont Food*, Inc. v.RuU. 389 F. Supp. 12 (E D. Pa. 1975). 
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instance of such a practice through multiple proceedings, we reject 
the contention that the mootness doctrine prevents the Board from 
considering the facial validity of OPM's interim regulation. 
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 4303 TO SECTION 4302 
The attack upon the OPM regulations is grounded on the claim 
that an unacceptable performance action under § 4303 may be in-
stituted only after a performance appraisal system satisfying 
§ 4302 covers the affected employee. In providing otherwise, 
AFGE argues, OPM's regulations require the commission of 
§2302(b)(H) prohibited personnel practices, because §4302 im-
plements or directly concerns the merit system principles and its 
violation is therefore contrary to § 2302(b)(l 1). 
Since under § 2302(b)(ll) we do not reach the question of how a 
particular law relates to the merit system principles unless we first 
determine that such law has been violated, we start by considering 
whether the regulations under review are in violation of any of the 
requirements of Chapter 43, subchapter I. This determination 
turns essentially on the relationship between § 4303 and § 4302. 
A. Statutory Analysis 
According to AFGE, the "integrated nature" of the provisions of 
Chapter 43, subchapter I, mandates the conclusion that no § 4303 
action may be taken against an employee as to whom a § 4302 ap-
praisal system is not fully in place. AFGE claims that such ap-
praisal systems must include all elements of § 4302, not merely 
those which happen to be mentioned also in § 4303. 
OPM relies heavily upon § 4303(a) which states: 
Subject to the provision of this section, an agency may reduce in 
grade or remove an employee for unacceptable performance. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The opening clause of § 4303(a) does support OPM's view that 
there are no requirements applicable to performance removal and 
demotion actions other than those found in § 4303 itself. Granting 
that much, however, this construction is insufficient to carry OPM 
as far as OPM contends, for by its own terms § 4303(a) authorizes 
actions only for "unacceptable performance." The term "unaccept-
able performance" thus limits the application of § 4303 no less 
than does the opening clause.35 
S5
 Congress more than likely intended by this opening clause simply to make plain 
that no additional procedural standards, such as those imposed by prior law. regula-
tion or judicial interpretation, would be required of agencies in § 4303 actions. In 
discussing this section the Senate Committee stated: 
One of the chief differences between the procedures currently applicable at 
the agency level and the proposed procedures concerns the standard govern-
ing the agency's action Under current law, an employee may be dismissed for 
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"Unacceptable performance" as used in the Reform Act is not a 
generic term. It is a term of art whose meaning is expressly defined 
in §4301(3) "for the purpose of this subchapter." In that sub-
chapter the term is then used only in § 4302(b)(5), § 4302(b)(6), and 
seven times in the title and text of § 4303. The only permissible 
conclusion is that the term has the same meaning in § 4303 as in 
§ 4302, i.e., the meaning specified by § 4301(3). 
Unacceptable performance as defined by § 4301(3) means "per-
formance . . . which fails to meet established performance standards in 
one or more critical elements of such employee's position" (emphasis 
supplied). OPM concedes that the word "established" in this 
definition means established pursuant to § 4302, but contends that 
only the portion of § 4302 relating to performance standards and 
critical elements is thereby implicated in the meaning of 
"unacceptable performance," not all of the elements of § 4302.36 
Textual analysis as well as the structure of Chapter 43. sub-
chapter I, taken as a whole37 demonstrates that "established" as 
used in §4301(3) refers to performance standards and critical 
elements which are established as part of an appraisal system under 
§ 4302. Indeed, OPM came close to saying as much when it ex-
plained, in issuing final § 430.202(a), that pre-Reform Act perfor-
mance standards are not to be carried automatically into § 4302 ap-
praisal systems but that ". . . standards will be established as part 
of new performance appraisal systems.' '3ft 
The performance appraisal systems required to be established by 
§ 4302 must not only meet certain criteria but must also be used to 
serve a number of specified purposes. Subsection (a) of § 4302 re-
unacceptable performance only if dismissal would improve the efficiency of 
the service. As a practical matter, agencies have found it very difficult to 
prove this to the degree required by courts through a series of judicial deci-
sions. Section 4303(a) imposes a new standard. It is "performance which fails 
to meet established requirements in one or more critical elements of the job." 
The Committee intends that this new standard should not be governed by the 
existing case law defining the present standard, "such cause as will promote 
the efficiency of the service." 
Legislative Htitorv, at 1507 (Senate Report). 
36
 Transcript at 80 (oral argument of OPM). 
87
 As stated by the Supreme Court in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)-
We believe it fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in 
isolation from the context of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our respon-
sibility in interpreting legislation 'we must not be guided by a single sentence 
or member of a sentence but (shouldl look to the provisions of the whole lew 
and its policy.' [Citations omitted ) 
See also, Hudson Distributors. Inc. v. Eh Lilly Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964); IV L.R B v. 
Lion Oil Co , 352 U S. 282 (1957); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F 2d 154 (D C Cir. 1968); 
and United States v. St Regi* Paper Co , 355 F 2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
** 44 Fed. Reg 45688 (1979). |Kmphasis supplied 1 
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quires each agency to "develop one or more" performance ap-
praisal systems which provide for periodic appraisals of 
employees* job performance, "encourage" employee participation 
in establishing performance standards, and "use the results of per-
formance appraisals as a basis for training, rewarding, reassigning, 
promoting, reducing in grade, retaining, and removing 
employees."39 In contrast, the only personnel action for which the 
former Chapter 43 provided that performance ratings were to be a 
basis was removal.40 
Subsection (b) specifies requirements to be met and purposes to 
be served which "each performance appraisal system shall provide 
for" under regulations to be prescribed by OPM. Among those re-
quirements is "establishing performance standards which will . . . per-
mit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of ob-
jective criteria . . . related to the job in question for each employee 
or position under the system/'41 This is the sole reference in 
§ 4302(b) to establishment of performance standards; it provides 
for such establishment only with respect to employees or positions 
"under the system," a clear indication that §4302 does not con-
template establishment of such standards on an isolated basis ex-
trinsic to or independent of an appraisal system. 
The only reference in § 4302 to the timing with which its re-
quirements must be met is in subsection (b)(2), which specifies that 
each appraisal system provide for— 
as soon as practicable, but not later than October 1,1981, with 
respect to initial appraisal periods, and thereafter at the 
beginning of each following appraisal period, communicating 
to each employee the performance standards and the'critical 
elements of the employee's position. 
As the only other portion of § 4302(b) mentioning performance 
standards and the only portion of § 4302 to use the term "critical 
elements," this provision likewise alludes to such standards and 
elements only in the context of a system, as indicated by the 
references to "initial appraisal periods" and "each following ap-
praisal period/' Such references to successive and continuing ap-
praisals could have no meaning except in the context of the rest of 
39
 Because § 4302 appraisal systems provide the basis for these actions, agencies 
are expected to start using § 4302 appraisals for these purposes as soon as their 
system is in place, upon OPM review and approval. This does not mean that an 
agency is required to demonstrate that it has used the results of appraissls under the 
§ 4302 system for decisions concerning training.rewarding, reassigning, or pro-
moting before it can take an action under § 4303 It is sufficient that it demonstrate 
its system provide* the bantu for making these decisions 
40
 See 5 U S C § 4304(b) (1977) By separate provision, performance ratings were 
also required to be considered in determining the order of retention of employees in 
a reduction in force. 5 U S C ^ 3502 (1977) 
41
 5 U S C § 4302(b)(1) (Emphasis supplied.! 
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§ 4302, including subsection (b)(3) which requires each appraisal 
system to provide for periodic evaluations of each employee "on 
such standards" and subsection (a)(1) requiring agencies to develop 
systems that "provide for periodic appraisals of job performance 
of employees." 
Subsections (b)(4), (5), and (6) require that each appraisal system 
provide for use of its results for the several purposes referred to in 
subsection (a)(3). Only the last of those uses is adverse to 
employees, requiring systems to provide for "reassigning, reducing 
in grade, or removing employees who continue to have unaccept-
able performance but only after an opportunity to demonstrate ac-
ceptable performance."42 
Analysis of § 4303 demonstrates that it is premised on the opera-
tion of a performance appraisal system meeting all the re-
quirements of § 4302. OPM agrees that prior communication to the 
employee of performance standards and critical elements estab-
lished under § 4302 is a necessary condition of the notice required 
by § 4303(b)(1)(A). OPM also agrees that a prior opportunity to 
demonstrate acceptable performance as required by § 4302(b)(6) is 
a necessary condition of such § 4303(b)(1)(A) notice.43 But 
§ 4303(b)(1)(A) also requires that the notice identify "specific in-
stances of unacceptable performance," which necessarily posits 
some process by which the agency has evaluated the employee's 
performance against the established performance standards and 
found that the performance "fails to meet [those] . . . standards in 
one or more critical elements." Such an evaluation process is 
similarly implicit in § 4303(d). which provides for consideration of 
improved performance during the notice period. The evaluation 
process posited by § 4303 can only be the appraisal process called 
for by §§ 4302(a)(1), (3) and (b)(1), (2), and (3). Any different conclu-
sion would be inconsistent with the requirement of §§ 4302(a)(3) 
and (b)(6) that appraisals under § 4302 systems be used "as a 
basis" for "reducing in grade, or removing employees who con-
tinue to have unacceptable performance. . . . " 
The only elements of § 4302 not expressly or implicitly refer-
enced in § 4303 are the requirement that appraisal systems "en-
courage" employee participation in establishing performance stan-
dards,44 and the requirements for use of appraisals for purposes 
other than demoting or removing unacceptable performers.45 
However, given the fact that § 4303 addresses only demotions and 
removals for failure to meet performance standards once they have 
been established, no occasion for referring to those other § 4302 
42
 5 U S C $ 4302(b)(6). 
43
 Transcript at 82 (oral argument of OPM). 
44
 5 U S C § 4302(a)(2) 
46
 5 U.S.C § 4303(b)(4), (5). and the reassignment provision of (6). 
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elements is provided by the context of § 4303, Consequently, no 
significance can reasonably be attached to the omission of such 
references in § 4303. 
OPM's further argument that §4302 has a "delayed effective 
date" by reason of the 1981 deadline in § 4302(b)(2) is wide of the 
mark. All provisions of the Act became effective on January 11, 
1979, except "as otherwise expressly provided in" the Act.46 No 
such express provision appears in connection with § 4302, and we 
decline to infer such an intention from § 4302(b)(2) in view of Con-
gress* plain demonstration in this same Act that it knew how to pro-
vide expressly for a delayed effective date when it intended to do 
so.4 7 Furthermore, the plain meaning of § 4302 is contrary to 
OPM's argument, since § 4302(b)(2) requires that appraisal systems 
provide for communication of performance standards and critical 
elements to each employee "as soon as practicable." The October 
1981 deadline for completing such communication to every 
employee covered by subchapter I of Chapter 43 obviously could 
not be met if the agencies were free to delay until October 1981 in 
commencing to develop the systems and establish the standards re-
quired by § 4302. 
This reading of §§ 4302 and 4303 does not lead to the conclusion 
that OPM's regulations require agencies to violate § 4302, as 
claimed by AFGE. The requirements of § 4302 are that agencies 
"develop" certain "systems" and that those systems shall each 
"provide for" meeting certain criteria and serving certain pur-
poses. No party has identified, and we have not found, any provi-
sion of the regulations under review that calls for agencies to 
violate those requirements. On the contrary. Part 430 of OPM's 
regulations obliges agencies affirmatively to develop such systems 
and to submit them to OPM for review no later than July 1, 1981. 
Rather, the conclusion to which our analysis points is that OPM 
interim procedures result in violation of § 4303, by providing for 
resort to that section's removal and demotion procedures in cases 
not authorized by § 4303(a). Our analysis of the language and struc-
ture of §§ 4302 and 4303, together with the definition of "unaccept-
able performance" in § 4301(3), demonstrates that § 4303(a) 
4
* Section 907 of the Act. 92 Stat. 127. 6 U.S.C. § 1101 note. 
47
 The Act's exceptions to the general effective date are stated unambiguously In 
such explicit phrases as. "Effective beginning October 1980 " section 307, 92 
Stat, i 147. amending 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (relating to veterans and preference eligiblesl; 
"The provisions of this title . . . shall take effect 9 months after the date of enact-
ment of this Act," section 415(a)(1). 92 Stat. 1179. 5 U.S.C. § 3131 note (Senior Ex-
ecutive Service); "Effective one year after the date of enactment of the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978. . . ." section 602(a)(3), 92 Stat. 1189. 42 U.S.C § 4728(h) (amend-
ing Intergovernmental Personnel Act); and "The amendments made by this subsec-
tion shall take effect on the first day of the first applicable pay period beginning on 
or after the 90th day after the date of enactment of this Act," section 801(a)(4)(A), 92 
Stat. 1222. 5 U.S.C § 5361 note (Grade and Pay Retention). 
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authorizes actions under that section only against employees for 
failure to meet performance standards which have been established 
as part of § 4302 performance appraisal systems. This would mean 
that a removal or demotion for failure to meet standards not so 
established cannot be an action for "unacceptable performance** as 
defined in § 4301(3) and, therefore, is not an action authorized by 
§ 4303(a). 
Such a reading of § 4303 is consistent also with the position 
derived from § 4301(3) that a removal or demotion action may be 
taken under § 4303 for an employee's failure to meet established 
standards in even a single "critical element'* of the employee's 
position. Since "efficiency of the service*' need not be shown under 
§ 4303, the agency's authority to establish an employee*s perfor-
mance standards and critical elements is tantamount to authority 
to shape the criteria by which the employee may be removed. When 
the lesser evidentiary burden of "substantial evidence" for § 4303 
actions is also considered, in lieu of the "preponderance" standard 
applicable under Chapter 75, it is manifest that performance stan-
dards and critical elements should be established under cir-
cumstances providing adequate safeguards for employees. Concern 
for such safeguards is apparent in the requirement of § 4302(b)(1) 
that performance standards "will, to the maximum extent feasible, 
permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of 
objective criteria." 
This concern is also apparent in the requirements of § 4304 that 
OPM make technical assistance available to agencies in the 
development of performance appraisal systems and that OPM 
review such systems for compliance with subchapter I, including 
compliance with the accuracy and objective criteria requirements 
of § 4302(b)(1), with authority in OPM to direct agencies to make 
corrections. By assuring that § 4303 actions are based only on per-
formance standards established under an appraisal system which 
has been reviewed for compliance with those requirements, this 
reading of § 4303 gives effect to the concerns for safeguards 
reflected in §§ 4302(b)(1) and 4304. 
B. Legislative History 
The legislative history shows that Congress intended to provide 
in § 4302 a more meaningful replacement for the former perfor-
mance rating systems which were regarded as useless or ineffec-
tive; to require a single interrelated framework for performance ap-
praisals under § 4302 systems in which those appraisals would be 
the basis for multiple personnel actions including promotions, pay 
increases and awards as well as adverse actions; and to require that 
§ 4303 actions be based on the results of such appraisal systems. It 
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the-art for appraising employee performance and the consequent 
potential for arbitrariness, and sought to protect against those 
risks by requiring objective performance criteria and careful 
review by OPM of each appraisal system. 
The Senate Report discussed at length the purposes of § 4302 per* 
formance appraisals and the relationship of such appraisals to 9 
4303 performance actions. The Senate bill did not include any 
delayed deadline for establishing § 4302 systems. Nonetheless, the 
Report reflected expectation that § 4303 actions would be in* 
tegrated with § 4302 systems. In summarizing the major provisions 
of S. 2640, that Report stated.48 
S. 2640 will accelerate the personnel action process while 
protecting employees* rights to fair treatment. The bill will 
simplify and expedite procedures for dismissals of Federal 
employees whose performance is below the acceptable level within a 
comprehensive framework for performance evaluation. The bill re* 
quires that performance evaluation be used as a basis for all deci-
sions about rewarding, promoting, and retaining Federal employee*. 
The Report describes "the purpose of section 203/ ' enacting all of 
subchapter 1 of Chapter 43 including both §§ 4302 and 4303, as "to 
provide for new systems of appraising employee work perfor-
mance." 4 9 It then states:50 
The bill provides that appraisals of performance for all pur» 
poses shall be made within a single, interrelated system. 
Finally, the bill makes the performance ratings given under the 
system more meaningful than in the past. The rating an employee 
receives should be a consideration in rewarding or promoting an 
employee and in decisions about demotion or removal from the 
Federal service. Salary increases under the merit pay system 
proposed by title V of the bill will be based on the performance 
ratings system provided by this section. 
The Report then provides a detailed discussion of § 4302 and the 
nexus between that section and personnel actions based on perfor-
mance. Because of their importance, pertinent excerpts are set 
forth here:51 
Section 4302(a) details the objectives of the performance ap-
praisal systems, and requires agencies to develop and 
establish one or more performance appraisal systems which 
will encourage superior performance. i4ny system established by 
an agency must meet the criteria established by this section. The 
4
" foeinlativ* History, at 1474 (Senate Report). (Emphasis supplied.) 
° /</ . .at 1503. 
5 0
 Id., at 1504. (Emphasis supplied.) 
51
 /of., at 1505-1506. [Emphasis supplied.) 
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provision requires "periodic appraisals" of job performance. 
Under current regulations, ratings are required at least an-
nually. The Civil Service Commission has informed the Com-
mitte that it anticipates that a similar requirement will be 
established under this provision. 
The section specifically encourages employee participation 
in establishing performance objectives. Experience has shown 
that doing so motivates employees to accomplish the objec-
tives. Management will have the ultimate responsibility under 
this section, however, to establish the performance standards. 
Section 4302(a) specifically provides that the ratings derived from 
the performance appraisal system will be used as a basis for a wide 
variety of personnel actions. 
. . . Performance appraisal is an integral part of manage-
ment . . . and any time which may be required to implement the 
system should be more than fully justified by improved employee 
performance. 
Agencies are required to establish performance require-
ments and standards of performance at the beginning of the 
rating period and to communicate them—though not necessar-
ily in written form—to employees. Employees1 performance ap-
praisals must be based on these previously established performance 
standards. 
Agencies are required to take action, based on performance ap-
praisals, to: 
(1) recognize and reward employees whose performance 
warrants it; 
(2) assist employees whose performance is unacceptable 
to improve; and 
(3) reassign, demote, or separate employees whose perfor-
mance continues to be unacceptable. 
Section 4302(b)(4) specifies that an adverse action should be 
taken against an employee with an unacceptable performance 
rating only after the employee has had an adequate opportu-
nity to improve his job performance. 
In its discussion of § 4303, the Report notes that an employee 
may be removed or demoted at any time that performance becomes 
unacceptable "during the performance appraisal cycle."52 again 
demonstrating the expectation that § 4303 actions are to be based 
on appraisals under § 4302 systems. 
Both the Senate and the House bills were based on proposals of 
the Administration, whose chief spokesman on the legislation was 
M/rf. at 1506. 
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Alan K. Campbell, then Chairman of the Civil Service Commis-
sion. Chairman Campbell's testimony before both bodies ad-
dressed the failures of the previous appraisal requirements, which 
the new system was expected to remedy:53 
The present performance appraisal requirements are based 
on the Performance Hating Act of 1950. The purposes of that 
Act were to recognize the merits of employees and their con-
tributions to efficiency and economy, to provide fair appraisals 
of employee performance, to improve employee performance, to 
strengthen supervisor-employee relationships, and to remove 
employees whose performance is unsatisfactory from their positions. 
These purposes have not been achieved. In part, this failure is at* 
tributable to inadequacies in the state-of-the-art for appraising 
employee performance. In other respects, the constraints and 
complexities of the present statutory provisions have made it 
impossible to administer a workable program that provides 
managers and employees the information they both need about 
employee performance. 
Of the existing statutory provisions, one of the weakest is 
the requirement to assign summary adjective performance 
ratings. Such ratings are useless as a basis for rewarding 
superior performance, encouraging improved performance, 
withholding pay step increases of employees whose perfor-
mance is marginal or substandard, or removing employees for 
unsatisfactory performance because they do not provide enough 
information to make any of these decisions. The inadequacy of 
summary adjective ratings as a mangement tool stems from 
the excessively restrictive statutory criterion for assigning an 
"outstanding" rating, from subsequent changes in the General 
Schedule pay statutes governing the determination of entitle-
ment to within-grade pay increases, and from the requirement 
to use adverse action procedures to demote or remove an 
employee for "unsatisfactory" performance. 
He then explained how the new system would be expected to link 
appraisal with a subsequent adverse action based on unacceptable 
performance:54 
A single integrated framework for giving performance appraisals 
for all performance related purposes is needed to better interrelate 
the various decisions that are made on the basis of work per-
formance . . . . Agencies will be required to take action, based on 
performance appraisals, to: (If recognize employees whose perfor-
mance significantly exceeds requirements; (2) help employees whose 
*"* House Hearings at 31; Senate Hearings at 102. (Emphasis supplied in both.| 
M
 House Hearings at 32; Senate Hearings at 102-103. (Emphasis supplied.I 
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performance is unacceptable to improve: and (3) remove employees 
from their positions when their performance becomes unacceptable, 
after warning and an opportunity for improvement. 
The new performance appraisal systems envisioned by this 
title will contribute to the goal of improving the quality of 
employee performance by establishing that certain personnel ac-
tions must be based on performance appraisals assigned under ap-
praisal systems tailored to the work force and mission of an 
agency . . . . The increased emphasis on meaningful ap-
praisals will impose additional responsibilities on managers, 
but it will also provide them with a more effective and 
equitable means of managing their employees. 
Further, in response to a written question from the Senate Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs, inquiring how an individual 
employee's performance will be rated under the performance ap-
praisal system, Chairman Campbell again expressed the interrela-
tionship of appraisal systems and performance-based personnel ac-
tions:55 
This question appears to assume that a single system will be 
utilized Government-wide. It is our intention, however, that 
agencies make the determination of what type of performance 
appraisal methods best suited their needs. This may range 
from a traditional system to a management by objectives type 
of system, with more than one system used for different 
groups of employees. For example, within the same agency, a 
management-by-objectives system might be used for profes-
sional and managerial employees and a traditional system 
might be used for clerical or wage employees. Regardless of the 
method used, the bill requires that performance appraisal systems 
meet certain criteria. Among these are that: (I) performance stahd-
ards must be established in advance; (2) the employee must be in-
formed of these criteria; (3) his or her performance will be a basis for 
promotions, pay increases, awards, retention in reduction in force, 
etc. 
S. 2640 was amended on the Senate floor in two respects pertinent 
here. Both amendments were offered by Senator Stevens and ac-
cepted by the Committee. One added the provision enacted as 
§ 4304(b)(1) requiring OPM to review each § 4302 appraisal system 
for compliance with the requirements of subchapter I. Senator 
Stevens explained:56 
The provision will insure compliance with merit principles and 
appropriate personnel standards. 
Senate Hearings at 154. (Emphasis supplied.I 
Legislative History, at 1664-1665 (Senate debate). (Emphasis supplied.I 
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Existing performance ratings in the Civil Service fail to 
measure the relative merits of employees. The rating system is 
a burden that withdraws more in effort than its returns in effi-
ciency or morale. Performance appraisals must be conducted 
uniformly, efficiently, and objectively. They should tell the 
employee what management thinks of his present contribution 
and his future prospects. 
They should help management to utilize its employees more 
fully. 
My amendment will insure central approval of all new appraisal 
systems. 
The bill already permits the development of new perfor-
mance appraisal systems. We would like to have those systems 
approved by OPM so that one agency is not developing a step 
backward while another one is developing a step forward. 
We are trying to develop, and the bill instructs the agency to 
develop, new performance appraisal systems. But we think they 
ought to be coordinated. That is what this amendment will do. 
The second pertinent Stevens amendment added to § 4302(b)(1) 
the requirement that performance standards "permit the accurate 
evaluation of job performance on the basis of (objective] 
criteria . . . ." Senator Stevens explained:57 
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I wish to submit an amend-
ment to establish objective criteria in the development of perfor-
mance appraisal systems. Senate Bill 2640 requires agencies to 
develop new appraisal systems to evaluate the performance of 
all employees affected by the legislation. These systems for 
employee evaluation will be even more significant than current ap-
plications. Personnel actions including removal have been 
strengthened by a streamlining of the appeals process. The 
basis for adverse action will be even more clearly centered on the 
employees' performance appraisal. 
The appraisal systems currently used in civil service have 
been widely criticized. The fact that practically all evaluations 
result in a satisfactory rating is a symptom of the problem. 
The current system lacks some specific standards to meet the 
goals of personnel evaluation required in the civil service 
reform bill. 
The reform bill requires agencies to develop new performance ap-
praisal systems consistent with criteria to be established by the Of' 
fice of Personnel Management. Yet the bill is silent on 
establishing one criterion of the greatest importance. Critical 
67
 Id., at 1666-1667 (Senate debate). [Emphasis supplied.] 
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elements of the position must be clearly stated as basis for per-
formance evaluation. Critical elements should be defined as 
those specific skill levels, responsibilities, or individual ac-
tions which will be evaluated in performance appraisal. 
My amendment requires performance appraisal systems to 
identify the critical elements of a position. The employee must 
know the specific criteria which will be used in his evaluation. 
This amendment clearly states that intention. 
A similar provision calling for performance standards that per-
mit accurate evaluation on the basis of objective criteria had 
already been adopted by the House Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service. That provision was offered during the Committee 
markup of H.R. 11280 and agreed to with this explanation by 
Representative Clay:5 8 
Mr. Chairman, this amendment insures that, to the extent possi-
ble, employees * performance appraisals shall be based upon objec-
tive criteria. Experience with equal employment opportunity 
cases has demonstrated that the use of subjective criteria in 
promotions has been challenged in the courts on the grounds 
that women and minorities have been treated less fairly than 
white males. 
In sum, the use of objective criteria in performance appraisals, 
consistently applied, will benefit Federal employees by providing 
them with protection against arbitrariness and discrimination. It 
will also benefit management by removing a potential basis for 
legal attacks. 
The Stevens and Clay amendments demonstrate the intention of 
Congress that employees not be subject to the streamlined pro-
cedures of § 4303 on the basis of subjective performance standards 
established at the unreviewed discretion of agencies. The method 
chosen to avoid such potential for inconsistency, arbitrariness or 
discrimination was to require OPM review of each appraisal 
system for compliance with requirements of § 4302, including ac-
curacy and objective criteria requirements for performance stan-
\n interpretation of § 4303 that allowed agencies to bypass 
t review, on the theory that performance standards and 
elements need not be established as part of a § 4302 appraisal 
system, would seem plainly contrary to that legislative intent. 
The portion of the legislative history on which OPM most relies is 
a statement in the House Report concerning the interim period un-
til the October 1, 1981, date specified in § 4302(b)(2). That passage 
states:59 
House Markup, at 58. (Emphasis supplied.) 
69
 Legislative History, at 657-658 (House Report). 
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The new section 4301(3) defines "unacceptable perfor-
mance'* to mean performance which fails to meet established . 
performance standards in one or more *'critical elements" of 
an employee's position. The committee recognizes that per-
formance standards are not adequately described under the 
present civil service system. For that reason, the committee, in 
section 4302(b)(2) authorizes a 3-year delay in the establish-
ment of performance standards and the description of critical 
elements of a job. Between now and October 1, 1981, the Office 
of Personnel Management must ensure that disciplinary ac-
tions against employees based on a failure to meet acceptable 
performance standards in one or more critical elements of the 
job are very carefully administered so that no employee will be 
disciplined when performance standards and critical elements 
have not been adquately defined by an agency. 
Reference to the 1981 deadline does not appear elsewhere in 
either the House or Senate Reports. The provision as adopted by 
the House was agreed to in Conference without comment in either 
the markup session or Report of the Conference Committee. 
However, the record of the House Committee markup session 
shows that the provision was adopted on the basis of the following 
discussion:60 
MR. UDALL We provided . . . that the agency should 
communicate such standard to such employee at the beginning 
of an appraisal period, indicating to the employee at such time 
which of such standards are for critical elements of the 
employee's position. 
The Administration pointed out that, while they have in 
some situations, they have performance standards, they don't 
in most agencies and for most positions. This is a basic change 
in the way they function, and would require them to gear up to 
do this for hundreds of thousands of individual positions. 
So they suggested that an effective date for this requirement 
would be October 1983, to give them that much time to put this 
system fully into operation. 
I don't know that they need all of that time, but they've con-
vinced me that they need a substantial amount of time to make 
this kind of a change, and that's the purpose of the amend* 
ment. 
MR. NIX. Any further discussion on the amendment? 
MR. HARRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think this does present 
a very difficult problem, in that we tell a person, first, what his 
or her job is, what performance requirements there are, but 
*° House Markup, at 54. 
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then we can discipline or discharge him or her without them 
knowing what the critical elements were. 
I can understand that it takes time, maybe, to identify the 
critical elements of the job. Obviously, they're identified well 
enough to discharge the person. And I just wonder how much 
time you want to leave it in this sort of limbo. 
It seems to me that 5 years is an inordinate amount of time, 
and I'd move an amendment, Mr. Chairman, to change the 
year to 1981 instead of 1983. 
MR. UDALL. I'll accept the gentleman's suggestions and 
ask for unanimous consent to insert "1981" instead of "1983", 
and we can argue about it in conference, or later on, if that's an 
unreasonable accommodation. 
MR. NIX. Without objection, it is so ordered. The question 
arises on the adoption of the amendment as offered. Those in 
favor of the adoption of the amendment will say aye. Those op-
posed, no. It is the opinion of the Chair the ayes have it, and 
the amendment is agreed to. 
The quoted passage from the House Report and the House Com-
mittee markup discussion set forth above comprise the entire 
legislative history of the 1981 deadline provision in § 4302(b)(2). 
0PM contends that the House Report passage constitutes a clear 
statement that Congress expected that performance-based actions 
would be taken prior to the etablishment of completed performance 
appraisal systems. AFGE, on the other hand, reads the same 
passage as an expression of concern that employee due process 
rights not be diluted. 
The statutory language in § 4302(b)(2), both as enacted and in 
H.R. 11280 as reported by the House Committee,61 requires that 
performance standards and critical elements be communicated to 
all employees "as soon as practicable, but not later than October 1, 
1981." The second and third sentences of the House Report 
passage, explaining the provision for this "3-year delay," must be 
read in context with the statutory language that was being ex-
plained, i.e., as referring to the deadline by which every single 
employee throughout the Federal government must have been ad-
vised of his or her performance standards and critical elements. 
The Committee recognized that this would entail a major effort by 
the executive branch, since "performance standards are not ade-
quately described under the present civil service systems" and, as 
Representative Udall had explained at the markup session on this 
provision, performance standards did not yet exist "in most agen-
cies and for most positions."62 
§l
 See Legislative History, at 525 (H R. 11280). 
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 The same information had been reported to Congress by the General Account-
ing Office in the Comptroller General's Report, Federal Employee Performance Rating 
But clearly the Committee expected some employees to be in-
formed of their performance standards and critical elements sooner 
than October 1, 1981, in accordance with the requirement in the 
Committee bill for such communication "as soon as practicable." 
The final sentence of the Report passage, concerning the period 
"|b|etween now and October 1, 1981," can only refer to such 
employees, or more particularly to those among them who might 
become subject to § 4303 actions. However, nothing in the Report 
suggests that the critical elements and standards of such 
employees were not to be established and communicated as part of 
§ 4302 appraisal systems. In the Committee bill as in the Act, 
§ 4302(a) called for each agency to develop "one or more" perfor-
mance appraisal systems,, which might be implemented at different 
times so long as all were implemented no later than October 1, 1981. 
It was, therefore, entirely reasonable for the Committee to foresee 
§ 4303 actions involving standards and elements under § 4302 ap-
praisal systems fully established for some agency units, com-
ponents, or appropriate categories of employees sooner than Oc-
tober of 1981,63 without any implication that actions could proceed 
against individually-targeted employees outside of any § 4302 ap-
praisal system. Consequently, the House Report does not support 
the interpretation OPM attributes to it. 
This view of the House Report gains corroboration from the fact 
that the House Bill did not include any provision such as that 
added to the Senate Bill by the Stevens amendment, requiring 
OPM to review each appraisal system for compliance with the re-
quirements of § 4302. Under that circumstance the last sentence of 
the House Reports passage concerning the interim period until Oc-
tober 1, 1981, in which the Committee expressed its desire that 
OPM "ensure" that no § 4303 actions are based on inadequately 
defined performance standards and critical elements, may be seen 
as a reflection of concerns paralleling those of Senator Stevens 
which led to enactment of § 4304(b)(1). When the Conference Report 
including that provision was presented for final approval in the 
System* Need Fundamental Change, at 18 (March 3. 19781. The Civil Service Commis-
sion, commenting on the draft of that report, had advised: 
The problem is that it takes time, effort and good procedures to do it well. For 
jobs predominantly involving qualitative duties such as analysis, decision-
making, research and management, the results may not be completely satisfac-
tory regardless of the time and effort spent. Likewise, everyone agrees that 
employees should be fairly appraised in relation to the requirements. The prob-
lem is how to do it validly and reliably, [at 1311 
** For example, if SSA chose to implement in 1980 an appraisal system for all of 
its claims representatives, more than 13,000 employees would be covered by such a 
system. See Transcript at 95 (oral argument of SSA). This example is illustrative 
only; we express no opinion concerning the size of an appropriate category of 
employees. 
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Senate, Senator Stevens closed the debate on the Report by referr-
ing again to that provision, stating:64 
The Office of Personnel Management will be required to ap-
prove all performance appraisal systems developed by agen-
cies. The approval must consider each system's effectiveness, objec-
tivity, and compliance with merit principles. All performance ap-
praisal systems will be required to identify the specific skill 
levels, responsibilities, and individual actions that will be con-
sidered in performance evaluation. 
The OPM review mandated by § 4304(b)(1) appears intended to 
preclude use of just such procesures as here adopted by SSA pur-
suant to OPM's regulations. The admitted absence of any SSA per-
formance appraisal system enables SSA to identity first the 
employees against whom the agency wishes to act and then to 
establish critical elements and performance standards on an in-
dividual basis—what SSA calls an "as-needed basis"—solely for 
those employees. 
Rather than ascertaining adequacy of performance on the basis 
of performance standards and critical elements previously 
established under a system that has been reviewed by OPM for "ef-
fectiveness, objectivity, and compliance with merit principles," a 
procedure such as SSA's enables an agency to stand on its head the 
appraisal process required by the Act—identifying "unacceptable 
performance" on an unspecified ad hoc basis and afterwards 
writing elements and performance standards to facilitate the 
desired adverse action. Without suggestion that SSA did that in 
any of the individual actions taken under its implementing pro-
cedure,66 the Board concludes that the inherent dangers of any 
such individually-targeted procedure were precisely what Congress 
sought to avoid in requiring "unacceptable performance" to be 
determined under a §4302 appraisal system that has been reviewed 
and approved by OPM pursuant to § 4304(b). 
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Act and its legislative 
history, the Board determines that both interim § 432.206 and final 
§432.205 of OPM's regulations, in providing for §4303 actions 
against employees for failure to meet performance standards which 
have not been established as part of § 4302 performance appraisal 
systems,66 violate the requirement of § 4303(a) that such actions 
may be taken only for "unacceptable performance" as defined in 
§ 4301(3). 
64
 legislative History, at 1728 (Senate debate on Conference Report). (Emphasis 
supplied.1 
65
 As previously stated, the merits of any individual case are not before the Board 
in this proceeding. 
"* OPM. while contending that § 4303 may be applied without regard to establish-
ment of § 4302 appraisal systems—a contention which the Board here expressly re-
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V. RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 4303(a) TO MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
Having established that the OPM regulations under review 
prescribe or authorize actions in violation of § 4303(a), the two-step 
analysis required by § 2302(b)(ll) obliges the Board next to con* 
aider whether § 4303(a) is a 
, . . law . . . implementing, or directly concerning, the merit 
system principles contained in section 2301 . . . 
In this case, arguments have been made that the law violated 
relates to several merit principles.67 Most of those arguments have 
been addressed to the premise that § 4302 is the law that has been 
violated, but on the analysis set forth in Part IV of this Opinion the 
Board has found the violated law to be § 4303(a). That conclusion 
simplifies identification here of the most pertinent merit system 
principle, which plainly is § 2301(b)(6), providing t h a t . . . employ-
ees should be separated who cannot or will not improve their per-
formance to meet required standards.** 
It need not be assumed, however, that (b)(6) is the only relevant 
principle. Like many provisions of the Act, § 4303 and its interrela-
tionship with § 4302 by way of § 4301(3) reflects a carefully fash-
ioned balance among considerations expressed in several of the 
merit system principles. The Board's task is not to create that 
jects—argues in the alternative that "the combination of the interim regulations in 
Part 432 and interim procedures for appraisals provided for by Part 430 would con-
stitute an appropriate interim performance system." Record, p. 115. However, an 
OPM regulation or procedure cannot constitute an agency's appraisal system. 
Moreover. OPM does not claim to have reviewed and approved SSA's procedures 
under § 4304(b). nor do OPM's Part 432 "interim procedures" provide for such 
review and approval of so-called "interim performance systems" adopted 
thereunder. 
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 The merit principles variously claimed to be violated are set forth in § 2301(b) 
as follows: 
(b) Federal personnel management should be implemented consistent with the 
following merit system principles: 
(2) All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and 
equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to 
political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origins, sex. marital status, 
age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and 
constitutional rights. 
(5| The Federal work force should be used efficiently and effectively. 
(6| Employees should be retained on the basis of the adequacy of their perfor-
mance, inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be 
separated who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required 
standards. 
(7) Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases in 
which such education and training would result in better organizational and in-
dividual performance. 
(8) Employees should be— 
(A) protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for 
partisan political purposes . . . 
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balance but to recognize where it was struck by the Congress and 
give effect to it. In ascertaining where Congress struck that balance 
on the question under consideration here, we receive guidance from 
this statement in the Senate Report:68 
One of the central tasks of the civil service reform bill is sim-
ple to express but difficult to achieve: Allow civil servants to 
be able to be hired and fired more easily, but for the right 
reasons. This balanced bill should help to accomplish that ob-
jective. 
This statement, capsulizing reams of legislative history, ex-
presses the "central** importance attached by Congress to section 
203 of the Act, enacting §§ 4301 to 4305. Also of general guidance is 
the statement in section 3(2) of the Act that the purpose of defining 
prohibited personnel practices in § 2301(b) is to prevent "conduct 
which undermines the merit system principles and the integrity of 
the merit system."6 9 
Such general guidance must be given all the more consideration 
because the terms "implementing" and "directly concerning" in 
§§ 2302(b)(ll), unlike some others, have not been defined in 
Chapter 23 or elsewhere in the Act.70 Since we conclude that 
§ 4303(a) is a law "implementing" the merit system principles, we 
need not consider here what the term "directly concerning" encom-
passes. 
Section 2302(b)(ll) is the only provision of the Act referring to a 
"law, rule, or regulation" implementing the merit system prin-
ciples of § 2301.71 Nothing in the Act excludes relevant portions of 
the Act itself from the category of "laws" implementing those prin-
ciles, and logic suggests the contrary. If "laws" in §2302(b)(ll) 
were limited to those subsequently enacted, the provision would be 
deprived of all current effect. If the term were limited to laws 
previously enacted, the protections afforded by § 2302(b)(ll) would 
be unduly confined to those found warranted in the past. If the term 
were meant to include all laws except those enacted by "the most 
comprehensive reform of the Federal work force since passage of 
the Pendleton Act in 1883,"72 surely Congress would have said so. 
M
 Legislative History, at 1468 (Senate Report). 
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 6 U.S.C. § 1101 note. 
70
 E.g., "Personnel action" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Similarly, 
"covered position" is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B). 
71
 Those principles are not self-executing, as previously noted. Section 2301(c) 
directs the President or agency heads to take action, including issuance of rules, 
regulations, or directives, "necessary to ensure that personnel management is based 
on and embodies the merit system principles," but only "pursuant to authority 
otherwise available." Compare § 2302(c) and 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(7) relating to im-
plementation of § 2302,, discussed in Legislative History, at 1997 (Conference 
Report). 
72
 Legislative History, at 1465 (Senate Report). 
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Absent any such limitation expressed or suggested in the statute or 
its history, we read the term '•law" in § 2302(b)(ll) to include rele-
vant portions of the Act itself. 
The Act provides no special definition of "implementing." Nor 
does anything we have discovered in the legislative history amplify 
the intended meaning of that term. We therefore look to its connota-
tion in normal usage, guided by the declared purpose of the Act. We 
take the term in its ordinary meaning, i.e., to carry out, accomplish, 
fulfill or give practical effect to,7 3 in the context of a manifest pur-
pose or design to prevent conduct which directly and substantially 
'•undermines" the merit system principles and the "integrity" of 
the merit system.74 
It would be difficult to find a law which is more clearly designed 
to give practical effect to merit system principle (b)(6) than § 
4303(a), and which more clearly is intended to correct conditions 
found to have "undermined confidence in C merit system."75 The 
§ 4302 appraisal process by which "unacceptable performance" is 
to be identified under § 4303(a) was expressly designed to remedy 
the existing '[performance evaluation procedures [which] do not 
work well enough to distinguish employees whose performance is 
below an unacceptable level to make the changes stick."76 That 
new appraisal process, and the "streamlined" appeals procedure 
authorized for cases to which § 4303 applies,77 were deliberately 
designed to accomplish separation of employees "who cannot or 
will not improve their performance to meet required standards."78 
Having determined that § 4303(a) implements § 2301(b)(6), we 
conclude that violation of §4303(a) through failure to base unaccep-
table performance decisions upon standards established as part of 
a § 4302 appraisal system constitutes a prohibited personnel prac-
tice under § 2302(b)( l l ) . 7 9 
73
 See Webster 's Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 1968). 
74
 See section 3(21 of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1101 note. 
™ legislative History, at 1467 ((Senate Report). 
76
 id., at 1473 (Senate Report). 
77
 id., at 1474 (Senate Report). 
78
 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(6) Compare the closely parallel language of §§ 4301(3) and 
4302(b)(6). Of course, in finding that § 4303(a) implements the merit systems prin-
ciples, we do not imply that all other provisions of the Act do also, nor do we now 
consider any other particular provision. 
79
 Our holding addresses only the application of § 4303 to employees for whom no 
performance appraisal system has been established pursuant to § 4302. We do not 
intimate that procedural or operation defects in appraisal systems established by an 
agency give rise to § 2302(b)(l 1) prohibited personnel practices whenever § 4303 ac-
tions under such appraisal systems are initiated. In any such case, to establish a 
§ 7701(c)(2)(B) defense an employee must show that the decision was "based on" a 
prohibited personnel practice in the particular case. i.e.. that the procedural or 
operational defect in the appraisal system amounted to a prohibited personnel prac-
tice affecting the particular decision in a way that was harmful to the employee. 
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VI. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS AND ELEMENTS 
During the course of this proceeding two related questions were 
raised which the Board considers significant as the agencies under-
take to establish their performance appraisal systems. These 
issues are: 
(i) whether critical elements and performance standards 
must be based on employee position descriptions and be the 
same for all employees who have the same position descrip-
tion; and 
(ii) whether critical elements and performance standards 
must first be uniformly established by the agency head-
quarters and only then modified for application in the field. 
In considering these issues the Board finds that an examination 
of the pertinent statutory language and the legislative history 
reveals Congress placed very few restrictions on the establishment 
of performance standards and critical elements and in fact made it 
clear that the agencies were expected to have substantial flexibility 
in this area. 
The Act requires only that performance standards permit the ac-
curate evaluation of job performance based on objective criteria 
and be related to job in question for each employee or position 
under the system. Moreover, the language of the Act specifically 
permits performance standards to be related to the job in question 
"for each employee or position under the systems/* Thus, it is clear 
that Congress intended for the agencies to consider either the 
specific employee or the position in establishing performance stan-
dards rather than just the latter.80 
The legislative history of the Act reflects that Congress pur-
posefully did not specify how these standards and elements should 
be developed by the agencies because it had determined that within 
the statutory restrictions, this was a matter that should be left to 
agency discretion. As stated in the Senate Report: 
The Office of Personnel Management will issue guidelines 
and make technical assistance available for performance ap-
praisal, but agencies will have great flexibility to choose or develop 
their own systems. Agencies should determine what type of perfor-
mance appraisal methods best suit their needs. This may range 
from a traditional system to a management by objectives type 
80
 5 U.S.C. § 4302(bMll (emphasis supplied). Both of the versions of this provision 
as reported out of the House and Senate Committees provided for performance stan-
dards for each employee. The Conference added the language "or position," without 
explanation. Thus, it is clear that each alternative was considered separately. Addi-
tionally, it should be noted that the suggestions that performance standards be 
linked to an employee's official position description was specifically made at the 
House Hearings but not adopted. See, House Hearing, at 207. 
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of system, with more than one system used for different 
groups of employees. 
. . . Any performance appraisal system should put primary em-
phasis on the quality of the employee's work. Moreover, a per-
formance evaluation of a supervisor or manager should con-
sider the performance of that employee's subordinates. These 
tailored systems should not be more complex than necessary to meet 
an agency *s particular needs.** 
Given this background, the Board cannot conclude that perfor-
mance standards and critical elements must be based on position 
descriptions. Nor can it conclude that agencies must centralize 
establishment of these criteria. Rather, the agencies should have 
flexibility in relating performance standards and critical elements 
to position descriptions and in centralizing or decentralizing this 
function in accordance with their own needs. 
VII. APPLICATION OF SECTION 1205(e) 
TO REGULATIONS UNDER REVIEW 
This being the first review proceeding conducted by the Board 
under 5 U.S.C. § 1205(e), it is appropriate to examine the scope of 
the authority. The specific application of that authority to the 
regulations in question, on their face and as implemented by SSA, 
is then considered. 
A. Scope of Review 
Section 1205(e)(2) directs the Board to declare an OPM regulation 
or rule: 
(A) invalid on its face, if the Board determines that such pro-
vision would, if implemented by any agency, on its face, require 
any employee to violate section 2302(b) of this title; or 
(B) invalidly implemented by any agency, if the Board deter-
mines that such provision, as it has been implemented by the 
agency through any personnel action taken by the agency or 
through any policy adopted by the agency in conformity with 
such provision, has required any employee to violate section 
2302(b) of this title. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The essential distinction between facial invalidity and invalid 
implementation is that the former relates to prospective applica-
tion of regulations, whereas the latter relates to implementation 
81
 L*Ki*lative History, at 1606 (Senate Report) [Emphasis supplied.) 
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which has already taken place in some particular agency resulting 
in commission of a prohibited personnel practice at that agency. 
This distinction corresponds with the remedies available to the 
Board, which are an order to agencies not to comply with facially 
invalid regulations, and an order requiring agencies to correct any 
invalid implementation that has already occurred.82 
Recognition of this distinction between §§ 1205(e)(2)(A) and (B) is 
significant, because it demonstrates that the difference between 
facial and applied invalidity is not a matter of whether the regula-
tion in question "requires" or merely "permits" agencies to com-
mit prohibited personnel practices. Under both subsections (A) and 
(B) a determination of invalidity must be based on a finding that 
such practices would be or have been "required" within the mean-
ing of § 1205(e); the difference is only between prospective and past 
implementation of the rule or regulation. 
The statute does not define the terms "require" or "required." 
However, both the purpose of § 1205(e) and its legislative history 
demonstrate that a narrow interpretation in the sense of a literally 
imperative or mandatory command should not be ascribed to these 
terms. Rather, a rule or regulation "would require" a prohibited 
personnel practice if it is reasonably foreseeable that it will result 
in such a practice, and it "has required" such a practice if its ap-
plication has actually had that result. A more restrictive interpreta-
tion would subvert the purpose of § 1205(e) and be inconsistent 
with the legislative intention. 
If the use by an OPM regulation of the precatory "may" were to 
put the regulation beyond the reach of § 1205(e), OPM by the 
skillful use of language could avoid entirely the Board's § 1205(e) 
authority. Moreover, OPM does not have the authority to command 
agencies to take personnel actions under § 4303, but may only 
prescribe the conditions under which such actions may be taken. A 
regulation providing that action may be taken if certain conditions 
are met is equivalent to a direction that no further conditions are 
necessary, even if the regulation does not expressly so state. 
The legislative history supports this interpretation. Board 
authority to review OPM regulations was not included in the Ad-
ministration's bills or in the House or Senate bills reported from 
Committee. Senator Mathias first introduced the proposal on the 
Senate floor,83 with the agreement of Senators Ribicoff, Percy and 
Stevens, as well as the Administration. Referring to the minority 
views of himself and Senator Stevens in the Senate Committee 
1,2
 5 U.S.C. 9 1205(e)(lMC). 
83
 The Mathias amendment was essentially identical to § 1205(e). 
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Report,84 Senator Mathias explained85 that the Board's proposed 
authority to invalidate a rule 
. . . prior to implementation reflects our concern that hun-
dreds of civil servants and many agencies should not be placed 
in the unseemly position of acting upon a regulation or being 
affected thereby when it is obvious that implementation would 
amount to illegality. 
The Mathias amendment as adopted, as was a similar amendment 
to H.R. 11280 thereafter offered on the House Floor by Represen-
tative Fisher.86 In commenting on the Conference Report when 
final approval was considered in the Senate, Senator Stevens, who 
had co-sponsored the Mathias amendment, stated that he read 
§ 1205(e) as authorizing the Board to eliminate any rule or regula-
tion "which would . . , result in prohibited personnel practices upon 
agency implementation."87 
Given the purpose of § 1205(e) to enable the Board to reach OPM 
rules directly if they would result in widespread abuses, thereby 
avoiding the necessity for multiple proceedings to correct abuses 
that have a common source, it would be inconsistent for the Boards 
authority to be so narrowly construed that the Board could not pre-
vent reasonably foreseeable illegal action from occurring. We 
therefore find that a broad interpretation of § 1205(e) is ap-
propriate. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group. 425 U.S. 1 
(1976). 
B. Facial Validity of the Regulations 
Applying the standard of § 1205(e)(2) to the OPM regulations in 
issue, the Board determines that those regulations are invalid on 
their face. By their own terms, both interim § 432.206 and final § 
432.205 provide for the taking of removal and demotion actions 
under § 4303 prior to the establishment of a performance appraisal 
system under § 4302. This is a clear violation of § 4303(a), as con-
*
4
 In that report, Senators Mathias and Stevens had expressed concern that 
"merit would he seriously endangered" by the unchecked authority of the OPM 
Director to make 'personnel policy for the entire Federal civil service work force," 
noting that: 
The power to make personnel policy includes the power to interpret the laws; 
to decide the plolicies for authorizing exceptions to certain laws; to make the 
policies which determine how job applicants shall be ranked for employment 
consideration; to take positions out of the competitive service so they can be 
filled politically; and to set aside almost all civil service laws in Demonstration 
Projects that would affect many thousands of individuals. Legislative History, at 
1698 (Senate Report). 
"* Id . at 166R (Senate Debate). (Emphasis supplied.) 
m
 Id., at 855 (House Debate). 
"
7
 Id., at 1728 (Senate Debate). (Emphasis supplied.) 
234 
eluded in Part IV of this Opinion. Employing OPM's "interim pro-
cedures*' under both interim and final Part 432 would require an 
employee to commit a § 2302(b)(ll) prohibited personnel practice. 
The OPM regulations are thus facially invalid. 
C. Validity of SSA Implementation 
SSA has admittedly taken personnel actions and adopted an im-
plementing policy in conformity with interim § 432.206 which have 
resulted in § 4303 actions against employees based on standards 
not established by any § 4302 performance appraisal system. 
Those SSA actions have, therefore, required the commission of 
§2302(b)(ll) prohibited personnel practices for the reasons 
hereinabove stated, and such implementation of the OPM regula-
tions is hereby declared invalid. 
VIII APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 75 TO 
PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS 
In support of its argument that § 4303 actions should be permit-
ted prior to the establishment of a § 4302 system, OPM urges that 
Congress did not intend that the Reform Act would result in a 
moratorium on performance-based actions until 1981. OPM asserts 
that Chapter 75 is by its own terms inapplicable to performance-
based actions. We do not agree. 
We agree that Congress did not intend to make it any more dif-
ficult to remove employees under the Reform Act. We also believe 
Congress intended no moratorium on removal or demotion arising 
from inadequate performance. For that very reason, we find OPM's 
position untenable. OPM overlooks the fact that there will be a 
substantial period of time before agencies could take § 4303 actions 
even applying the regulations under review. No one disputes the 
fact that performance standards simply cannot be developed over-
night. Under OPM's own interpretation, no performance-related ac-
tions could be taken during that period. 
Section 7512(2)(D) states that Chapter 75 is inapplicable to a 
"reduction in grade or removal under § 4303 of this title/* and § 
7701 provides that the substantial evidence test applies to "an ac-
tion based on unacceptable performance described in section 
4303." Reading these two sections together, it is apparent that as 
used in both section the term "unacceptable performance" is the 
term of art which is defined at § 4301. It is not a general term cover-
ing all types of poor performance. As we have ruled, if the process 
of Chapter 43 is not followed, "unacceptable performance" cannot 
be demonstrated. However if a determination of inadequate perfor-
mance is not made under a performance appraisal system provided 
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for in Chapter 43, then it may be processed as a Chapter 75 
action.88 
The legislative history of the new Chapter 75 is sparse. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that it deals with the questions of when 
an action must be taken under Chapter 43, it frequently refers to 
the term "unacceptable performance'* and the requirements which 
flow therefrom under this Chapter. For example, the Senate Report 
states that subchapter II of Chapter 75 governs adverse actions 
"where the basis of the agency action is misconduct or any other 
cause besides unacceptable performance. Actions based on 
unacceptable performance are governed by Chapter 43 . . . . " 8 9 After 
referring to the exception of "employees who are subject to adverse 
actions on the basis of unacceptable performance, " the Report states 
"Section 4303 of title V, as amended by this bill, covers employees 
demoted or removed for unacceptable performance/'90 (Emphasis 
added throughout.) 
Whichever action an agency chooses to pursue, it will have to 
comply with the procedural requirements of that Chapter. If an 
agency sees some advantage in pursuing performance-based action 
under Chapter 75, it is not inconsistent with the Act so long as the 
agency meets the higher burden of proof—and the more difficult 
standard of demonstrating that the action will promote "efficiency 
of the service." There is not the slightest evidence in the legislative 
history to suggest that Chapter 43 was ever to be a refuge for 
employees to escape Chapter 75. Chapter 43 originated as a relief 
measure for agencies and it was enacted for that purpose. 
Pursuant to its authority under 5 U.S.C. § 1205(e) the Board has 
determined that 5 C.F.R. §432.205 (final) (1979) and §432.206 
(interim) (1979), hereafter "the Regulations," are invalid on their 
face and have been invalidly implemented by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. 
** The Civil Service Commission consistently maintained that the greatest defects 
in the pre-existing law under Chapter 75 were: (1) the multi-level appeals process, 
and (2) reversal of agency action on appeal for minor procedural error. Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 2 of 1978 eliminated the first problem. The harmful error requirement 
of $ 7701 now minimizes the second. 
99
 Legislative History, at 1510 (Senate Report). 
9 0
 /rf., at 1514. Thus, the Senate Report equates Chapter 43 actions with "unaccep-
table performance" actions under § 4303, and recognizes that Chapter 75 can apply 
to any cause "besides unacceptable performance." Therefore, guidance offered in 
the Senate Report would not seem to exclude performance-based actions that did not 
fit the definition of "unacceptable performance." Until Chapter 43 is implemented, 
therefore, an employee's performance could not be measured against the standards 
and critical elements that are the basis for determining unacceptability. The Senate 
Report by inference can be read to mean that Chapter 75 is available for any action 
not brought under § 4303, and the option remains for the agency to choose whether 
to proceed under Chapter 43 or Chapter 75. 
236 
Accordingly it is ordered that all agencies91 shall forthwith cease 
taking personnel actions under the Regulations. 
It is further ordered that SSA shall within 20 days from the date 
of this order submit to the Board and serve on AFGE, OPM, and 
the Special Counsel a complete status report with respect to each 
personnel action that SSA has taken under the Regulations since 
January 11,1979. 
It is further ordered that within 40 days from the date of this 
order SSA, OPM, AFGE, and the Special Counsel shall each sub-
mit a proposed order from appropriate SSA corrective action con-
sistent with this Opinion. 
For the Board: 
RUTH T. PROKOP. 
Chairwoman. 
RONALD P. WERTHEIM, 
Member. 
ERSA H. POSTON, 
Vice Chair. 
Dissenting in part, con-
curring in part, with 
separate opinion. 
DATE: December 17, 1979 
OPINION OF VICE CHAIR POSTON 
[Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part] 
While I am in full agreement with the decision of the Board that 
the Social Security Administration's implementation of the OPM 
regulations providing for interim performance based adverse ac-
tions resulted in the commission of prohibited personnel practices, 
I cannot concur in the Board's determination that both OPM's in-
terim and final regulations are invalid on their face. Therefore, I 
dissent with respect to this latter conclusion. 
My dissent is based in large measure on my active participation 
in the drafting and legislative passage of the Civil Service Reform 
Act.92 While civil service reform sought increased protection of 
employee rights, another impetus for the reform movement from 
the Administration's standpoint was the failure of the civil service 
91
 As defined in 5 U.S.C. § 4301(1). 
92
 From June 16, 1977, until December 31. 1978. I was a Member of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. During this period, all Members of the Commission were exten-
sively involved in the President's Civil Service Reform proposals. 
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ADDENDUM I 
Middleton v. Department of Justice, 
23 M.S.P.R. 223 (1984) 
522 MAYFIELD v. DEPT. HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP. 
|23 M.S.P.K.2I7 (I9S4).) 
igency programs. Appellant was as high a grade as was Ms. 
Vhite. The proposing official testified that he had found no 
'vidence Ms. White had had knowledge of the improprieties in-
olved in the processing of the Essex project. See H.T. at 310; 349. 
The improper processing resulted from appellant's directives; it 
ollows, then, that he should have been more aware of potential 
roblems than the Area Manager should have been. In view of 
heir varying degrees of involvement and program responsibilities, 
ppellant has not shown that the Area Manager was equally 
ulpable for the processing errors which occurred. Nor has a valid 
laim of disparate treatment been made out. See Archuleta v. 
department of the Air Force, 16 M.S.P.R. 404 at 407 (1983); Greene 
. Department of Health and Human Services, 3 MSPB 459, 3 
I.S.P.R. 379(1980). 
(51 With regard to the penalty, the presiding official found that 
the agency forced the facts, as they saw them, into a pigeon-hole 
enalty which was not appropriate to the charges, and blindly 
allowed the mandate of the table of penalties/' The only support 
yr this statement is the fact that the deciding official consulted the 
ible of penalties, and found the offense of "giving preferential 
•eatment" to be most akin to the charges. The deciding official 
»stified that his decision as to the proper penalty was reached after 
tie consideration had been given to appellant's replies. H.T. 376-
n. 
Appellant was a high-level official whose position entailed signifi-
int financial and supervisory responsibilities. He was employed 
$ Housing Director less than a year when the offenses began to 
;cur. As the agency has noted in its petition for review, 
It is hard to fathom how much more serious a loss might be 
sustained by the government, and poor people in need of housing 
that the $2.5 million in mortgage money and $8.2 million in rental 
subsidies would have bought, to sustain such a relatively mild 
penalty. 
In view of the nature and seriousness of the offenses in relation 
» appellant's position, the Board finds that the agency has demon-
rated that it gave reasoned consideration to the penalties; and, 
lat the 30-day suspension and 1-grade demotion without loss of 
ly are penalties which fall within the tolerable limits of reason-
deness. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 MSPB 513, 5 
S.P.R. 521 (1981). The Board agrees with the presiding offi-
al's finding that action based on the charges herein is taken for 
ich cause as would promote the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. 
7513(a). 
MIDDLETON v. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 223 
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Accordingly, the agency's petition for review is GRANTED; the 
initial decision is REVERSED; and, the agency's actions are SUS-
TAINED. 
This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board in 
this appeal. 5 C.F.R. <> 1201.113(c). 
The appellant is hereby notified of the right under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7703 to seek judicial review of the Board's actions by filing a 
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C, 20439. 
The petition for judicial review must be received by the court no 
later than thirty (30) days after the appellant's receipt of this order. 
For the Board: 
STEPHEN E. MANROSE, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Y NUMBI* SYSHM> 
James L. MIDDLETON, Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent. 
AT07528310286. 
Merit Systems Protection Board. 
Sept. 21, 1984. 
Employee was removed from v Deputy United States 
Marshal based on his acceptance of $100 from known felon upon 
whom he was directed to serve rr-ind iury subpoena. The Atlanta 
Regional Office sustained removal, and employee petitioned for 
review. The Merit Systems Protection Board held that: (1) surrep-
titious tape recordings of employee accepting bribe were properly 
admitted; (2) employee was not entitled to raise exclusionary rule 
or entrapment defense in administrative removal proceeding; (M) 
employee failed to establish entrapment; (4) transcripts of surrepti-
tious tape recordings were properly admitted in absence of any 
request by employee* for original tapes; and (.r>) there was sufficient 
nexus between employee's conduct and efficiency of the service to 
warrant his removal. 
<B 
Petition denied. 
524 MIDDLETON v. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
(23 M.8.IM1.223 (I9MM 
I. Merit Protection «»472 
Mere disagreement with presiding official's findings of fact and 
Tedibility determinations does not warrant full review of record by 
>oard. 
I. Merit Protection <3»121 
Tape-recorded incriminating conversations between employee 
md informant were properly admitted in employee's appeal from 
lis removal on charge of accepting bribe. 
I. Merit Protection <s=>151 
Even assuming that surreptitious tape recording of employee 
iccepting bribe had been illegal, exclusionary rule did not bar 
igency's use of such evidence in administrative removal proceeding 
vhere evidence had been seized by law enforcement officers for use 
n criminal proceeding, since suppression would not have any deter-
ment effect. 
I. Merit Protection e»350 
Employee who had been surreptitiously tape recorded in act of 
iccepting bribe could not raise entrapment defense in agency's 
idministrative removal proceeding. 
K Merit Protection <3=>350 
Employee's acceptance of bribe from known felon who was 
ictually serving as government informant did not involve entrap-
nent, inasmuch as informant merely afforded employee opportunity 
JO engage in wrongdoing and employee accepted. 
I. Merit Protection «=»350 
Neither mere solicitation nor setting "trap for the unwary" 
constitutes entrapment. 
r. Merit Protection s=»154 
Fact that employee had not been given Miranda warning prior 
,o surreptitious taping of his act of accepting bribe from govern-
nent informant did not render his statements inadmissible in ad-
ninistrative removal proceeding, inasmuch as his conversation with 
nformant did not take place in custodial setting. 
t. Merit Protection e=»111f 115 
Hearsay evidence is admissible in board proceedings, and best 
•vidence rule is not applicable. 
>. Merit Protection <3=>121 
Transcripts of surreptitious tape recordings of employee ac-
cepting bribe from government informant were properly admitted 
n administrative removal proceeding, where employee had never 
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moved to have actual recordings produced and had pointed to no 
alleged inaccuracies in transcript. 
10. Merit Protection «=»35l 
Statute intended to prevent use of improper influence to obtain 
position or promotion did not prohibit agency from taking action 
against employee for misconduct merely because proposing and 
deciding officials did not have personal knowledge of basis for 
action. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2). 
11. Merit Protection <S=»161 
There was sufficient nexus between deputy marshal's accept-
ance of bribe and efficiency of service to warrant his removal. 5 
^S.C.A. <> 2802<b)(10). 
12JMerit Protection <s=>2 
**S Merit systems principles are merely hortatory and provide no 
independent basis for action by either agency or employee. 5 
U.S.C.A. § 2301. 
13. Merit Protection «=»43-l 
Board will not review issues raised for first time on review. 
14. Merit Protection <s=>453 
Employee had waived error in regard to his claim that he had 
been deprived of testimony of informant due to presiding official's 
failure to issue subpoena by failing to request subpoena for infor-
mant or to renew his request that informant be produced at 
hearing. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Appellant James L. Middleton has petitioned for review of the 
presiding official's October l\l, 1083, initial decision affirming his 
removal from the position of Deputy United States Marshal in the 
Southern District of Mississippi based on his acceptance of $100.00 
from a known felon upon whom he was directed to serve a grand 
jury subpoena.' 
1. The targe! of the subpoena was an acquaintance of appellant's. Initially, 
appellant was unable to locate him but shoitlv theiealter he contacted appellant 
and arranged a meeting in a local night club. Dining this meeting, appellant 
advised the taiget of the status of the unsolved subpoena and advised him how 
to avoid any subsequent subpoenas, l ie also agieed to wain the taiget should 
anothei subpoena be issued. The taiget gave appellant five $20 dollai bills m a 
malchbook. Unknown to appellant, the taiget was a paid I Ml infoimant who 
was "vvned" with a miciophnnc and tape lecoidci Tianscnpts o! the tape 
recordings of appellant's conversations with the taiget' mloi maul constituted 
the primary evidence against appellant Appellant took the SUM) 00 and did not 
56 MIDDLETON v. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
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[1-61 The presiding official found that the evidence established 
e conduct charged and that removal promoted the efficiency of 
e service. In regard to these findings, appellant merely reiter-
es his disagreement with the presiding official's findings of fact 
id credibility determinations; therefore his claim does not warrant 
review of the record. Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 
5PB 297, 298-299, 2 M.S.P.R. 129, 132-133 (1980). The 
esiding official also denied appellant's motion to suppress the 
pe recorded conversations between himself and the informant on 
e ground that no law prohibited the recording of a conversation 
here one party, here the informant, consented to the procedure. 
ie presiding official further held that even if the taping had been 
Bgal, the exclusionary rule did not bar the employing agency's use 
evidence in an administrative proceeding where the evidence had 
•en seized by law enforcement officers for use in a criminal 
oceeding2 since suppression would not have any deterrent effect 
ie presiding official correctly cited and applied the law in this 
gard and his holdings will not be disturbed. Lastly, the presiding 
ficial held that the lack of any deterrent effect also rendered an 
itrapment defense unavailable to appellant. The presiding official 
ats likewise correct in this holding. See, e.g., United States v. 
>rlf 584 F.2d 1316, 1321 (4th Cir.1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1130, 
S.Ct. 1050, 59 L.Ed.2d 92 (1978). He further found that even if 
e defense was available, appellant had not established entrap-
»nt. We agree with this factual conclusion.3 
[71 Appellant raised several issues for the first time in his 
sthearing brief which were not directly addressed in the initial 
cision.4 First, appellant maintained that his conversations with 
eport the mailer until two months later when rumors began circulating that a 
Marshal fitting appellant's description was being investigated by the FBI . 
Appellant was charged with accepting a gratuity from a person known to have a 
r iminal record in return for nonperformance of official duties, retaining the 
noncy received and not advising his superiors of the incident, and improperly 
livulging official information to a private party, all in violation of several 
)epartmcnt of Justice regulations as well as Government-wide standards of 
onduct. 
The local United States Attorney declined to bring a criminal prosecution 
igainst appellant. 
Neither mere solicitation nor setting a "trap for the unwary" constitute 
ntrapment. .See. e.g., United States v. Rippy, 606 F.2d 1150. 1154-1155 (D.C. 
^ir.1979). In this case, the informant merely afforded appellant the opportuni-
v to engage in wrongdoing and appellant accepted. Hampton v. United States, 
25 U.S. 484. 96 S.Ct. 1646. 48 L.hd.2d 113 (1976). There is no evidence that his 
onduct was the result of anything other than his own predisposition. 
Although we do not address all of these issues here, those issues not addressed 
lave been reviewed and found without merit. 
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the FBI's informant had to be excluded for failure to provide the 
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Even assuming that the informant 
was a law enforcement official for this purpose, Miranda rights are 
limited to custodial interrogations. Ashford v. Department of 
Justice, 6 MSPB 389, 392, 6 M.S.P.R. 458, 464-65 (1981). Appel-
lant's conversation with the informant did not take place in a 
custodial setting.* 
[8,91 Second, appellant objected to admission of transcripts of 
the tape recordings of his conversations with the informant. He 
argued that the original tapes were not introduced into evidence 
and alleged that no foundation was established for admission of the 
transcripts. His argument is rejected. First, there is no evidence 
that appellant ever moved to discover the tapes prior to the hearing 
or that he moved to have them produced at any time. In fact, 
during his opening statement, appellant's representative acknowl-
edged that he had not even heard the tapes. Hearsay evidence is 
admissible in Board proceedings and the best evidence rule is not 
applicable. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 MSPB 342, 
343, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). A transcript is a more conve-
nient and accessible medium for evaluating evidence than are tapes. 
Finally, there was absolutely no showing of any evidentiary prob-
lem with the transcripts. To the contrary, FBI agent Rives testi-
fied as to the circumstances of both the recording and the transcrip-
tion. He also testified that the transcripts were accurate and 
authentic. Appellant pointed to no alleged inaccuracies; in fact, his 
own admissions corroborate their accuracy in all material aspects. 
Appellant had a full opportunity at the hearing to examine the 
circumstances of their creation and to determine their accuracy. 
Behensky v. Department of Transportation, 19 M.S.P.R. 341 
(1984). The transcripts were properly admitted and considered. 
United States v. Cosby, 500 F.2d 405 (9th Cir.1974). 
[10-12] Third, appellant argued that his removal was based on 
two prohibited personnel practices.* Prohibited personnel practices 
5. The Supreme Court has refused to find custody when a citizen comes to the 
place of interrogation on his own. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 
560-561, 100 S.Ct. I3S8, 1164-1365, 63 L.Kd.2d 622 (1980) (U.S. Attorneys 
Office) and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711. 714, 50 L.Kd.2d 
714 (1977) (police station). 
*. Appellant also argued that his removal violated various merit systems princi-
ples found at 5 U.S.C. § 2101. This argument is misdirected since the merit 
systems principles arc merely hortatory and provide no independent hasis foi 
action bv cither the agency or an employee. Welts v. Harris, 1 MSPB l<*9, 203, 
n. I I , I M.S.P.R. 208, 215, n. I I (1979). 
(23 M.S.P.R. 223 (I984).| 
constitute an affirmative defense to an otherwise supportable agen-
cy action. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B). However, appellant's argument 
here is without merit. Section 2302(b)(2), Title 5, United States 
Code, was intended to prevent the use of improper influence to 
obtain a position or promotion; it does not prohibit an agency from 
taking action merely because the proposing and deciding officials 
do not have personal knowledge of the basis for the action. E.g., 
Roane v. Department of Health and Human Serviees, 8 MSPB 37, 
39, 8 M.S.P.R. 339, 342-43 (1981). Although the presiding official 
did not specifically address appellant's claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 2302(b)(10), he did make a clear and specific determination that 
there was a nexus between appellant's conduct and the efficiency of 
the service. We agree with his determination and this finding 
negates appellant's § 2302(bK10) claim. See Robb v. Railroad 
Retirement Board, 11 MSPB 103, 105, n. 1, 12 M.S.P.R. 467, 471, 
n. 1 (1982). 
|13,14| For the first time in his petition for review, appellant 
alleges that he was deprived of the testimony of the informant 
(Gibson Sturgis) by the presiding official's failure to issue a subpoe-
na and that the agency action violated certain provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 4303. The Board will not review issues raised for the first time 
on review.7 Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 MSPB, at 
343, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271. 
Accordingly, the Board finds that appellant's petition for review 
does not meet the criteria set forth at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 and 
hereby DENIES the petition. 
This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board in 
this appeal. The initial decision shall become final five (5) days 
from the date of this Order. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b) (1984). 
The appellant is hereby notified of the right under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7703 to seek judicial review of the Board's action by filing a 
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20439. 
7. It should, however, be noted that the instant act ion was based on misconduct 
and was taken pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Section 4303 relates to perform-
ance-based actions. Add i t iona l ly , appel lant d id not request a subpoena for Mr. 
Sturgis and d id not renew his request that Sturgis be produced at the hearing. 
Therefore, the issue was waived. Hernandez v. United States Postal Service, 10 
MSPB 799, 12 M.S.P.R. 275 (1982). 
(23 M.S.P.R. 22* (1984).) 
The petition for judicial review must be received by the court no 
later than thirty (30) days after the appellant's receipt of this Order. 
For the Board: 
STEPHEN E. MANROSE, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
(o |mmiNinsnffM> 
Joe PANIAGUA 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION. 
DA07528210762. 
Merit Systems Protection Board. 
Sept. 21, 1984. 
Employee was removed from his position as transportation 
operations officer based on charges of knowing use of his official 
position to induce improper benefit from government contractor and 
unauthorized possession of government property. The Dallas Re-
gional Office sustained removal, and employee petitioned for re-
view. The Merit Systems Protection Board held that: (1) hearsay 
evidence was insufficient to sustain charge that employee used his 
official position to have government contractor repair his car at 
decreased cost; (2) any error by presiding official in according full 
probative value to testimony of witness who appeared to be biased 
against employee was harmless; (3) charge of unauthorized posses-
sion of government property was supported by preponderance of 
evidence; and (4) penalty of removal was reasonable for such 
unauthorized possession. 
Petition granted; affirmed as modified. 
1. Merit Protection «=»115 
Relevant hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative pro-
ceedings before Board and may constitute substantial evidence to 
support agency's action; whether hearsay alone is sufficient to 
sustain action under preponderance of evidence standard is depend-
ent on its reliability and trustworthiness. 
I Merit Protection «»115 
In determining probative value of hearsay evidence, Board 
should consider availability of persons with firsthand knowledge to 
testify at hearing, whether statements of out-of-court declarants 
were signed or in affidavit form, agency's explanation for failing to 
obtain signed or sworn statements, whether declarants were disin-
terested witnesses to events and whether statements were routinely 
M M S P P - Q 
ADDENDUI 1 J 
Neal v. Department of Health and Human Serv. 
4 6 M.S.P.R. 2 6 (1990) 
-EFT. OF HEALTH ft HUMAN SERVICES 
14* MATJL J* (t t t tM 
Sharon NEAL, Appellant, 
v. 
EPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Agency. 
HQ7121ft91*035. 
P«™* Systems Protection Board. 
Aug. 17, 1990. 
Employee requested review of arbitration decision that su* 
led agency's action removing her from position of claims devel-
nent clerk for unacceptable performance. The Merit Systems 
>tection Board held that: (1) appellant's bare allegations of 
parate treatment and discrimination before both arbitrator and 
i Board, without specific reference to protected categories under 
tute defining prohibited personnel practices, failed to establish 
ard's jurisdiction to review arbitration award, and (2) appellant's 
erence to merit systems principles did not establish basis for 
ard to take jurisdiction over appeal from arbitration decision 
Request dismissed. 
Merit Protection «»103 
Merit Systems Protection Board may review MI arbitration 
•wd only if employee has been affected by prohibited personnel 
Mtiee, and action is otherwise appealable. 5 U.S.C.A 
1302(b)(1), *»21(d), 7702. 
Merit Protection *»U 
Appellant has burden of proving by preponderance of t 
dence that the Merit Systems Protection Board has jurisdicti 
hear case. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(aK2Ki). 
Merit Protection *»1*3 
Appellant's bare allegations of disparate treatment and discrim-
fttkni before both arbitrator and the Merit Systems Protection 
ard, without specific reference to protected categories under 
itute defining prohibited personnel practices, failed to establish 
card's jurisdiction to review arbitration award. 5 U.S.C.A, 
I 2302(b)(1), 7121(d). 
Merit Protection *»1G3 
Appellant's reference to"merit systems principles did not estab-
ih basis for Board to take jurisdiction over appeal from arbitration 
ecision. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2301(b). 
3 NEAL v. DEFT. OP HEALTH ft HUMAN 88RVICE8 f f I** MATJL M aim.) Merit Protection *»2 
Merit systems principles are intended to furnish guidelines to 
federal agencies and do not constitute an independent basis for 
legal action. 
William P. McKilien, American Federation of Government Em-
ployees, Greendale Wi,, for appellant 
Hoyt C. Griffin, Jr. Chicago, ULf for agency. 
Before LEVINSOM Chairman, JOHNSON, Vice-Chairman and 
PARKS, Member, 
OPINION AND ORDER 
The appellant has requested review of a May 30,1989 arbitration 
decision that sustained the agency's action removing her from th^ 
position of Claims Development Clerk based on unacceptable per-
formance. In its response to the appellant's request, the agency 
asserts that the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the arbitration 
award because the appellant has not raised a claim of discriminator 
under 6 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). Because it appeared that the Boarc 
lacks jurisdiction over the matter appealed, the Clerk of the Boarc 
issued an order on June 6, 1990, providing the appellant with ar 
opportunity to clarify her claims of disparate treatment and discrim-
ination. 
The appellant has responded to the Board's order, and the agency 
has replied to the appellant's response. For the reasons set forth 
below, we DISMT' the appellant's request for review of the 
arbitration award for lack of jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
[1,1] As explained in the order, the Board may review an arbi-
tration award under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) only if the employee has 
been affected by a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 2302(bXl) and the action is otherwise appealable under 5 U.S.C. 
| 7702. See Salinas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
34 M.S.P.R. 563, 554 (1987), affa\ 846 F.2d 77 (Fed.Cir.1988) (Table). 
As further stated, the appellant has the burden of proving by 
preponderant evidence that the Board has jurisdiction to hear the 
sase. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). 
[S] In her request for Board review of the arbitration award, th 
appellant does not raise a claim of prohibited discrimination, no 
does she raise the arbitrator's failure to make a specific finding or 
"ier claim of disparate treatment Appeal File, Tab 3, Appellant's 
Brief. Similarly, in her response to the Board's order, the appellant 
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as failed to identify any discrimination of the type prohibited by 5 
J.S.C. ( 2302(b)(1)* Rather, she simply asserts that "the record as 
i whole" shows "disparate treatnumt/discrimination" and that the 
tgency "discriminated" against her in creating the performance 
itandards for her position. 
Based upon our review of the record, we find that the appellant's 
tar* allegations of disparate treatment and discrimination before 
toth the arbitrator and the Board, without specific reference to any 
of the protected categories under 6 U&C. § 2802(b)(1), fail to 
establish the Board's jurisdiction to review the arbitration award 
under 6 U.S.C. } 7121(d). Compare, e.g., Ogden Air Logistics 
Center % American Federation of Government Employees, 6 
MSPB 581, 6 M.S.P.R. 680, 635-36 (1981) (mere assertion that the 
agency's action violated 5 U.S.C. § 2802(b) is insufficient to estab-
lish the Board's jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. { 7121(d)), with 
McClain v. Department of the Air Force, 87 M.S.P.R. 658, 655 
(1888) (the Board has jurisdiction to review an arbitration award 
under 6 ILS.C. § 7121(d) where the appellant asserted the prohibit-
ed personnel practice of handicap discrimination based on alcohol 
abuse and the removal action could have been appealed to, the 
Board under 5 U.S.C Chapter 75). 
[4, §1 We also find that the appellant's reference to provisions in 
5 U&C. ( 2801(b) does not establish a basis for the Board to take 
jurisdiction over this appeal The merit systems principles are 
intended to furnish guidance to Federal agencies and do not consti-
tute an; independent basis for legal action. See MiddleUm u 
Department of Justice, 23 MLSJP.R. 228,227 n. 6 (1984), affd, 776 
F.2d 1060 (Fed.Cir.1985) (Table); Weils v: Harris, 1MSPB 199, 1 
M.S.P.R. 208, 214-15 (1979). Accordingly, the appellant's citation to 
the merit systems principles does not establish a cause of action. 
ORDER 
This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board in 
this appeal. 
NOTICE TO APPELLANT 
You have the right to request the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit to review the Board's final decision in your 
appeal if the court has jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. $ 7703(a)(1). You 
must submit your request to the court at the following address: 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit 
717 Madison Place, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20489 
The court must receive your request for review no later than 30 
calendar days after receipt of this order by your representative, if 
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you have one, or receipt by you personally, whichever receipt occurs 
first See 5 U.S.C. $ 7708(bXD. 
For the Board: 
ROBERT E. TAYLOR 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
fo firrwNmrmfCMl 
Softtmto C RINT, Appellant, 
v. 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Atency (GBA 1 0t7 740). 
8B06318910t*5. 
Merit Systems Protection Board. 
Aug. 20, 1990. 
Appellant petitioned for review of initial decision which sus-
tained reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) denying his application for a civil service retirement 
annuity. The Merit Systems Protection Board held that case would 
be remanded for further adjudication, in light of appellant's allega-
tion that he did not receive refund of retirement deductions, and 
OPM's failure to submit evidence that refund check was indeed 
sent, or received. 
Petition granted; initial decision vacated and remanded. 
Merit Protection *»IU 
In light of applicant's allegation that he did not receive a 
refund of retirement deductions, and failure of Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) to submit evidence that refund check was sent, 
or received, appeal from denial of application for civil service 
retirement annuity would be remanded for further abjudication. 
Sofronio C. Rint, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Philippines, pro se. 
Kenneth Brown, Washington, D.C, for agency. 
Before LEVINSON, Chairman, JOHNSON, Vice Chairman, and 
PARKS, Member. 
ADDENDUM K 
Thompson v. Department of Employment Sec, 
5 CSRB 43 (1993) 
COURTESY COPY 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
SYLVIA THOMPSON, : DECISION AND FINAL 
Grievant and Appellant, : AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, : 
: Case No. 10 CSRB/H.O. 149 (Step 5) 
Agency and Respondent. : 5 CSRB 43 (Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellant level 
review of the above-captioned case on April 7,1993. The following Board members heard 
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, Jean 
M. Bishop, Kathleen Hirabayashi and Jose L Trujillo. Sylvia Thompson (Ms. Thompson 
and Appellant) was present; she was represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The 
Utah Department of Employment Security (Department and UDES) was represented by 
Lorin R. Blauer, Legal Counsel for Department. A certified court reporter made a verbatim 
record of this proceeding and oral argument before the Board, which is commonly referred 
to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) and in the CSRB's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Manual (1993 edition). On November 2, 1992, the CSRB's rules at R137-1-20 C. and D. 
were amended through the State' s rulemaking procedures at §§63-46a et seq., with those 
amended provisions being applicable to this appeal hearing. 
This case proceeded properly through the State's grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumed jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson • s appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or 
Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the 
codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, according to §67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -408, as 
well as constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA). All the UAPA's formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to 
the CSRB ' s proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. After closing the record following oral 
argument, the Board entered into an executive session for deliberation and decision-making. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At the time of the Step 5 proceedings, Ms. Thompson had been employed 
continuously for over 21 years by the Department since her initial hiring in August 1970. 
During that period, Ms. Thompson advanced to more increasingly responsible positions up 
through and including her current position of Field Audit Supervisor, Grade 27. Appellant 
has held the latter job title with its accompanying duties and responsibilities for the past 11 
and one-half years (T. I, p. 15). Ms. Thompson was still in the Field Audit Supervisor 
position when she filed her grievance that gave rise to this appeal. 
Ms. Thompson was one of ten candidates who had applied for a Field Audit 
Manager, Grade 29, position. All ten applicants proceeded through the Department's 
multi-layered assessment process. Even though ten candidates had met the minimum 
qualifications for the Field Audit Manager position, only one could ultimately be selected 
and promoted because there was only a single position to be filled. 
The Department • s selection process officially commenced when the UDES personnel 
office issued Internal Job Announcement 92-45 on July 19, 1991, for the Field Audit 
Manager position. That document summarized the Field Audit Manager (hereinafter 
•Manager") position's duties, described the minimum qualifications, and provided 
instructions on how candidates could apply. To properly apply for the Manager position, 
all ten candidates, including Ms. Thompson, had to initially complete a standard Department 
employee application (Form 494). Ms. Thompson completed a Form 494 on July 31,1991, 
as part of the internal bidding process for the vacant Manager, Grade 29, position. A three-
member Screening Committee reviewed the applications and determined that all ten 
candidates had met the position's minimum qualifications. The Screening Committee 
evaluated each candidate's application to insure that the Manager position's required 
minimum qualifications had been met, which constituted the first level of review. 
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Next, a three-person Rating Committee closely evaluated all ten candidates1 
application forms to assess points for each candidate's educational credentials and prior 
related work experience. The Rating Committee reviewed each candidatef s application 
materials and awarded points on the basis of completed post secondary education and 
related work experience, both of which were evaluated as "directly related," 'generally 
related," or "marginally related," respectively. This committee scored all candidates solely 
on information placed on the application forms by each of the ten candidates. 
Ms. Thompson received the middle rating of "generally related" credit for her required four 
years of post secondary education. An important aspect is that her four years • post 
secondary education credit was awarded on a substitution basis: the Rating Committee 
awarded her four years • post secondary education credit by substituting on a year-for-year 
basis prior job related experience. In points, this amounted to four years • credit times eight 
•generally related" points for a total of 32 points for her educational background. 
Appellant scored the maximum 60 points for receiving the highest rating of "directly 
related" work experience based upon five years • credit times 12 "directly related" points. 
With 32 points for her "generally related" educational background and 60 points for her 
"directly related" work experience, Ms. Thompson's total raw score of 92 points divided 
by three (weighing factor) ranked her seventh, with 30.67, on the Rating Committee• s 
Application Score process among the ten applicants (Agency Exh. 3). 
All ten Manager candidates qualified for advancement to an Oral Interview Board 
(Oral Board). To be considered by the Oral Board, each Manager candidate was orally 
examined based upon four preselected, written questions that were distributed to each of 
the applicants just before their respective interviews. (See Jt. Exh. 4.) The four-member 
Oral Board evaluated all ten candidates• responses by a point system that assessed each 
candidatef s responses to the same four preselected questions. In turn, each applicant was 
judged and awarded points based on the following five categories, with separate fixed 
weights assigned to each category, for each of the four posed questions: 
1. Presentation of ideas (35%). 
2. Development and substance (35%). 
3. Tact and interpersonal skills (10%). 
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4. Leadership skills (10%). 
5. Technical knowledge (10%). 
The Selecting Supervisor (Don Avery) over the Manager position, personally composed all 
four questions that were asked of each candidate (Jt. Exh. 4). However, Selecting 
Supervisor Aveiy was not one of the four Oral Board interviewers who actually assessed the 
verbal responses of each candidate. 
Next, all ten candidates • Application Scores and Oral Board Scores (i.e., each still 
considered as 'subtotal scores") were combined in a weighing formula that produced 
combined Application Scores and Oral Board Scores, with each subtotal score comprising 
fifty percent of the Total Rating Score. As with her Application Score ranking, Appellant 
ranked seventh out of the ten applicants in her Total Rating Score. Consequently, 
Ms. Thompson's Total Rating Score was not among the three highest ranking candidates; 
therefore, her name was not presented to Mr. Avery for his final selection of one candidate. 
Selecting Supervisor Avery received the three highest ranked names, selected one, and 
presented that name to the Department fs Executive Committee, for its validation over the 
entire selection process. Ultimately, the Field Audit Manager appointment went to 
David W. Shore. Shore had once held the position of Field Audit Supervisor (first as a 
Grade 25, then as a Grade 27) for more than a year nearly a decade previously, until he was 
displaced due to a Department-wide reduction in force/bumping process that took place in 
1982 (T. I. pp. 6-7). Effective August 19, 1991, Shore was promoted into the Manager 
position, as a Grade 29. 
With Shore • s selection, Ms. Thompson realized that she was not the successful 
candidate for the Field Auditor Manager position. Upon being rejected, Ms. Thompson 
filed a formal grievance on August 23, 1991, and subsequently advanced her grievance 
though all levels of the State Employeesf Grievance and Appeals Procedures. 
ISSUES 
A. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5 Hearing 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/step 5 hearing as the 
issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Is Grievant entitled to prevail in her August 23, 1991 
promotion grievance? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
The CSRB Hearing Officer, after conducting an evidentiary hearing during which all 
testimonial and documentary evidence were received into the record, reached an ultimate 
conclusion that denied Ms. Thompsonf s grievance and remedy. 
B. Issues Addressed at the Step 5 Proceeding 
In the Step 5 Decision, the CSRB Hearing Officer made conclusive factual findings 
and legal conclusions regarding each of Appellantf s five "Arguments" or points as set forth 
in her August 23,1991 grievance statement. Each of Appellant • s five points is reproduced 
verbatim in italics below, as taken from her grievance statement; the selected, partial 
responses that follow are especially germane quotations taken from the CSRB Hearing 
Officer • s analysis of the case: 
1. The selection process was unfair because the successful candidate was "preselected." 
•Substantial evidence was not presented to establish that any 
person manipulated the [selection) process or that there was 
collusion among any of the persons who participated in the 
process . . . Evidence was presented by the Agency which 
showed: that the Screening Committee reviewed Grievant's 
application and determined that she met minimum 
qualifications in accordance with their own policies and 
procedures; that the Rating Committee reviewed Grievant's 
education and work experience consistently with their own 
policies and procedures and consistently with the other 
applicants; that the Oral Interview Board followed consistent 
procedures by asking each of the ten applicants the same four 
questions and then by rating them each on the same five 
criteria; and that the final selection was made in a logical, 
rational methodical manner than was fair to all the applicants." 
(Step 5 Decision, pp. 6-7.) 
2 The [RJating [CJommittee did not give adequate weight to [this] employee's] 
educational credentials. 
"Grievant would have received more credit for [her] education 
if she had filled out the application more completely. Three 
instructions stated that the education and work experience 
would be based solely on the information contained in the 
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application: 1) the job announcement, 2) the application itself, 
and 3) Agency policy memo 91-1. The Rating Committee gave 
credit based solely on the application; they did this to be fair to 
all the applicants involved in the bid process." (Step 5 
Decision, p. 7; emphasis in the original.) 
3. The selection process utilized by the Oral Board did not give proper weight to 
Employee's supervisory experience. 
The oral examination rating sheet for [Ms. Thompson] was 
introduced into evidence and there was nothing to indicate that 
[Ms. Thompson] had been improperly or inadequately 
evaluated." (Ibid., 8.) 
4. The Oral Board was given prepared questions which over-emphasized [sic] the 
positive attributes of the other candidates. 
"No substantial evidence was introduced to show that the 
ratings were arbitrary or capricious, and the rating scores 
appear to be reasonable. The Hearing Officer must find that 
the same reasonable exercise of discretion was made in the case 
of each of the applicants, and that none of the candidates had 
his or her positive attributes (or negative attributes) 
overemphasized any more than [Ms. Thompson] had her 
positive or negative attributes overemphasized." (Ibid.) 
5. The promotion selection process in this case has been tainted through favoritism and 
not based upon true merit principles. 
•Not a single person has been cited to have shown favoritism, 
bias, or prejudice in the selection process. No group of persons 
has been cited to have exhibited collusion or conspiracy or 
manipulation in the process. The selection process used has 
withstood careful scrutiny; it has been shown to have been 
conducted in a manner consistent with the principles of fairness, 
equality, integrity, consistency and merit principles." (Ibid., 9.) 
The above-quoted five points were the issues of Ms. Thompson• s grievance that were 
addressed, responded to and ruled upon in the decision issued from the Step 5 proceedings. 
C. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6 
Appellant has not contested any of the 17 evidentiary findings of fact as being 
inaccurate or flawed. Neither has Ms. Thompson challenged any of the CSRB Hearing 
Officer • s eight legal conclusions as being erroneous. Rather, Appellantf s appeal platform 
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is based upon her objection to the selection procedures relied upon by the Department in 
filling the Manager, Grade 29, position. Ms. Thompson argues that UDES * selection 
procedures are "inconsistent with the I Jtah [State] Personnel Management Act," thus 
Appellant presented the following three legal arguments during the Step 6 
proceeding: (1) that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred in concluding that UDES "had" to 
devise a method to assess differences in the ten applicants' educational and job experience 
credentials; (2) that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred determining that UDES 
appropriately weighed / !li - ce; and »ESf 
selection, procedures violated State policy because past job performance - ,Ken into 
account. These arguments are addressed below. 
D. The Board' s Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision 
137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D, is applicable to 
D. The Board • s Standards of Review. The board * s standards 
of review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. I he board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new oi 
additional factual findings. 
2, Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance 
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted 
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
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3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The above-quoted provisions of the Board' s administrative rules constitute the standards 
of review by which this case will be reviewed. 
E. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
Ms. Thompson, as the moving party to this appeal at Step 6, shoulders the burden 
of proof and the burden of going forward. To prevail, Appellant must demonstrate under 
the standards set forth at R137-1-21 D., above, that reversible error is present. 
SELECTION PROCEDURES AND MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
Appellant• s primary challenge to the Step 5 Decision is that the CSRB Hearing 
Officer erred by finding that the Department did not abuse its discretion by giving greater 
weight/value to educational attainment than to professional work experience. In particular, 
Ms. Thompson strongly objects to two statements in the CSRB Hearing Officer» s analysis 
of the Department • s selection procedures• methodology. Appellant remonstrates against 
the Step 5 Decision • s language that states, "a method had to be devised to assess the 
differences"1 between all applicantsf job experience and education. (Step 5 Decision, p. 7.) 
(Emphasis supplied.) Associated with Appellant • s objection to the Department • s selection 
procedures, Ms. Thompson also objects to the following Step 5 Decision analysis: "The 
Agency used its discretion to devise a method to weigh education in a certain way." (Step 5 
Decision, p. 8.) (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant maintains that although the Department 
deliberately chose a means of finding differences in the applicants • educational backgrounds 
and work experiences, that such was not a condition or prerequisite to proper selection 
methodology. Moreover, avers Ms. Thompson, the CSRB Hearing Officer failed to make 
any factual findings to support a conclusion that the Department "had" to devise a means 
of differentiating between educational attainments and work experiences among the ten 
candidates. We agree with the Department • s Brief (p. 2) that one of Ms. Thompson' s 
original five gravamina of, "Was adequate weight given to the Grievant's educational 
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ci 5dentiaL nas no w evolved - *~^e 
that the CSRB Hearing Ot -. *epartme. : * - e 
its discretion by giving greater weight (value) to educational instruction,, than, to professional 
work experience." Consequently, in assessing the validity of Appellantf s challenge, we 
review the evidentiary evidence and record in their entirety. 
As Ms. Thompson' s original grievance and this appeal concern both an agency' s 
achievement govern the selection and advancement of employees in Utah state 
go\ernment* Gi\cr tie construction and syntax, - presume that " - - c:rr^< 
mean:; _ ^/nonymot equivalent expression," rather than the slightly more comr^ < , 
meaning of an alte-n„ M repression2 Tn rg:-latu* ire: . : . . -
;! 990, informs us that *ment system* means: uring and promoting 
governmental employees to civil service positions on. [the] basis of competence." Some 
dictionaries include language stating that merit system also means an employment structure 
that is "determined by competitive examinations."3 
examinations" are present in the Manager, Grade 29, selection process. Additionally,, we 
review the Step 5 record to determine whether the Department abused its managerial 
discretion in the manner in which it valued education experience vis-a-vis work experience. 
A. Announcement Process 
dated July 19, 1991 (Jt. Exh 2) This document summarized the position's duties and 
responsibilities, stated the requisite minimum qualifications and informed prospective 
applicants on how to apply. Ten qualified departmental employees completed the 
application process and proceeded from the initial application screening process all thr way 
S ! 
B. The Screening Commit^? 
First, a three-person Screening Committee composed of staff from the Department' s 
personnel office screened all ten candidates' applications to ensure that minimum 
qualifications were met in each instance (T. I, pp. 26-27). All ten candidates passed this first 
level of review. The applicable standard of review was the State's approved class 
specification for the Manager, Grade 29, position (Grvt. Exh. 6). 
G The Rating Committee 
A UDES memo dated May 7, 1991, stated the policy that when employees bid on 
positions at Grade 25 and above, all applicants would have their educational background 
and related work experience "rated and scored" by a three-person Rating Committee. This 
committee, composed of a chairperson from the personnel office and two members chosen 
by the selecting supervisor, was instructed to score each applicant "entirely on information 
included in the Employee Application, Form 494" (Jt. Exh. 1). Again, all ten candidates 
passed this competitive review and received two individual raw scores, one for their 
educational attainment and another for their related professional work experience (Agency 
Exh. 3). All candidatesf two raw scores (one for education and one for related work 
experience) were added together and then divided by three as a weighing factor to produce 
a fifty percent value. This resulted in a single "Application Score," (T. I, pp. 32-33), for 
each candidate. (Later, each candidate' s Application Score would be combined with that 
candidate' s Oral Board score, resulting in a "Total Score," which constituted a final or 
single grand score for each candidate.) 
D. The Oral Interview Exam 
The Oral Board was composed of four interviewers or "raters." All ten Manager 
candidates received a copy of the four questions they were to be asked just before their 
individual interviews (Agency Exh. 4). Not the Oral Board, but the selecting supervisor 
formulated these four questions posed to all ten applicants (Jt. Exh. 4). The four Oral 
Board raters evaluated and scored the candidates1 answers in five categories. Two 
categories were weighted at 35% each, and three categories were rated at 10% each, for a 
total of 100% grading on each of the four predetermined questions. All applicants were 
rated only on their verbal responses. There was no further questioning, probing or 
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discussion by the Oral Board raters. Each rater completed an Oral Examination Rating 
Sheet, dated August 6, 1991, on each of the ten candidates (e.g., Agency Exh. 6). The Oral 
Board1* piirpn't* WT fn T«r< nrh rnnrlirhtr '• m l nn pntrnfinl Mipnusnrv skills 1 I 1 , 
p. 122) 
The four Oral Board raters assessed all ten candidates1 responses to the four 
preselected questions and awarded points to each candidate in five categories for each of 
the four questions posed. These five categories were then given weighted values by 
multiplying, the points awarded in each of the 'five categories by either 10% (three 
produced a single, combined Oral Board Interview Score for each candidate. (Agency 
Exh. 3, 6.) 
E. Total Score Results 
At this point in,, the selection process, each of the ten candidates had now received 
educational background and their related work experience) and a single Interview Score. 
These two scores—the Application Score and the Interview Score—were now combined4 into 
a final or grand Total Score (Agency Exh. 3). In terms of Total Score point value, 
Appellant ranked seventh out of the ten Manager candidates. 
F. Role of the Selecting Supervisor 
The names of the three highest ranking Manager candidates • i 
given to the Selecting Supervisor Avery, who selected one candidate for promo; ,i ...,/,. ;:. * 
three finalists. The top contender • s name was then ratified by the Department• s Executive 
Committee. David W. Shore was Mr. Avery • s pick for the Manager position, although the 
record does not show the names of the other two highest ranking candidates. Successful 
candidate Shore testified (Slioie) thru IK "ciiriie out tin imp in ilie 
selection process,"' ig Supciviwu Kwj) was not told how the 
three highest ranking candidates scored among themselves (T. II, p. 34,35). Avery testified 
that he had "favored no candidates," among the ten (T. n, p. 28). Nevertheless, Avery had 
the option of selecting any one of the top three candidates (T. n, p. 35). 
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G. Role of the Executive Committee 
According to written procedure promulgated in 1990, after the selecting supervisor 
makes a preliminary selection, the selecting supervisor then presents the "top names for 
final selection and presentation to the Executive Committee"5 for those positions at Grade 
25 or higher (Jt. Exh. 1). In this instance, Selecting Supervisor Avery • s choice of Shore was 
approved, resulting in the latter' s promotion into the Manager, Grade 29 position. 
H. Selection Through Competitiveness and Competency 
Having found that merit principles in the public work force are based upon individual 
competence (i.e., achievement) and competitive exams, we may now review the 
Department • s selection procedures with these principles in mind. To begin with, UDES 
announced the position and recruited Department-wide. All ten applicants were found to 
have met minimum qualifications, which would have entitled any of the ten to be appointed 
had the Department not relied upon an assessment process that sought to determine, if not 
the best candidate, at least one of the three best qualified candidates. Ten current UDESf 
employees constituted a substantial applicant pool from which to draw. Just by the mere 
fact of having ten fully qualified candidates, a very competitive selection process was 
established. 
Additionally, with the process of having three separate committees-each with its 
distinct, but limited participation—minimized, if not eliminated, the influence or any prospect 
of personal favoritism, bias, prejudice or manipulation determining the outcome of the 
selection process. Each of the three selection committees (Screening, Rating, and Oral 
Board) assessed the "comparative merit or achievement" (§67-19-2(3)) of the ten Manager 
candidates from a different perspective, including a different dimension of their 
qualifications. For example, the Screening Committee fulfilled its charge by assessing 
whether or not the ten candidates met the Statefs classification specification's minimum 
requirements (Grvt. Exh. 6). The Screening Committee neither ranked candidates nor dealt 
with them personally. At the first level of review, only candidates failing to meet minimum 
qualifications would have been screened out. None were. This documentary review simply 
insured that all candidates either met or exceeded minimum qualifications as set forth on 
the classification specification. All candidates were treated consistently and fairly by having 
•12-
the same standards of review applied to their Form 494 applications. 
Next, three different reviewers comprised the Rating Committee, which assessed the 
'technical qualifications for the position" regarding each candidatef s education and work 
experience (T. I, p. 122), This committee evaluated all candidates • prior post secondary 
educational backgrounds and the degree of job relatedness of their individual professional 
work experiences. (See Agency Exh. 4.) The Rating Committee applied the same standards 
to all candidates1 applications and assigned general point values to each candidate's 
educational record and work experience. Candidates received point values for post 
secondary education and work experience that was either determined to be 'directly 
related," "generally related," or "marginally related." For both education and job 
experience, up to five years' credit was awarded.6 In both cases, the number of years and 
the degree of job relatedness determined each candidate' s point values. The same system 
was applied consistently to all ten candidates • application materials. This process offered 
a fair, competitive and uniform evaluation of the candidates • educational and work related 
backgrounds. There was no showing of disparate treatment, or impropriety nor any illegal 
discrimination. The Board concludes that by applying the same standards, reasonable 
standards, that "fair treatment based upon the value of each employee' s services" was 
applied as prescribed at §67-19-2(b). 
The third and final committee—the Oral Board—assessed the ten candidates1 
competency in a competitively structured oral examination. Each candidate answered 
verbally to four preselected questions that had been composed by Selecting Supervisor 
Avery. All ten candidates received the same four questions, under the same conditions, and 
were given a written copy of the exam questions shortly before their respective exam. The 
four Oral Board raters assessed each of the candidates » responses and applied the same 
rating system to their answers (Agency Exh. 6). The oral exam process was open, fair, 
consistent and it reasonably and rationally attempted to measure the candidatesf abilities 
and understandings in responding to work related issues as each candidate expressed his or 
her ability to think about and articulate responses to each of the four job-related questions. 
During this process, the candidates were asked questions to draw out their knowledge about 
and to demonstrate their skills regarding certain elements of supervision and leadership 
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considered essential to the Manager position, by Avery (T. II, p. 27). 
Each of the three reviewing committees was composed of different members: one set 
of three served on the Screening Committee, another set of three persons served on the 
Rating Committee, and again, four other persons served as raters on the Oral Board. Thus, 
along with Selecting Supervisor Avery, eleven different UDESf employees participated in 
the Field Audit Manager selection process. This three-level review process together with 
a selecting supervisor component provided integrity in the evaluation of the ten candidatesf 
qualifications, offered fair and reasonably equal treatment to all candidates, and provided 
a selection process devoid of •favoritism, bias, or prejudice in the selection process," as 
stated by the CSRB Hearing Officer (Step 5 Decision, p. 9). 
I. A Process of Differentiating Among Candidates 
Appellant objects to the CSRB Hearing Officer' s statement that "a method had to 
be devised to assess the differences in the type of education and experience" of the ten 
candidates because "most of the applicants had lengthy experience with the Agency."7 
(Emphasis supplied by Appellant.) Appellant avers that "the Department was not required 
to find differences in the experience and education of all of the applicants." (Brief, p. 3.) 
Ms. Thompson argues that although UDES chose to devise a method of selecting 
candidates, the CSRB Hearing Officer made no factual findings to support an analysis that 
the Department "necessarily had to devise a method to differentiate between education and 
experience as it pertains to the position in question." (Ibid) For the sake of argument, if 
we were to agree that the Department was not required to find differences in education and 
work experience, but did, that does not necessarily mean that such an act was unlawful, 
improper or in violation of administrative rule or statute. In fact, where an agency relies 
upon the merit principles of competence/achievement and competitive examination, it would 
be unusual not to assess differences in the candidates• qualifications. 
Pertinently, Ms. Thompson has not challenged the accuracy of any of the Step 5 
Decisions factual findings or legal conclusions, but on appeal she raises an issue found in 
the "Discussion" portion of the evidentiary decision. 
The CSRB factfinder first noted that several of the candidates had an employment 
history of 20 or more years ("Most applicants had lengthy experience with the Agency . . 
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. . ") as with Ms. Thompson's and Mr. Shore's 21 year tenures (T. II, p. 5). The Board 
believes that the CSRB Hearing Officer was merely making a reasonable analysis that 
UDES needed to apply a fair method to assess/value the ten candidatesf educational 
backgrounds and work experiences. We note that the sentence to which Ms. Thompson 
objects is placed in the middle of a paragraph in which the CSRB Hearing Officer explained 
to Appellant that all the applicants had received the same type of assigned values for their 
education (i.e., directly related, generally related or marginally related). 
Importantly, the trier of fact then explained that Ms. Thompson "would have 
received more credit for education if she had filled out the application more completely." 
The Step 5 Decision continued by pointing out that Ms. Thompson had received three 
pieces of information which advised applicants that their education and work experience 
would be assessed for point value based solely on the candidates' Form 494 applications 
(T. I, pp. 119-20). It is within that fuller context that the CSRB Hearing Officer had 
explained to Appellant that by failing to completely include her educational courses she had 
only weakened her candidacy by receiving a "generally related" value for education instead 
of a possible "directly related" rating with 40 points (8 points x 5 years, instead of 
Appellant » s credited 4 years). We conclude that Appellantf s argument over "had to devise 
differences" is without material substance. We believe there was substantial evidence to 
support the CSRB Hearing Officer » s holding that the UDES fairly assessed the candidates' 
education and work experience. 
Finally, Appellant asserts that, T o attempt to screen candidates based on education 
. . . is an abuse of discretion." (Brief, p. 7.) Our common dictionary tells us that the use 
of "screen" in this context means, T o examine systematically in order to determine 
suitability."8 That, we hold, is the essence of those merit principles of competency and 
competitive examinations. Indeed, the Departmentf s entire selection process was a system 
of examining the ten candidates to determine their suitability through a systematic screening 
or examination that was open, fair, equally competitive and reasonable. The selection 
process used by the Department manifests acceptable merit principles. 
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WEIGHING THE CANDIDATES' EXPERIENCE 
A. Work Experience Credit 
Appellant maintains that the CSRB Hearing Officer erred in determining that the 
Department appropriately weighed Grievant • s experience. First, it is important to correct 
Appellant • s misstatement as set forth in her Brief. Appellant claims that she was given 
"marginally related" credit of four years for her work experience (Brief, p. 9, para. 2); in 
fact, she was given "generally related" credit for five years (Agency Exh. 5). Thus, 
Appellant received the maximum allowable total of 60 points for her work experience, not 
the four years times eight points of "marginally related" credit or 32 points she states (Ibid.) 
Appellant further errs by stating she was given four years• work experience credit rather 
than five (Brief, p. 10, para. 2). The record evidence shows Ms. Thompson was given five 
years' credit for her directly related work experience (Agency Exh. 5). In part, 
Ms. Thompson may be confusing the two different standards applied at two separate and 
distinct levels of the selection process: four years of full-time paid professional related 
employment credited to her on a year-for-year basis as a substitution for her lack of a 
Bachelor's degree (normally a four-year academic endeavor), which occurred at the 
Screening Committee level or first level of review for purposes of determining minimum 
qualifications (Grvt. Exh. 6); as compared with the second level of review by the Rating 
Committee that assessed only credit value for her prior education and work experience. 
Appellant also asserts that the Department' s selection procedures should not have 
placed a "cap" of five years on her work experience. Nevertheless, this cap of five yearsf 
directly related work experience applied equally to all ten candidates. UDES further 
defined the applicable work experience by stating that work experience performed within 
the last five years counted as "directly related" work experience. Next, work experience 
that occurred more than five but less than ten years counted as "generally related" work 
experience. Finally, work performed more than ten years ago was considered as "marginally 
related." Thus, currentness of work experience was used as a yardstick. This was a fair and 
reasonable method for assessing length of years and degree of job relatedness as long as all 
applicants had the same standards applied consistently to their circumstances. Although 
Ms. Thompson believes that she should have been given more credit for her 11 years of 
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directly related work in Field Audit, nonetheless she received the maximum allowable points 
for her work experience. Under this work related assessing system, Ms. Thompson received 
all the points she was entitled to and no less than any other candidate who was also credited 
with the five years• maximum allowable for directly related job experience. 
It was Appellants Oral Board score and her lack of identifying her educational 
achievements on her Form 494 that caused her overall ranking of seventh place, not any 
lack of credit for her work experience under the evaluation system used by UDES. In 
theory, had she received more than five years credit or even up to 11 years of directly 
related work experience, other candidates may have also received the same or more years 
of credit as these were all long term employees.9 For example, Shore also had over 20 
years and had even held the Field Audit Supervisor position for more than one year. 
Moreover, Ms. Thompson avers that the Department valued education much more 
than it did directly related worked experience (Brief, p. 10). That is not accurate. Under 
UDES' selection system, five years of directly related education (5 x 12 points = 60 points) 
is equal to five years of directly related work experience (5 x 12 points = 60 points). 
Admittedly, however, for one type of position, an agency may reasonably value education 
over work experience; for another position, the same agency may value work experience 
over education. An agency has managerial discretion, with DHRMfs approval and in 
conformity with the Statef s approved classification specification, to assess its staffing needs. 
The imperative is that all applicants be treated with consistency and that the same standards 
be applied (with possible legal exceptions for reasonable accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA). 
B. Valuing Education Over Work Experience 
Ms. Thompson argues that the Department • s selection procedures should not give 
•education greater value than directly related work experience," and that to do so is 
"fundamentally unfair and violates the policy of this State." (Brief, p. 10.) UDES • Internal 
Job Announcement 91-45 (Jt. Exh. 2) established the following minimum qualifications for 
education and experience: 
Education and Experience: 
(1) Bachelor^ degree in accounting, plus three years of full-
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time, paid professional employment, OR 
(2) On a year-for-year basis: 
(a) Graduate level education in accounting can be 
substituted for the required employment, OR 
(b) Full-time paid professional related 
employment can be substituted for the required 
bachelor • s degree. 
Appellant did not qualify under (1) because she lacks a Bachelor's degree. Also, 
Ms. Thompson did not qualify under (2)(a) because she lacks graduate level credit. Thus, 
Appellant met the Grade 29 position • s minimum qualifications by credit for (2)(b), which 
permitted her to substitute "on a year-for-year basis" four years of "full-time paid 
professional related employment" in lieu of the Bachelor • s degree. In fact, four years of 
Ms. Thompson • s work experience was applied to meet the required four years of college-
level course work. Here again, Appellant contends that she should have been awarded five 
years' credit instead of the actual substituted four years as credited by the Screening 
Committee. First, it is noted that the Screening Committee only determined whether 
minimum qualifications had been met in a yes/no assessment. The Screening Committee 
awarded no points. The assessment of prior education and work experience was done by 
the Rating Committee which assigned point values and overall ratings. The latter 
committee awarded points on each candidatef s Education and Work Experience Rating 
Sheet (Agency Exh. 5). Appellant has confused the responsibility of the Screening 
Committee with that of the Rating Committee. Consequently, the Screening Committee 
could not have awarded Ms. Thompson any points for her work experience that would have 
been accepted later and counted by the Rating Committee. Thus, the substitution process 
performed by the Screening Committee is not applicable to nor a part of the point 
assessment process performed by the Rating Committee at the second level of review for 
the Manager candidacy. Importantly, the Department • s Brief is directly on point with 
valuing education and placing a limit on substituting no more than four years of work 
related experience for a Bachelor's degree: 
Since a full-time student will normally earn a Bachelor's 
Degree in four years, it was reasonable for the rating committee 
to place a cap of four years on the number of years of work 
experience that can be used to substitute for the Bachelor' s 
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Degree. It is noted by Mr. Browning at 1st T107, lines 6-9, 
•the only way that a person could get any credit for more than 
four years of education is if they have an advanced degree." It 
is noted that the internal job announcement, Joint Exhibit 
No. 2, only allows work experience to be substituted for the 
required Bachelor • s Degree. It does not allow work experience 
to be substituted for an advanced degree. In evaluating and 
assigning points on the education and work experience rating 
sheet, Agency Exhibit No. 5, it was not unreasonable for the 
rating committee to weigh work experience, which is being 
substituted for the required education, as "generally related" 
rather than "directly related." Mr. Browning explained at 1st 
T100, line 12 - T101, Line 18, "education is the prime, basic 
qualification for this job . . . education is important. If you are 
going to be an accountant or auditor, you have to know certain, 
basic things. The easiest way to gain that is through education 
. . . as a general rule, a person with an educational background 
will be able to handle a larger variety of problems and handle 
them easier." (Respondent • s Brief, p. 9.) 
In some circumstances the Department, or any State agency, might value directly 
related work experience as more important than an educational degree. Yet, in other 
circumstances management might need to consider a specific amount of education along 
with a certain number of work experience years to set minimum qualifications. However, 
it is not unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion for UDES • officials to have valued a 
Bachelor's degree in accounting or a Bachelor's degree in general as slightly more 
worthwhile than comparable work experience. It can be reasonably argued that the exercise 
of obtaining an undergraduate degree, or even a graduate degree, through completing 
rigorous course work and academic programs, provides certain experiences and training not 
found elsewhere. (See, Shore, T. n, p. 17; Avery, pp. 40,41-42.) That academic instruction 
received more emphasis or weight in the Rating Committee' s formula for valuing both work 
experience and academic instruction was not unreasonable in the circumstances, nor an 
abuse of discretion, nor an impropriety in assessing the ten candidates' educational and 
work related backgrounds. A Field Audit Manager, Grade 29, position is a fairly high level 
position, one well within the ranks of management. While persons without a college degree 
are not precluded from appointment, it is not unreasonable to anticipate appointees will 
likely hold a college degree, given the span of control and the amount of responsibility 
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inherent in the position. Nevertheless, even without a Bachelor' s degree and without 
stating her full college-level credentials, Appellant was given a sufficient opportunity to 
apply for the Manager position and be considered along with all the other qualified 
candidates. 
PRIOR JOB PERFORMANCE 
Appellant's third issue is that the Department's selection procedures violate State 
policy because Ms. Thompson • s exemplary job performance was not taken into account. 
Ms. Thompson invokes the statutory language of State employees being "rewarded for their 
performance,11 and that "comparative merit or achievement govern the selection and 
advancement of employees" (§67-19-2(3)). These, of course, are broad policy statements 
rather than explicit legal provisions. Certainly as broad policy statements, this statutory 
provision does not mandate the factoring in of prior job performance appraisals. 
Appellantf s issue of injecting performance appraisals and past performance ratings into the 
selection process was not raised or previously addressed at the Step 5 level for the CSRB 
Hearing Officer • s consideration. Indeed, Appellantf s prior job performance was not among 
the five gravamina set forth in her statement of grievance. See above, pages 5-6. As a new 
issue, one raised on appeal for the first time, we decline to consider it now inasmuch as it 
was not considered by our Hearing Officer previously (R137-1-21 B.). 
APPELLATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Board legally concludes that the CSRB Hearing Officer' s factual findings are 
both reasonable and rational, and supported by substantial evidence contained in the record 
as a whole. 
2. The Board further concludes as a matter of law that the CSRB Hearing Officer 
has correctly applied the relevant State and departmental policies, administrative rules, and 
statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary Step 5 Decision. 
3. Additionally, the Board concludes that the Departmentf s decision in selecting and 
promoting David W. Shore and rejecting Ms. Thompson for the Field Audit Manager, 
Grade 29, position is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Board further 
concludes that the Department fs original decision on this grievance is both reasonable and 
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rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, 
administrative rules, and statutes applicable to this case. 
4. The Departments selection process that relied upon the efforts of three 
reviewing committees and a selecting supervisor who designates a best qualified appointee 
from the three highest ranked candidates was a reasonable and rational exercise of 
managerial discretion, UDESf officials did not violate any administrative rules, statutes, 
policies nor did they act improperly in the selection of Shore and the rejection of Appellant 
for the Manager position. The Board further concludes that Shore's selection and 
promotion comport with the general understanding of merit system principles. 
5. The Department did not abuse its discretion by considering the candidatesf 
educational achievements as part of the Manager 29 selection process. Achievement and 
competency in education may be relied upon as merit factors. 
6. The Department did not violate any State policy, administrative rule or statutory 
provision, nor abuse its discretion or act improperly, when it valuated both work experience 
and educational credentials as directly related, generally related or marginally related. 
7. The Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it selected one of the 
ten highly qualified Manager candidates and rejected the other nine, which included 
Appellant. UDES* officials acted fairly, consistently and equitably in operating the 
screening and rating processes that evaluated past work performance and educational 
credentials of all applicants, including Appellant' s. 
8. Grievant has not demonstrated by substantial evidence that she was directly 
harmed by any unjust or violative condition of the Department• s selection procedures, by 
any defect in the application of the selection procedures, or by the selection of Mr. Shore 
for the Manager position. 
9. Grievant has not shown that the Department did not select the best candidate or 
from the three best rated candidates or alternatively did not select a better qualified 
candidate than Grievant, under the selection process and criteria used. 
10. The Department did not abuse its discretion in developing and using the 
selection procedures relied upon to select and promote Shore into the Manager position. 
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DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing facts of the case and the Boardf s legal conclusions, there 
is no basis upon which to reverse the Step 5 Decision. Therefore, Ms. Thompson • s appeal 
of her April 23,1991 promotion grievance is denied. Importantly, however, the Board also 
commends Ms. Thompson for her more than two decades of successful service to the 
Department and the state of Utah, for her more than eleven years of tenure as the Field 
Audit Supervisor, and for her highly rated performance appraisals that are contained in the 
record. We wish her well and compliment her for being a very dedicated public servant of 
the state of Utah. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this 28th day of May 1993. 
H&i 
Bruce T. Jon 
Career Servi 
•l{ \-<T/^\ hairm 
Review 
an 
Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. The first sentence to which Appellant finds objectionable language is contained in the CSRB Hearing Officer's 
analysis pertaining to Ms. Thompson's second point in her grievance statement ("Was adequate weight given to 
Grievant's educational credentials?") Below, with emphasis supplied, is the objectionable sentence but set within 
its larger context as written by the CSRB Examiner: 
In evaluating education and work experience later in the process, that Rating 
Committee followed its own policies and procedures in assigning values for 
work and experience as "direcdy related,* "generally related," and "marginally 
related" to the requirements of the actual position. All the applicants received 
credit in the same manner. Most of the applicants had lengthy experience 
with the Agency, so a method had to be devised to assess the differences in 
the type of experience and education. 
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2. WEBSTER'S II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988 ed), p. 826. 
3. WEBSTER'S II, p. 743; New College Edition The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(1980 ed.), p. 822. 
4. Personnel and Training Memo 91-1 (Jt. Exh. 1) provides the following instruction on obtaining a final score, 
however, the terms used are slightly different from those other terms used in the record for scoring purposes: 
Final Selection: Composite scores are computed by combining Rating 
Committee scores with Oral Board scores according to a percentage split 
predetermined by the selecting supervisor, and included in the internal job 
announcement. The selecting supervisor is then given the top names for final 
selection and presentation to the Executive Committee. 
5. The Executive Committee was composed of the following: Floyd G. Astin, Administrator (i.e., chief executive 
office of UDES); Karen Assay, Administrative Assistant; Terry Burns, Director of Unemployment Insurance; 
Dave Turner, Director Employment Services; Rosemarie Carter, Director of Administrative Services; and 
Bill Horner, Director of Labor Market Information (T. n, p. 33). 
6. Appellant has argued otherwise as she received only four years' credit for her "generally related" education 
(4 years x 8 points * 32 points), instead of the maximum possible five years' "directly related" educational 
credit (5 years x 12 points * 60 points). In part, Ms. Thompson's lesser point value for education resulted 
because she failed to completely fill in and describe all of her post secondary course work as requested on 
Form 494, on the Job Announcement, and on UDES' memo 91-1. Admittedly, Appellant received less credit 
for post secondary education due to the lack of a baccalaureate degree. As one candidate had a Master's degree, 
it is reasonable to assume that some of the others had completed some college graduate level course work. See, 
for example, T. II, pp. 31-31. 
7. Appellant has inverted the CSRB Hearing Officer's original wording, which reads: "Most of the applicants 
had lengthy experience with the Agency, so a method had to be devised to assess the differences in the type of 
experience and education." (Step 5 Decision, p. 7.) 
8. The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1166. 
9. Personnel Specialist Jan Browning testified that due to the high calibre of all ten candidates, that eight out 
of ten would have received the maximum points ('max out,* T. I, p. 108), if everyone had been credited with 
all of their years of work experience substituted for educational credit (T. I, pp. 114-15), which is the way 
Appellant wanted the assessing done (T. I, pp. 33-34, 43-44, 50-51, 53-55, 79, 84). 
For example, Selecting Supervisor Avery characterized the entire group of ten candidates with the following 
description: 
The entire field was very qualified. There was a lot of stiff competition. 
There was a CPA, there was a candidate with a [M]aster's degree, there were 
three current [Contributions supervisors if you include Sylvia, there were five 
field auditors with over ten years of experience each, they were all lead or 
senior field auditors, there was, I believe, two or three people that had 
completed the [State's] [M]anagement [Certification [Pjrogram that were not, 
at that time, supervisors, there was one individual who had recently returned 
from Washington, D. C. where he was like one of ten individuals selected 
nationwide to participate in a Department of Labor project to set up a set of 
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quality standards for the entire unemployment insurance operation. So the 
competition was stiff. These were all highly qualified people. These were ten 
very high qualified people (T. n, pp. 31-32). 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated §63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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ADDENDUM L 
Crawford, v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 
5 CSRB 45 (1993) 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
CATHY CRAWFORD, et al., 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency. 
DECISION AND FINAL 
AGENCY ACTION 
Case Nos. 5 CSRB 45 (Step 6) 
8 CSRB/H.O. 119 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level 
review of the above-captioned case on June 17,1993. The following Board Members heard 
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, 
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. Cathy Crawford, Dale Hansen and 
Sherry Morgan (Appellants) are a remnant group of three employees who have jointly 
appealed a Step 5 Decision, which originally included 20 employees. Phillip W. Dyer, 
Attorney at Law, represented Appellants on behalf of the Utah Public Employees' 
Association (UPEA). Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman represented the 
Utah Department of Corrections (Department and UDC). A certified court reporter made 
a verbatim record of this proceeding, consisting mainly of oral argument before the Board, 
which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utali 
Code Unannotaied (1993 Supp.) 
This case proceeded properly through the Stated grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumedjurisdiction over this appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the codified Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407, and -408, as well as 
constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utali Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). All the UAPAfs formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRBfs 
proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. The Board entered into an executive session for 
deliberation and decision-making, but did not conclude its deliberations until August 12, 
1993, when the Board closed the case record and made an ultimate decision. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During July 1990, 20 UDC employees filed individual grievances that were 
consolidated into one group grievance at Step 5 pursuant to §67-19a-401(7)(a) and R140-1-1 
Definition, ("Consolidation"), Utah Administrative Code (1990 Supp.). The CSRB 
designated this case as Cathy Crawford, et aLy v. UtaJi Department of Corrections 
(^Crawford*). UPEA represented all aggrieved employees in the Crawford case in contrast 
to the companion case of Michael Hansen, et aL, v. Utafi Department of Corrections 
('Hansen*), in which the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), Local 1009, provided counsel for a smaller group of eight aggrieved employees. 
Both the Crawford and Hansen cases involved allegations of pay equity complaints by 
aggrieved employees who claimed greater years of service and related job experience 
compared with certain more recently hired UDC employees. The Department• s Field 
Operations Division employed all Grievants in both group grievances as Adult Probation 
and Parole Agents (AP&P Agents) at the time these grievances were filed. The same CSRB 
hearing officer heard and ruled upon both the Hansen and Crawford cases. Consequently, 
the Board • s examiner made common references between both cases during their procedural 
processing, as well as during the actual Step 5 evidentiary hearings of both cases, as did each 
party1 s counsel. 
Initially, both group grievances had been combined for a joint hearing under 
R140-1-1, Definition ('Joint Hearing"). However, as case management of both the 
Crawford and Hansen group grievances became unworkable on a consolidated basis due to 
certain recognizable distinctions, the CSRB administrator separated the cases effective 
March 8,1991. 
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Almost three years have elapsed between the time Grievants filed *heir statements 
of grievance and the presentation of oral argument at Step 6 before this Board in the 
Crawford case. The three Appellants deserve a brief explanation for this long processing 
period. 
Grievants filed their statements of grievance during July 1990, with the CSRB 
hearing officers Step 5 or evidentiary decision being issued two years later. During this 
24-month period, the first appointed CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference, issued a Prehearing Conference Order, then upon a party's request, recused 
himself based upon good cause. The second CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference to sort out the issues, dealt with several motions to dismiss, received several 
other motions on which he made rulings, requested written briefing on specific legal issues, 
and entered a few interim orders (in both cases). The Step 5 hearing was noticed up with 
four separate dates, along with an additional half-dozen continuances being requested and 
issued. After Appellants Crawford, Hansen1 and Morgan appealed the Crawford Step 5 
Decision, nearly three months passed before the evidentiary proceedings • transcript became 
available to the parties. Upon access to the Step 5 proceedings • transcript volumes, 
Grievants1 counsel requested and received four separate month-long extensions for 
submitting his brief. Next, Agency • s counsel requested and received a single month-long 
extension. Overall, more than eight months elapsed between requesting the Step 5 
proceedingsf transcript and the filing of both parties • Step 6 appeal briefs. 
As only three of the twenty original aggrieved employees participating in the 
Crawford grievance case have perfected an appeal to Step 6 (Appellants Cathy Crawford, 
Dale E. Hansen and Sherry Morgan), this Step 6 Decision is applicable only to Appellants' 
particular appeal. Thus, this decision is not directed to nor intended for any other former 
Crawford case participants. 
ISSUES 
At fospes Atfivfltoted at Step 5 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing as the 
proper issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Are the grievants entitled to prevail on their respective 
salary grievances? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
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During the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings held on June 18 and July 22-23,1992, the 
CSRB hearing officer dismissed the individual cases of 9 of the 20 aggrieved employees1 
cases. Next, after conducting the de novo evidentiary hearing during which all testimonial 
and documentary evidence were received into the record, the CSRB trier of fact reached 
an ultimate conclusion that denied all 11 remaining Grievants their requested remedy and 
relief. 
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6 
Appellants1 Brief asserts that the CSRB hearing officers Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Step 5 Decision) is an inadequate legal decision. 
Appellants have characterized their confusion over the Step 5 Decision in the following 
passages: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue this case on appeal for 
one very simple reason, to-wit: The Hearing Officer has not 
made specific, detailed findings of fact which can be pointedly 
addressed, refuted or supported. Instead, the Hearing Officer 
has labeled his rather rambling discussion as being Findings of 
Fact when, in fact, many of his findings are conclusions of law 
. . . [Example omitted.] Grievants are thus prohibited from 
pointing out facts that support or refute the conclusions because 
no finding exists to support the conclusions . . . . 
It is thus Grievantsf initial position that the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer has failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
so as to permit this Tribunal to effectively review his analysis 
and decision (Brief, pp. 1-2). 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision is ambiguous in its factual findings and legal 
conclusions, and that the evidentiary decision lacks both factual sufficiency and specificity. 
Therefore, they have identified the four most 'pertinent issues" needing resolution. 
Appellants • four pertinent issues constitute their four legal arguments at Step 6, which they 
have expounded on in their Brief as follows: (1) the hearing officer committed reversible 
error by not properly interpreting certain provisions of the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act consonant with its policy provisions, (2) the hearing officer erred when 
determining that law enforcement experience was directly related to an AP&P Agent's 
position for pay equity analysis, (3) the hearing officer erred when not comparing 
Appellants1 salary data with all (i.e., meaning Bassi's and Benson's) of the 
•comparablesf" salary data presented into evidence, and (4) the hearing officer erred when 
^ 
concluding that Appellants had not been harmed by existing pay inequities. At the Step 6 
proceeding, Appellants emphasized and expanded upon their first and fourth points, while 
leaving the second and third points to their Brief. 
C. The Board' s Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2,1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision 
at R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Appellants' appeal to this Board-level review. The Board's review standards state: 
D. The Board • s Standards of Review. The board • s standards 
of review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance 
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted 
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The Board reviews this appeal based upon the above-quoted provisions. 
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
Appellants are the moving parry at Step 6 and therefore shoulder both the burdens 
of proof and of persuasion. To prevail, Appellants must demonstrate under the standards 
set forth at R137-1-21 D., above, that reversible error is present in the Step 5 Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board now exercises its vested discretionary authority in making and entering 
into the case record its own findings of fact and legal conclusions, in addition to those 
findings already made at the proceedings below. 
A. General Findings 
1. Initially, there were 20 Grievants in this pay equity group grievance. Nine 
Grievants had their respective cases dismissed during the evidentiary proceedings held on 
June 18, July 22-23,1992. 
2. The Step 5 Decision denied remedies to the following 11 Grievants: Karl Bartell 
(Bartell), Cathy Crawford (Crawford), Patricia Dennis (Dennis), Dale E. Hansen (Hansen), 
Jeffrey MacLeod (MacLeod), Sherry Morgan (Morgan), Lisa Shavers (Shavers), 
Katherine Straten (Straten), Beverly Thomas (Thomas), Paul Truelson (Truelson) and 
Gerald White (White). 
3. None of the just-named 11 Grievants prevailed at the Step 5 or evidentiary level. 
The Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that no salary inequities had been created when 
the Department credited three former police officers with their respective years of law 
enforcement experience. Nor did any of the eleven Grievants prevail when they compared 
themselves with two State employees who had accepted lateral pay-rate transfers into AP&P 
Agent positions from other State agencies. 
4. All the just-named 11 Grievants were AP&P Agents within the Department's 
Field Operations Division during the processing of this grievance. 
5. At the grievance's filing date (July 26,1990), the 11 Grievants' various lengths 
of service time as AP&P Agents ranged from Morgan's 13 years, 10 months down to 
Truelson' s 2 years. Ten Grievants held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 23, while only 
Truelson held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 21. 
6. Crawford, Dennis, Straten, Shavers, and Thomas had the same pay rate of $11.23 
at the grievance filing, while the other six had various pay rates: Morgan ($1334), 
Bartell ($1429), Hansen ($12.47), White ($1134), MacLeod ($11.73) and Truelson ($9.81). 
7. All 11 Grievants claimed personal harm based upon the Department's filling 
AP&P Agent positions either by hiring new employees or by the acceptance of current State 
employees transferring into Field Operations. Grievants • specific complaint was against five 
recruited AP&P Agents who had been offered salaries at pay rates above the minimum 
entry levels. 
8. The five newer AP&P Agent hires used as "comparables" by the three Appellants 
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were: William Brad Bassi (Bassi), Ronald W. Benson (Benson), Kenneth Lee Bingham 
(Bingham), Scott Pepper (Pepper) and Randy Richins (Richins). All five newer AP&P 
Agents had been hired (or transferred) above the minimum entry level pay rate for their 
respective salary grade, whether on Grades 19,21 or 23. These five newer agents were 
designated as "comparables" during these proceedings, which term is still applicable. 
B. Appellant Cathv Crawford 
9. The Department hired Crawford in July 1986, as an AP&P Agent, at entry-level 
Grade 17 (A-3, G-24). 
10. On a yearly basis, Crawford received promotions through AP&P Agent ranks as 
she advanced from Grade 17 to Grades 19,21 and 23. Crawford's most recent promotion 
occurred in July 1989, when she advanced to the senior working level of AP&P Agent, 
Grade 23. 
11. At the filing of this group grievance (July 1990), Crawford had exactly four 
years' direct AP&P Agent experience. At that time, her pay rate was $1123 per hour. 
12. Crawford, at her grievance filing, had been credited with an additional three 
years and two months of directly related job experience for her prior service as a 
Correctional Officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff' s Department. Thus, along with her 
four years • AP&P Agent service, Crawford • s total directly related job experience for both 
AP&P Agent and prior Correctional Officer duty amounted to seven years, two months of 
service. (G-24, G-41, T. I-pp. 154, 167.) 
13. Crawford selected Bassi, Benson, Bingham, Pepper and Richins as her 
•comparables" for grieving "new hire" pay equity comparisons (Grvts. Exht. 24; T. I 
pp. 174-75). 
C Appelant PPfc E, Hansen 
14. Hansen began his employment with UDC in April 1975. Appellant Hansen 
commenced as a Probation Aide, later advanced to an AP&P Technician, and still later he 
received a promotion to Correctional Counselor at Grade 17. Hansen served as a 
Correctional Counselor from October 1979 through January 1986. During this time, he 
advanced to Counselor, Grade 19. In 1986, Hansen received promotion to Correctional 
Counselor, Grade 21, which was the top position in that career ladder series. As 
Agent Hansen had accrued six years and four months of counseling experience, this time 
period was credited to his total service as being directly related AP&P Agent experience 
(Agency Exht. 3). 
15. In January 1986, Hansen transferred from a Grade 21 Correctional Counselor 
to a Grade 21 AP&P Agent, at his same pay rate. In March 1986, Hansen was promoted 
to AP&P Agent, Grade 23. (T. 1.16-17; Agency Exht. 5.) 
16. At the time of grievance filing (July 1990), Hansen had four years, six months 
of AP&P Agent experience (Agency Exht. 3). Additionally, Agent Hansen also received 
credit for his prior tenure (i.e., six years and four months) as a Correctional Counselor, 
which brought his total credited AP&P service to ten years, ten months.2 In July 1990, 
Hansen's pay rate was $12.473 per hour as a Grade 23 Agent. (Agency Exht. 3, 5.) 
17. Hansen compared his AP&P Agent employment experience and pay rate with 
those of newer Agents Bassi and Pepper. (G-l; T. I p. 19.) 
P. Appellant Sherry Morgan 
18. In 1966, Sherry Morgan began employment with the State' s Division of Family 
Services in the former Department of Social Services (now Human Services) as a Social 
Service Worker, Grade 17. In March 1973, Appellant Morgan transferred from Social 
Services into an AP&P Agent position with UDC. As her Social Services' duties were not 
directly related to AP&P duties, she received no credit for her prior State employment 
(Agency Exhts. 3; T. I. p. 227). 
19. From 1973 into 1977, Morgan advanced in the AP&P Agent career ladder series 
from Grade 15 to Grade 23. In late 1977, Appellant Morgan resigned for personal reasons 
(Agency Exht. 3; T. I p. 227). 
20. In 1980, the Social Services Department re-hired Morgan as an Eligibility 
Examiner, Grade 21, while placing her in an exempt or Schedule A position. The following 
year Morgan worked as an Eligibility Technician, Grade 15, at a lesser pay rate but in a 
Schedule B or career service position (Agency Exht. 3). 
21. On May 30,1981, Morgan transferred to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position 
with UDC's Field Operations Division. Effective May 29, 1982, Appellant Morgan was 
promoted to an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, position, which position she continued to serve in 
until her grievance filing (July 1990). (T. I pp. 227-28; Agency Exht. 3.) 
22. At grievance filing, Morgan had 13 years, 10 months of directly related AP&P 
Agent experience as credited by UDC (Agency Exht. 5). Agent Morgan credited herself 
with only 13 years and 4 months of directly related AP&P Agent experience (Grvts. 
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Exht. 33). Morgan's pay rate at the grievance filing was $13.34 (Agency Exht. 5), although 
Morgan erroneously stated her pay rate as $12.84 in her Summary Status document (Grvts. 
Exht. 33). 
23. Agent Morgan selected comparables Bassi and Pepper for pay equity 
comparisons. 
E. Comparable William Brad Bassi 
24. Bassi had been employed with the State's Juvenile Court from February 1975 
until mid-May 1989. Bassi began his career as a Probation Aide, advanced through the 
ranks as a Probation Officer from Grade 15 to 26, finally attaining supervisor status. 
25. As a State employee, Bassi transferred into UDC initially and temporarily as a 
Corrections Trainee, Grade 13, (essentially during his POST Academy certification training), 
at which time he retained his higher Grade 26 Juvenile Court pay rate. After POST 
certification, Bassi received placement at the AP&P Agent, Grade 23, level effective 
August 19, 1989, again retaining his former Juvenile Court pay rate due to his lateral 
transfer action from one State agency to another. (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07.) 
26. Bassi was not a "new hire," but rather a State employee who had transferred 
from one State jurisdiction to another while continuing his State service. 
27. Bassi, with his 15 years' service as a State Juvenile Court Probation Officer, was 
accepted and treated by UDC as a career service employee, not a probationary employee. 
UDC accorded Bassi immediate recognition of his prior merit or tenured status with the 
Juvenile Court (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07). 
28. All three Appellants^-Crawford, Hansen and Morgan—selected Bassi as a 
comparable new hire for comparison purposes. 
F. Comparable Ronald Benson 
29. The Department hired Benson as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21 on 
May 12,1986. During October 1987, Benson's position was reclassified to a Security and 
Enforcement Officer, Grade 21, with the same grade and pay rate (Agency Exht 2). 
30. Effective April 16, 1988, Benson transferred from his Utah State Prison 
assignment to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position in UDC's Field Operations Division. 
For his intra-departmental transfer, Benson received no pay increase (Agency Exht. 2; T. II 
pp. 9,11-12,19,21,26). According to State policy R468-7-4.(7), Benson's lateral transfer 
did not entitle him to a salary increase. 
31. Benson received a promotion to AP&P Agent, Grade 23, one year later, on 
April 15,1989. 
32. Appellant Crawford selected Benson as a comparable for comparing her service 
length and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
G. Comparable Kenneth Lee Bingham 
33. Bingham was employed by the Department on April 2, 1988. As a new hire, 
Bingham began as an AP&P Agent at Grade 19. Bingham advanced to AP&P Agent, 
Grade 21, after completing a full year as a Grade 19. After a second full year, Bingham was 
promoted to Grade 23 (Agency Exhts. 2, 4). 
34. Upon leaving the Weber County Sheriff • s Department, Bingham accepted a two 
dollar per hour pay cut to join Field Operations as an AP&P Agent (T. I p. 137). 
35. Bingham had been an AP&P Agent for over two years when Appellants filed 
their grievances in July 1990. As of July 1990, Bingham's pay rate was $12.59 compared 
with Crawford • s lesser $1123 per hour, a difference of $1.36 per hour (Agency Exht. 4, 5; 
T. I pp. 124, 130). 
36. The Department credited Bingham with approximately 14 years and 6 months' 
law enforcement experience at the grievance filing. Bingham • s full service credit was based 
upon a combination of law enforcement experience gained with the Weber County Sheriff' s 
Office, U.S. Army military police duty, and his AP&P Agent service with Field Operations 
(T. I. pp. 127, 130, 133; Grvts. Exht. 22; Agency Exht. 2). 
37. Only Appellant Crawford selected Bingham as a comparable (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
H. Comparable Scott Pepper 
38. Pepper hired on as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, effective December 23, 1989 
(Grvts. Exht. 48). Pepper' s initial pay rate was $13.28. When the Crawford group grievance 
was filed, Pepper's salary rate had increased to $13.81 per hour (Agency Exht. 2, 4). 
39. The Department credited Agent Pepper with 16 1/2 years • directly related work 
experience (with the Murray City Police Department) upon his hiring, and he had 17 years' 
experience when the grievance filing commenced (Grvts. Exhts. 47,48). 
40. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable for length of service and pay rate comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1,24,33). 
41. As of July 1990, Pepper's 17 years' directly related job experience exceeded 
Crawford's 7 years, 2 months; exceeded Hansen's 10 years, 10 months; and exceeded 
-10-
Morgan's 13 years, 10 months of directly related experience. 
42. Correspondingly, at the time of the grievance filing, Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81 
exceeded Crawford's $1123 by $2.58 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
43. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Hansen's $12.47 
by $134 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
44. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Morgan's $13.34 
by a more narrow $0.47 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
I. Comparable Randv Richins 
45. UDC hired Richins on July 11,1990, as an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, at the pay 
rate of $12.17 per hour (Agency Exht. 2). 
46. The Department credited Richins with 14 years, 8 months of directly related job 
experience based upon his prior law enforcement experience (Grvts. Exhts. 46, 48). 
47. Appellant Crawford selected Richins as a comparable for comparing her length 
of service and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
48. Richins • pay rate of $12.17 at the grievance filing exceeded Crawford' s $11.23 
by $0.94 (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
J. Additional General Findings 
49. In 1985, Gary W. DeLand became the executive director of the Department. 
Director DeLand established policy that resulted in greater law enforcement training, 
emphasis, and capabilmes for certain staff, including AP&P Agents. 
50. Director DeLand established a training academy within the Department that 
provided more stringent law enforcement and correctional training leading to Category II 
peace officer certification, in place of the former Category I training of prior years for 
AP&P Agents. 
51. To further emphasize the change to a higher level of peace officer standards 
within the Department, Director DeLand directed that law enforcement training and 
experience should be given equal weight with the more traditional AP&P roles of 
supervision and counseling in the recruitment of new AP&P Agents. 
52. Under Director DeLand, UDC's Field Operations Division created a new 
program known as the Intensive Supervision Unit (ISU). DeLand directed his managers to 
especially recruit new employees who had extensive law enforcement experience, particularly 
from sheriffs' offices, local police departments, and from other law enforcement sources and 
agencies, to staff the ISU. 
53. Some new recruits transferred into the ISU from other State agencies. Thus, 
Bassi and Benson, for example, are transferees who retained their prior agencies • pay rates, 
who continued their State employment as permanent employees with career service status, 
and who were precluded from needing to serve another probationary period. 
54. A few other newly hired agents had been recruited for AP&P duty in the ISU 
due to their lengthy law enforcement experience. Comparables Pepper, Richins and 
Bingham each had extensive law enforcement experience. At the time of their respective 
hirings, Pepper had 16 1/2 years1 law enforcement experience; Richins had 14 years, 8 
months; and Bingham had 14 years, 6 months. 
55. Bingham and Richins had been hired as AP&P Agents at Grades 19 and 21, 
while Pepper had been hired at Grade 23. 
56. Appellants Crawford, Hansen and Morgan selected the following comparables 
for their respective pay inequity comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33): 
Crawfprd Han^n Morgan 
Bassi Bassi Bassi 
Benson 
Bingham 
Pepper Pepper Pepper 
Richins 
57. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable. All four were at Grade 23 in July 1990. Appellantsf years of directly related 
experience and salary rates at the grievance filing compare with Pepperf s, as follows: 
Name Experience Salary Rates July 1990 
(years and months) 
Pepper 17-00 13.814 
Morgan 13-10 13.34 
Hansen 10-10 12.47 
Crawford 07-02 1123 
58. A bachelors degree in law enforcement or criminal justice meets the State's 
educational requirement for AP&P Agent service along with a half-dozen other fields of 
major study, or on a year-or-year work experience substitution (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15,45,49). 
Specified other designated "directly related experience" also qualifies new hires or 
transferees for job experience in addition to law enforcement and criminal justice. Some 
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of the original Grievants qualified for AP&P Agent placement based upon their directly 
related experience such as counseling, correctional officer, jail duty, etc., as alternatives to 
law enforcement experience. 
59. Some individual AP&P Agents perform a lesser amount of law enforcement 
duties, while others perform a greater amount (Grvts. Exht. 35, pp. 6-7; T. II, pp. 45). Thus, 
some AP&P Agents perform more at the law enforcement end of a continuum; others 
perform more at the social work/counseling end (T. II, pp. 62, 64 BAKSH; T. I, pp. 74-75 
McDONALD; T. Ill, pp. 310-11 GILLESPIE). 
60. State agency management, such as UDC officials, may determine how much or 
how little directly related work experience may be credited to new hires for given job titles, 
but must do so on a consistent, even-handed basis (T. I, pp. 73-75 McDONALD). 
61. Appellant Morgan holds a bachelor of science degree in the directly related 
academic field of sociology (Grvts. Exht. 33). Comparable Pepper received a bachelor of 
science degree apparently in the nondirectly related field of international business (Grvts. 
Exht. 42). Pepper • s prior law enforcement experience meets the DHRM Grade 23 AP&P 
Agent classification specification. Pepper fs 17 years1 directly related experience exceeds 
Morgan • s 13 years, ten monthsf AP&P Agent experience. Pepper • s $0.47 per hour more 
than Morgan's pay rate is not unreasonable, violative of rule or law, improper nor arbitrary. 
Pepperf s more than three years • directly related experience justifies his greater salary over 
Morgan's lesser pay rate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Those terms used in the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at 
Utali Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) §67-19-2, under the heading "Policy of state," such 
as "comparative merit" (3), "fair treatment" (5), and so forth, are broad policy statements. 
As broad policy statements of intent and purpose, they provide both guidance and 
philosophic credence. However, as very general policy statements, they do not contain a 
precise measurable gauge for assessing alleged violations of such terms as "merit 
principles," "fairness" or "inequity." Because these terms are used in a veiy broad and 
general context, they lack the specificity necessary to be self-executing. 
2. Human Resource Management Rules, July 1, 1990, (hereinafter UDHRM Rules9) 
defines the personnel action of a transfer as: "Movement of an employee within an agency 
or between agencies from one position to another position for which the employee qualifies, 
including a change of work location or organizational unit." (R468-1-1.) 
3. DHRM R468-5-5.(4) states that career service employees of one jurisdiction or 
merit system may transfer into another, including transferring into and between Utah's 
executive branch departments, which would include UDC. 
4. Bassi was placed in an AP&P Agent position by the Department under provision 
of a lateral transfer. Substantial evidence shows that Bassi was accorded continuous State 
employment from one merit system jurisdiction to another, specifically from the Juvenile 
Court to UDC. 
5. Both the pay rate and work experience comparisons between Crawford, Morgan 
and Hansen with Bassi1 s as AP&P Agents are inappropriate and legally insupportable. 
Bassi was not a "new hire" and his pay rate as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, was, in fact, only 
a continuation of his leaving pay rate from the Juvenile Court. 
6. R468-7-4.(7) states: "Individuals may not be offered salary increases to leave one 
position for another if the positions are of the same salary range whether in the same or a 
different agency." While it may be asserted that DHRM Rules are not applicable or even 
binding on judicial employees (R468-2-l.(l)), UDC treated Bassi as if he had already been 
an executive branch career service employee and the Department properly applied 
DHRM • s transfer provisions to Bassi• s employment circumstance. Thus, Bassi was not 
offered a salary increase to join UDC, but merely retained his former jurisdiction fs leaving 
pay rate upon entering AP&P service. No violation of rule or statute resulted. 
7. Appellants1 allegations of a pay rate inequity based upon Bassi1 s "hiring rate" 
are legally insupportable inasmuch as Bassi was accorded transfer status from the Juvenile 
Court, not new employee status. Appellants • premise of Bassi as a "new hire" is based 
upon a legally defective comparison, which precludes any measurement of similarly situated 
employment comparisons. Bassi vs transfer status and pay rate fully complied with 
DHRM • s transfer requirements. There was no violation of rule in setting Bassi • s starting 
pay rate. It was neither unreasonable nor inappropriate to begin Bassi • s employment with 
Field Operations by maintaining his Juvenile Court fs leaving pay rate. 
8. Benson clearly was not a "new hire." Agent Benson had been hired by UDC in 
1986 as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21. Later, the Department reclassified Benson 
as an Enforcement and Security Officer, also at Grade 21. In April 1988, Benson 
experienced an intra-departmental transfer into an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position. The 
grieving of a personnel action occurring in 1988 on the grievance filing date of July 26,1990, 
is untimely by Crawford (§67-19a-401(5)(a)). A grievance may only be filed within 20 
working days from the event giving rise to the grievance, or within 20 working days from 
knowledge of the event, but nevertheless, not more than one year after an event's 
occurrence (§67-19a-405(5)(b)). 
9. As Benson entered AP&P as an Agent, Grade 21, and the three Appellants were 
all at Grade 23 upon their grievance filing, the comparison, particularly Crawford's, is 
inappropriate. Appellants may only compare themselves with incumbents if they are in the 
same position title (i.e., AP&P Agent) and at the same grade level (i.e., Grade 23). 
Crawford' s comparison with Benson is fatally defective because she compared her Grade 23 
status to his initial Grade 21 status. Not until one year after his AP&P Agent appointment 
did Benson actually receive a promotion to Grade 23. 
10. UDC treated Benson as an intra-departmental transfer; as such, he was accorded 
all the rights and privileges of a career service employee who had been transferred pursuant 
to DHRM's R468-7-4.(7). Benson was not a new hire who began serving a probationary 
period as an AP&P Agent; instead, Benson actually continued his accrued annual leave, sick 
leave, career service status, and all the other entitlements of an employee who had already 
been vested with career service status. Crawford' s case against Benson is fatally flawed by 
untimeliness and an inappropriate position comparison, thus by law must fail. 
11. Crawford's comparison with Bingham's pay rate upon his being hired is 
untimely (§67-19a-401(5)(a) and (b)). Bingham was hired in 1988, and Crawford's 
grievance not filed until two years and nearly four months later in 1990. By law, that 
constitutes a fatally defective filing based upon an untimely event, which must result in 
Crawford's grievance being dismissed. 
12. Bingham was first hired by UDC as an AP&P Agent, Grade 19. Crawford was 
already at Grade 23. Crawford's comparison to Bingham is inappropriate due to differing 
position levels and salary grades. During a two year period (1988-90), Bingham received 
two promotions, first to Grade 21 then to Grade 23. These two promotions substantially 
increased Bingham' s pay rate over his initial hiring rate of $1037. But for Bingham' s two 
promotions subsequent to his hiring, his pay rate at the grievance filing ($12.59) would not 
likely have exceeded Crawford's by $136 per hour as it did. 
13. The Department was justified in setting Bingham's starting pay rate at $1037 
due to his 14 years • prior law enforcement experience. 
14. Pepper1 s 17 years1 directly related law enforcement experience reasonably 
justifies his higher pay rate of $13.81 over each of the Appellantsf lesser rates. Based upon 
Pepper's greater law enforcement service length, his higher pay rate of $13.28 upon entry 
to AP&P Agent service was neither arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, nor an abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, the record evidence does not support any claim to a violation of 
either a personnel rule or a statutory provision. 
15. Prior to July 1,1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) stated: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to the midpoint of the approved range. 
The department head is responsible for providing funding and 
for preventing inequities as determined by agency management. 
Effective July 1, 1990, DHRMfs R468-7-3.(2) was amended to read: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum pay of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority at their discretion to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. Hiring above the minimum of the range shall 
not be used as justification to increase the salary of current 
encumbents [sic] except where approved market data supports 
such increases. (Emphasis supplied to amended wording.) 
16. The amended language of R468-7-3.(2), effective July 1, 1990, eliminated the 
specific responsibility of the department head for "preventing inequities as determined by 
agency management." The "anti-inequity" proscription was eliminated prior to the 
grievance filing on July 26, 1990. 
17. Claims arising out of the "anti-inequity" rule prior to July 1, 1990, may include 
proven economic losses. However, any alleged losses would have to be quantified and 
limited to back pay and accompanying benefits, not general psychological damages nor 
speculative considerations having an impact only on future prospects. 
18. Appellants shoulder the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is substantial 
evidence (§67-19a-406(2)). 
19. The three Appellants must be able to identify specific new hires whose starting 
pay rate differentials relative to theirs cannot be objectively justified. 
20. Department officials did not act in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable, nor did they violate any administrative rule or statue when crediting the 
-16-
comparables for their prior law enforcement experience upon their being hired or 
transferred into AP&P Agent positions. To credit the comparables for their actual law 
enforcement experience fell within the acceptable ambit of management prerogative. 
21. All three Appellants selected Bassi as a comparable. Crawford also selected 
Benson as a comparable. Both Bassi and Benson were current State employees who had 
transferred from one State agency to another. Bassi and Benson retained their prior 
individual pay rates after being transferred. By neither increasing nor decreasing Bassi's 
and Benson • s pay rates, the Department complied with DHRM • s R468-7-4.(7) (Transfers). 
Therefore, Bassi and Benson are not appropriate comparables for any of the three 
Appellants. 
22. All three Appellants, Crawford, Hansen and Morgan, selected Pepper as a 
comparable. At the grievance filing, Pepper had 17 years' directly related experience 
compared with Crawford »s 7 years and 2 months; Hansen's 10 years and 10 months; and 
Morgan's 13 years and 10 months. Pepper's more extensive directly related experience 
adequately justifies his higher pay rate. Given Pepper's greater directly related work 
experience, the difference in pay rates is reasonable and rational. 
23. Crawford also selected Richins as a comparable. Richins was hired on July 11, 
1990, subsequent to the elimination of the so-called "anti-inequity" portion of the pre-
July 1,1990 version of R468-7-3.(2). 
24. Crawford' s selection of Richins for wage comparison was inappropriate because 
Crawford was then positioned on Grade 23 while Richins was hired on Grade 21. 
Furthermore, Richins had 14 years, 8 months of directly related work experience, while 
Crawford had less than half as much with 7 years, 2 months. In light of Richins' greater 
directly related work experience (including law enforcement), no inequity existed between 
Richins' and Crawford's pay rates at the grievance filing. 
25. Crawford also selected Bingham as a comparable. This comparison is 
inappropriate because Crawford was on Grade 23, while Bingham was hired at a Grade 21. 
Additionally, Bingham had 14 years, 6 months of directly related experience at his hiring as 
compared with Crawford's 7 years, 2 months' experience. Therefore, Crawford's 
comparison to Bingham is acutely flawed. 
26. It properly falls within the managerial prerogative of agency management to 
determine relevant qualifications for agency assignments and staffing, including the 
qualifications and criteria appropriate to recruiting and selecting AP&P Agents so long as 
such qualifications are reasonable and rational Pursuant to DHRMf s classification system 
and its promulgated classification specifications, State agencies, including UDC, may assess 
applications for filling positions. 
27. UDC complied with DHRM ^classification system and recruiting strictures. It 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for Director DeLand to place prior law 
enforcement experience on a par with prior AP&P Agent experience, or even other types 
of relevant correctional experience, including counseling. 
28. UDC considered, evaluated, and credited educational background for purposes 
of qualifying persons to meet DHRMf s "minimum qualifications" (MQs) for AP&P Agent 
positions. The Department was not required by law (neither by statutory provision nor 
administrative rule), or by UDC • s own policies and procedures, to credit equally years of 
educational experience along with directly related work experience for purposes of salary 
setting. The three Appellants have not shown a violation of any statutory provision, 
administrative rule or promulgated policy or procedure in the comparablesf hiring process. 
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing any direct, actionable, unreasonable, 
or unjustified inequity, including any personnel rule violation, even with timeliness questions 
aside. 
29. The hiring of Bingham, Pepper and Richins, along with the transfers of Bassi and 
Benson, did not create pay inequities for Appellants Crawford, Hansen or Morgan. 
Consequently, their appeals must fail and be denied. 
30. The three Appellants1 claims of pay rate inequities anent any or all the 
comparables, are not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Appellants• complaints are 
determined to be without merit, and their grievances fail for reason of not meeting their 
burden of proof by showing that they have been directly harmed by the Departments 
employment practices (§67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii))f or that they have been subjected to any 
personnel rule violation regarding applicable salary provisions. 
31. The Departments acceptance of certified law enforcement experience for 
placing "new hires" above the entry pay rates and/or up to the midpoint was accomplished 
in conformity with both DHRM's Rules and DHRM's General Classified State Pay Plan. 
Furthermore, that acceptance was not an unreasonable exercise of managerial discretion. 
The Department is entitled to some reasonable discretion in assessing the type of experience 
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most applicable to hiring AP&P Agents as long as such discretion does not violate DHRM's 
Rules nor evidence inconsistent or unequal treatment within a department's work force. 
32. The Department's officials did not act inappropriately, unlawfully or 
unreasonably in determining that directly related law enforcement experience may be used 
as a substantial factor in setting individual salary rates of newly hired AP&P Agents. 
33. The State's, i.e., DHRM's, classification specifications for AP&P Agents at 
Grades 17, 19, 21 and 23 (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15) along with other documentary evidence 
(Grvts. Exhts. 2,35,45 and 49) constitute more than sufficient substantial evidence to show 
that law enforcement experience or law enforcement education, or a combination of both, 
are acceptable in meeting minimum qualifications (MQs) for AP&P Agent entry 
requirements. 
34. The Department relied upon directly related experience, not education, in setting 
newly hired AP&P Agents' individual pay rates. This practice conforms with DHRM' s 
rules and policy, and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of discretion under the facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
35. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Pepper • s greater salary rate is not 
unwarranted vis-a-vis Morgan's slightly lesser pay rate given his more than three years of 
directly related experience over Morgan • s total directly related experience. 
36. Pursuant to R137-1-21 D. 2., the Board concludes as a matter of law that its 
hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies, rules and statutes. Furthermore, the 
Board concludes that the Step 5 Decision is both reasonable and rational based upon the 
totality of its factual findings and the record evidence as a whole. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Merit System Terms Within the USPMA 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision errs by failing to interpret certain USPMA 
terms consistent with some of its overall policy provisions. Crawford, Hansen and Morgan 
claim that the following evidentiary paragraph contains reversible error: 
The Hearing Officer concluded in the Hansen case and applies 
the same conclusion to the Crawford case that general language 
in State law and Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM) rules promising a personnel system based upon 
•merit principles" and manifesting "fairness" and eschewing 
•discrimination," while valid as statements of policy and intent, 
do not comprise enforceable rules of managerial conduct (Ibid., 
P. 2) 
Appellants are referring to the following twofold provisions at §67-19-2: 
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or 
achievement governs the selection and advancement of 
employees in Utah State government and that employees be 
rewarded for performance in a manner that will encourage 
excellence and strengthen the system. (Appellants • emphasis.) 
* * * 
(6) It is the policy of this state to insure its employees 
opportunities for satisfying careers and fair treatment based on 
the value of each employee • s services. (Appellants • emphasis.) 
Appellants maintain that the Hearing Officer erred by holding that the above-quoted 
provisions are "statements of policy and intent," but are not self-executing or enforceable 
rules of managerial conduct. By the Hearing Officer's so holding, Appellants also posit 
that the trier of fact was "predispos[ed] toward favoring management in this particular 
grievance" (Brief, pp. 6-7). 
Appellants appear to read the above statutory provisions according to the way in 
which they desire to have them read, rather than giving these words their plain meaning as 
the Legislature intended (§68-3-11). For example, each of the seven subsections under §67-
19-2 begins, "It is the policy of this state . . ." (emphasis supplied). The CSRB Hearing 
Officer neither stated nor implied that merit system principles are inapplicable to grievance 
hearings. Rather, the CSRB examiner simply stated that these provisions do not comprise 
enforceable rules per se, but constitute broad policy statements. Analogously, in this 
tribunal • s most recent decision we made the following statement about these same statutory 
provisions and terms: "These, of course, are broad policy statements rather than explicit 
legal provisions." (Syhria Tlxompson v. Utafi Department of Employment Security, 
5 CSRB/H.0.43 (1993), p. 20.) The introductory statutory phrasing so affirms in each 
instance. Moreover, the record of the entire Step 5 proceedings for both the Crawford and 
Hansen cases evidences many instances where the Hearing Officer allowed all Grievants to 
amend their grievance statements, to search out "comparables" of their choosing not 
previously designated in their grievance statements, to disregard strict time lines, to reject 
several motions to dismiss on various grounds (some of which may have been proper 
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grounds), and to allow Grievants their opportunity for a fair hearing despite some 
procedural and jurisdictional elements working against Grievants. In consequence, the 
Board concludes as a matter of law that the Hearing Officer did not commit reversible error 
regarding any USPMA provisions under §67-19-2 as alleged by Appellants. Nor does the 
entire case record show any predisposition to Agency management. 
B. Law Enforcement Experience as AP&P Agent Experience 
According to Appellants, The Hearing Officers analysis appears to confuse the 
issue of meeting minimum qualifications for the Adult Probation and Parole position with 
the issue of what are equitable salaries for persons occupying an Adult Probation and 
[PJarole position," (Brief, p. 8). The three Appellants as well as the other 17 Grievants 
claimed that their job duties comprise only ten to twenty percent law enforcement duties. 
Therefore, argue Appellants, the newer comparables as AP&P Agents should not receive 
credit for their prior years of law enforcement experience, otherwise salary inequities arise. 
In Finding number 58, we found substantial evidence showing that law enforcement 
experience qualified as one of many types of directly related experience for AP&P Agent 
service as set forth on DHRMf s classification specifications. Although directly related law 
enforcement experience justified above-entry level pay rates for the comparables, many of 
the Grievants also received credit for other types of directly related qualifying work 
experiences for being counselors, correctional officers, and county jailers, etc. The DHRM 
classification specifications for AP&P Agents, Grades 17-23, provided a variety of directly 
related work experiences that benefitted many of the original 20 Grievants with additional 
years of service beyond just their AP&P Agent years • service. Bartell received credit for 
his prior Correctional Officer and his Enforcement Officer service. Crawford received credit 
for her Salt Lake County jailer tenure. Hansen received credit for his prior half-way house 
Counselor years. 
Most of the original 20 Grievants defined their pure law enforcement duties as 
consisting of between only ten to twenty percent of their overall AP&P Agent duties. In 
contrast, comparables Bingham, Pepper and Richins, each of who had over 14 years' police 
experience, placed their law enforcement duties as AP&P Agents at 70-80 percent or more. 
They even viewed the non-ISU agents as performing at least 40-50 percent law enforcement 
duties. Human Resource Directors McDonald and Baksh spoke in terms of more social 
work/counseling at one end of the AP&P Agent spectrum and almost pure police work at 
the other end. Yet all are AP&P Agents whose particular duties and assignments may range 
up or down the continuum as assignments change from time to time. The evidence in the 
record does not support Appellants1 argument that the Hearing Officer erred in 
determining that law enforcement experience was not directly related AP&P Agent work. 
The weight of the evidence, in fact, supports the opposite finding. 
The Board concludes, as a matter of law, that law enforcement experience and its 
qualifying variants as found on DHRM • s class specs, such as police science, criminal justice 
and correctional supervision, directly relate to AP&P Agent duties and may be considered 
for assessing prior experience, and hence for setting pay rates of newly hired agents. 
C Assessing Status of Transferees; 
Appellants% third issue is that the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to compare the 
Appellantsf pay rates with those of Bassi and Benson. The latter comparables transferred 
into AP&P Agent service, one from Juvenile Court and the other from within UDCf s 
Institutional Operations Division to the Field Operations Division. As shown in 
Conclusions, above, numbers 2-10, Bassi • s and Bensonf s entry pay rates into AP&P Agent 
status were governed by DHRM's R468-M (Transfer"), R468-5-5.(4) and R468-7-4.(7). 
Accordingly, neither Bassi nor Benson received pay rate increases upon their being 
transferred into Field Operations to AP&P Agent positions. The proper administrative rules 
were fully complied with and no violations occurred. Therefore, Appellantsf complaint 
regarding any impropriety as to Bassi1 s or Benson's pay rate status is moot. Appellants 
err in asserting that a 'transferee [should] not be treated differently than a private applicant 
for the position" (Brief, p. 14). Instead, transferees are entitled to those rights as set forth 
in DHRM's Rides (1990) at R468-5-4.(3) -(4) and -5-5. 
P, Alleged Pay Rgte Inequities; Crawford and Pepper 
Appellants maintain that the Step 5 Decision erred in limiting the pay rate 
comparisons between Appellants and the comparables solely to work experience and not to 
education also. The decision below concluded that if Morgan • s 13 years, 10 months» work 
experience was added cumulatively to her four years spent in obtaining a directly related 
bachelor's degree in sociology, her cumulative total would be greater than comparable 
Pepper1 s 17 years1 directly related experience, where no cumulative total included a 
bachelor's degree in a related field. In that light, the Hearing Officer opined that: 
That one differential of $0.47 per hour does not seem sufficient 
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to refute the management decision that education be used as a 
minimum requirement for entry and that salaries be based on 
directly related experience, Grievants having been credited for 
experience in counselling and other activities in addition to 
probation and parole supervision. (Page 5.) 
The Board agrees with Appellant Morgan that a $0.47 per hour difference would not be 
de minimis absent any justification for the difference. Albeit the Hearing Officer fs analysis 
is correct, and no salary inequity exists between Morgan1 s and Pepper fs pay rates. The 
trier of fact concluded that in UDC only directly related experience applies to adjusting new 
hires • entry pay rates-exclusive of years spent in getting an education, advanced degrees, 
or other credentials, etc. Human resource management officials McDonald, McGowan and 
Baksh each testified that only directly related work experience is used in setting initial pay 
rates, not educational attainments. Educational years are applied only against the minimum 
qualifications for each job titlef s classification specification. The Hearing Officer noted that 
once an applicant had met the position • s educational prerequisite, then education was not 
used again as a management tool or criterion for setting salary ("does not seem sufficient 
to refute the management decision that education be used as a minimum requirement for 
entry and that salaries be based on directly-related experience . . . " ) . In sum, the Step 5 
Decision held that Morgan may not add her four years for a college degree to her 13 years, 
10 months1 work experience and thus surpass Pepper fs 17 years1 work experience. We 
agree. Pepperf s higher salary rate is reasonable, justifiable, not violative of rule or law, nor 
an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, to raise any issue in 1990 at grievance filing regarding the salary freezes of 
FY1986-88 is untimely. Matters such as these are governed by the administrative rules 
applicable at the contemporary time period. 
DECISION 
Appellant Crawford1 s pay equity comparison with Benson fails because: 
(1) Benson fs entry into Field Operations and AP&P Agent service was through an intra-
departmental lateral transfer, and (2) Benson began as a Grade 21 Agent while Crawford 
held the higher level of Agent, Grade 23—an inappropriate comparison, and (3), the event 
giving rise to the grievance (Benson1 s pay rate at transfer) was untimely filed. 
Ms. Crawford• s salary equity comparison with Bingham is fatally defective because: 
(1) the event giving rise to the grievance, i.e., Bingham's hiring, is untimely given that the 
hiring occurred in April 1988 and the grievance filing in July 1990, (2) Bingham was 
originally hired as an Agent, Grade 19, while Crawford held the higher level of Agent, 
Grade 23, making an improper comparison, and (3) Bingham had twice as many years of 
directly related experience as Crawford. 
Agent Crawford "s comparison with Richins is impermissible and defective because: 
(1) Richins was hired after the DHRM provision at R468-7-3.(2) was amended on July 1, 
1990, when the department directors former obligation to prevent salary "inequities" 
under the so-called •anti-inequity" proscription was removed, and (2) Richins, upon his 
hiring, had twice as much directly related experience as Crawford. 
The comparison cases of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Bassi are wholly 
defective because Bassi was accepted into Field Operations and AP&P Agent duty through 
an interjurisdictional, merit system transfer of a State employee from one State agency to 
another, at no pay increase, but with retention of tenure and career service status. 
Finally, the comparisons of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Pepper are defective 
because Pepper had been properly credited with more years of directly related experience 
than each Appellant. 
Based upon the entire record evidence, Appellants appeal must be denied with the 
Step 5 Decision being affirmed. There is no appropriate remedy to the Appellants1 
grievances. 
-24-
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this J/f day of August 1993 
Bhice 
Chairman 
Career Service Review Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. Grievant Dale E. Hansen in the UPEA case is not to be confused with grievant Michael Hansen in the 
AFSCME (Hansen) companion case. 
2. The Step 5 Decision assigned Hansen with ten years seven months total directly-related AP&P Agent 
experience (Table 1, p. 4). However, Agency Exht. 3 shows the Department crediting Agent Hansen with ten 
years ten months directly-related experience. 
3. Hansen testified that his July 1990 pay rate was $1233 per hour (T. I p. 18), and so stated and affirmed in 
his Summary Status document (Grvt. Exht. 1). Nevertheless, that figure is in error; Hansen's actual pay rate was 
$12.47 as shown on Agency Exht. 5, an individual departmental computer-generated salary history on Hansen. 
4. Pepper's salary rate upon being hired on December 23,1989, was $13.28; as of July 1,1990, his pay rate had 
increased to $13.81. During the Step 5 proceedings most, if not all, pay rate comparisons between all the 
Grievants and comparables were measured from the date of the grievance filing—July 26,1990. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unamotated §£M6b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unamotated 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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